Opinion
Case No. 5D18-3984
08-23-2019
Roderick D'Anthony WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Valarie Linnen, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Valarie Linnen, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
LAMBERT, J.
Roderick D'Anthony Williams makes his third appearance before this court regarding his convictions following trial for first-degree murder and kidnapping that he committed while he was a juvenile. Williams is presently serving a life sentence for the first-degree murder, with a judicial review hearing after fifteen years, and a concurrent fifty-year prison sentence for his kidnapping conviction, with a review hearing after twenty years. In this appeal, Williams argues that sections 775.082(1)(b)2. and 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2014), are unconstitutional because the timing of his respective review hearings under these statutes is grossly disproportionate based on the relative severity of his two offenses and thus fails to offer him a meaningful opportunity for release based on his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. For the following reasons, we decline to address the constitutionality of these statutes and affirm Williams's sentences.
Section 921.1402 was enacted in 2014, while section 775.082 was simultaneously amended in 2014 to add subsection (1)(b), and neither section 921.1402 nor section 775.082(1)(b)2. has been amended since they were first enacted in 2014. See ch. 2014-220 §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla.
Williams was initially sentenced by the trial court to serve life in prison on his first-degree murder conviction and to serve a concurrent fifty years' imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Williams's convictions without comment. Williams v. State (Williams I ), 171 So. 3d 143, 144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). We did, however, reverse his sentence for the first-degree murder and remand for the trial court to hold an individualized sentencing hearing under the then-recently-enacted juvenile sentencing laws to consider whether Williams's life sentence remained an appropriate sentence. Id. at 145. Also, because the jury did not find that Williams actually possessed and discharged a firearm during the commission of the first-degree murder, we specifically directed the trial court to make a separate written finding under section 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as to whether Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id. Based upon this determination, Williams would either be entitled to: a judicial review hearing after twenty-five years under section 921.1402(2)(a) if the trial court found that he had actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim; or a judicial review hearing after fifteen years under section 921.1402(2)(c) if the trial court had found that he did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim.
The legality of Williams's fifty-year prison sentence for kidnapping was not raised in the first appeal.
The verdict also did not differentiate as to whether Williams committed premeditated or felony first-degree murder.
Prior to his resentencing, Williams moved pursuant to Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), to empanel a jury to make the aforementioned factual findings as to whether he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. In Alleyne , the United States Supreme Court held that any factor that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an "element" of the crime, not a "sentencing factor," and must be determined by a jury. Id. at 106–07, 133 S.Ct. 2151.
Williams contended that Alleyne was applicable in his case for two reasons. First, under section 775.082(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes, a finding that he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim would mandate a minimum sentence of at least forty years' imprisonment but, without this finding, there is no required minimum sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b)2, Fla. Stat. Second, as a juvenile offender, a finding that Williams had actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim would entitle him to a judicial review hearing and potential release to probation after twenty-five years. See § 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat. However, if it was found that he did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim, then, under section 921.1402(2)(c), Williams would be entitled to a review hearing and potential release to probation in fifteen years (provided the underlying sentence exceeded fifteen years). Thus, depending solely upon this specific factual finding made by the trial court, Williams faced either a forty-year minimum prison sentence or no minimum sentence and a judicial review hearing, and possible early release, after either twenty-five years or fifteen years.
The trial court denied Williams's motion to empanel the jury. The court reasoned that in Williams I , our court had specifically ordered the trial court, and not a jury, to make the factual finding as to whether Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The trial court thereafter entered an order finding that Williams actually killed and intended to kill the victim, and it resentenced Williams to serve life in prison, with a review hearing after twenty-five years. The trial court also resentenced Williams to serve a concurrent fifty years' imprisonment on his kidnapping conviction, but it included in that sentence a judicial review hearing after twenty years.
Williams appealed his resentencing, asserting that Alleyne required that this factual issue as to whether he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim must be determined by the jury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirmed. Williams v. State (Williams II ), 211 So. 3d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In doing so, our court observed that although Williams's Alleyne argument appeared to have merit, in Falcon v. State , 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015), the Florida Supreme Court, under similar circumstances where the record did not conclusively establish that the juvenile offender had actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim, nor had the jury found the defendant to have been in actual possession of a firearm during the commission of the subject crime, directed the trial court to make the factual finding as to whether the juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Williams II , 211 So. 3d at 1073. Additionally, because it did not appear to us that either party in Falcon had specifically addressed the applicability of the Alleyne decision, we certified a question of great public importance to our supreme court as to whether Alleyne required the jury, and not the trial court, to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b) of whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question. The court held that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b) of whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim, Williams v. State (Williams III ), 242 So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla. 2018), and receded from its earlier decision in Falcon to the extent that its decision there concluded that this determination was to be made by the trial court. Id. at 288 n.7. The court found that based upon the jury instructions that were given, including the principals instruction that allowed the jury to find Williams guilty of first-degree murder even if he did not actually shoot the victim, and the general verdict form, which did not differentiate between whether Williams was convicted of premeditated or felony first-degree murder, there was no clear jury finding that Williams had actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id. at 288–89. It therefore concluded that an Alleyne violation had occurred. Id. at 289.
The court then analyzed whether an Alleyne violation is subject to harmless error review. Id. It concluded that it is, and proceeded to conduct a harmless-error analysis. Id. at 289–90. The court determined that the record failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim; thus, the Alleyne violation in this case was not harmless. Id. at 292.
The court next addressed the appropriate remedy for an Alleyne violation. Id. Williams had suggested to the court two alternatives: either empanel a new jury to make this requisite factual finding or simply resentence him under section 775.082(1)(b) 2, which, by the terms of this statute, equates to a finding that Williams did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim. Id. As previously discussed, resentencing pursuant to this statute would entitle Williams to a judicial review hearing after fifteen years under section 921.1402(2)(c) and further avoids the forty-year minimum prison sentence requirement.
The court held that a resentencing under section 775.082(1)(b) 2. is the appropriate remedy for an Alleyne violation that is not harmless. Id. at 293. It resultingly quashed our decision in Williams II and remanded the case back to our court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." Id. at 294. We then withdrew our mandate in Williams II and remanded the case to the circuit court, with directions to proceed in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's opinion.
After we sent the case back to the circuit court for resentencing, Williams filed a motion in that court to have sections 775.082(1)(b) 2 and 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes, declared unconstitutional. He argued that the sentencing interplay between these two statutes failed to provide constitutionally "graduate[d] and proportionate" punishment because it allowed a juvenile offender convicted of a capital offense, such as first-degree murder, but who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim, a review hearing after fifteen years under section 775.082(1)(b) 2; yet a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense, such as kidnapping, was not entitled to a review hearing under section 921.1402(2)(d) until after twenty years. Williams further contended that section 775.082(1)(b) 2 is unconstitutional as applied to him because he would receive only a single judicial review hearing after fifteen years for his first-degree murder conviction, while under section 921.1402(2)(d), he would receive a judicial review hearing after twenty years on his kidnapping conviction and, if unsuccessful at that hearing, a second review hearing ten years after his initial review hearing.
The trial court denied Williams's motion to declare these statutes to be unconstitutional. The court then conducted Williams's individualized sentencing hearing. It concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment remained appropriate for Williams's first-degree murder conviction. The court entered a separate order explaining its reasoning for this sentence and addressed the various factors that it considered under section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes, in reaching its sentencing decision. The trial court then entered a corrected judgment imposing the life sentence that included a provision that Williams would now be entitled to a judicial review hearing fifteen years from the date of his original sentence. This appeal ensued.
We first note that Williams has not challenged his life sentence in this appeal. Instead, he argues that the trial court erred in finding the statutory interplay between sections 775.082(1)(b) 2 and 921.1402(2)(c) to be constitutional. Williams asserts that having his judicial review hearing and possible release to probation after fifteen years on his first-degree murder conviction, yet having to wait twenty years for his review hearing for his kidnapping conviction, results in "grossly disproportionate" sentences, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to have his punishments "graduated and proportionate." See Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ("Embodied in the Constitution's [Eighth Amendment] ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportionate to [the] offense.’ ") (alteration in original). To remedy this alleged constitutional violation, Williams asks that, under the rule of lenity, we afford him a judicial review hearing after fifteen years for both of his convictions.
"The rule of lenity is a ‘fundamental tenet of Florida law regarding the construction of criminal statutes, which weighs in favor of the defendant.’ " State v. Weeks , 202 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Polite v. State , 973 So. 2d 1107, 1112 (Fla. 2007) ). It requires that "[a]ny ambiguity or situations in which statutory language is susceptible to differing constructions must be resolved in favor of the person charged with an offense." Id. at 9 (quoting Kasischke v. State , 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008) ). The rule is codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (2014).
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When addressing whether sentences are constitutionally graduated and proportionate, "courts must presume [constitutional] validity when assessing a punishment that was selected by a democratically elected legislature." Lightbourne v. McCollum , 969 So. 2d 326, 336 (Fla. 2007) (citing Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 175, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) ). We do this because "[a]ny evaluation of the proportionality of a sentence to its associated crime involves an often imprecise analysis" and "[t]he length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative." Hale v. State , 630 So. 2d 521, 526 (Fla. 1993) (second alteration in original).
First, we observe that, to prove his claim that the sentences with the differing review hearings are grossly disproportionate, Williams would bear the difficult burden of demonstrating that the legislature could not reasonably conclude that a juvenile offender who personally kidnapped a victim should receive a later judicial review hearing than a juvenile offender who was a principal to first-degree felony murder but did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim. Nevertheless, because we find that we can effectively dispose of this case on other grounds, we decline to pass on the constitutionality of these statutes. See Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State , 115 So. 3d 261, 280 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that it is "[a] settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds" (quoting Singletary v. State , 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975) )); see also Williston Highlands Dev. Corp. v. Hogue , 277 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1973) ("It is a fundamental principle that Courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute where the case before them may be disposed of upon any other ground.").
To place the question before us in context, Williams is asking that we declare section 775.082(1)(b) 2 unconstitutional because its provision allowing for a fifteen-year judicial review hearing is not graduated and proportionate, despite requesting and essentially receiving the fifteen-year judicial review hearing from the Florida Supreme Court in his most recent appeal. As previously indicated, that court explicitly determined that Williams was entitled to resentencing under section 775.082(1)(b) 2, Williams III , 242 So. 3d at 294. It seems to us, and we so conclude, that if Williams had constitutional concerns with being resentenced under this statute because, unlike section 921.1402(2)(d), it only provided for one judicial review hearing or that the fifteen-year judicial review hearing in his case was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his twenty-year review hearing for his kidnapping conviction, then he could and should have made this argument to the Florida Supreme Court. We agree with the First District Court's recent observation in Copeland v. State , 240 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) :
Now, on remand, it is hardly this court's or the trial court's place to depart from
the sentencing framework [under the juvenile sentencing laws] explicitly ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, or to declare its remand order unconstitutional. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. Inc., v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 328 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1975) (noting that trial courts lack authority to deviate from an appellate court's mandate); Ketcher v. Ketcher , 198 So. 3d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ("Where, as here, the final judgment is reversed and remanded with specific instructions, the lower court has authority to conduct further proceedings ... but the court cannot exceed the specific bounds of that instruction.").
Id. at 60.
Accordingly, because we conclude that Williams is essentially requesting that our court determine the Florida Supreme Court's earlier remand order to be unconstitutional, which we have no authority to do, we affirm his present sentences.
AFFIRMED.
EISNAUGLE and HARRIS, JJ., concur.