Opinion
122732
08-22-2018
Calvin WILLIAMS, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant.
Claimant's attorney: SUGARMAN LAW FIRM, LLP, By: Sam A. Elbadawi, Esq., Zachary M. Mattison, Esq. Defendant's attorney: HON. BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD, Attorney General for the State of New York, By: G. Lawrence Dillon, Assistant Attorney General
Claimant's attorney: SUGARMAN LAW FIRM, LLP, By: Sam A. Elbadawi, Esq., Zachary M. Mattison, Esq.
Defendant's attorney: HON. BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD, Attorney General for the State of New York, By: G. Lawrence Dillon, Assistant Attorney General
Walter Rivera, J.
Claimant seeks damages for the catastrophic injuries he sustained during his incarceration at Mid-State Correctional Facility (Mid-State) when, on January 11, 2013, he dropped a barbell totaling 495 pounds during a squat lifting exercise resulting in the squat rack flipping over and claimant falling backwards and hitting the back of his neck on the barbell. The trial of this claim was bifurcated and this Decision pertains solely to the issue of liability.
Claimant, an experienced weight lifter, who considered himself to be an expert at lifting weights, argues that the squat rack was defective because, according to the manufacturer, BSN Sports, Inc., the squat rack was designed to safely withstand 800 pounds of weight; yet the squat rack flipped over when claimant was squat lifting 495 pounds with a barbell positioned behind his shoulders and he dropped the barbell which struck the squat rack. Claimant further argues that the squat rack should have been fastened to the floor and that defendant made the squat rack less stable and more dangerous by placing it on top of cow matting over the concrete floor. Claimant also argues that defendant was negligent in its inspection and maintenance of the squat rack and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case.
Claimant commenced an action against the manufacturer (Williams v. Sports Supply Group, Inc. , Sup Ct, Queens County, Index No. 9624/13). The matter was settled in 2016 and the action was discontinued.
Defendant maintains that it did not have notice, either actual or constructive, of a foreseeably dangerous condition regarding the squat rack as the squat rack was safely used on the cow matting without complaints or injuries for more than 20 years prior to claimant's accident. Defendant also maintains that the squat rack was as safe as it appeared to be; it was not designed to be fastened to the floor and defendant did not create a dangerous condition by placing the squat rack on cow matting, rather than directly on the concrete floor. Finally, defendant argues that claimant assumed the risks associated with attempting to do a squat exercise with 495 pounds of weight without the aid of a spotter and that claimant is not entitled to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The relevant facts are set forth as follows. At the time of the accident claimant was 35 years old, 5 feet, 8 inches tall and weighed 180 pounds (Ex. 27, pp 7, 61). Claimant was an experienced weight lifter who was self-described as an expert (id. at 74-75). Prior to his incarceration, he belonged to several health clubs that he frequented on a regular basis (id. at 11-12). During his incarceration, he used the facility gym sometimes twice a day for one year prior to his accident and performed squat lifting exercises on a regular basis (id. at 14, 65-66). During claimant's routine workouts, he squat lifted up to 520 pounds (id. at 34). The most claimant squat lifted at the facility was 550 pounds (id. at 31, 34). Claimant sometimes used spotters if he knew that they were trained to act as a spotter (id. at 22). He testified that he had used spotters for squat lifting 550 pounds at the facility (id. at 77). On one prior occasion, claimant had to release the weight he was squat lifting without the use of a spotter (id. at 64).
On the date in issue, claimant declined another inmate's offer to assist as a spotter (id. at 55-57). Claimant squat lifted 520 pounds and then proceeded with his routine of scaling the weight back to 495 pounds. Claimant testified that he successfully performed approximately seven repetitions with 495 pounds before the accident and then got stuck in the eighth repetition (id. at 58). He explained that "stuck" meant that he could not move forward to rerack the barbell (id. at 84-85). He testified that:
"I performed my 495 and then I got stuck at the upright position and then I released ... the barbell from behind my shoulders ... I saw the ... barbell hit the left peg ... and I immediately saw the front right side of the squat rack literally flipped up, pushed me backwards and then when I woke out of conscious [sic] there I was ... I was on the floor. The squat rack was literally on top of me" (id. at 45-46, 58-59, 86, 87).
Claimant testified that a photograph received in evidence as Exhibit 7 did not accurately depict the squat rack on top of him (id. at 48). Claimant also testified that the photograph received in evidence as Exhibit 8 indicated to claimant that the squat rack had been moved after his accident (id. at 49).
At trial, claimant was shown the rules posted in the facility gym which stated: "DO NOT DROP OR SLAM WEIGHTS" and "ALWAYS USE A SPOTTER" (Ex. 18). Claimant testified that he was unaware of the posted rules (Ex. 18; Ex. 27, pp 76-77).
Claimant testified that, prior to his accident, he had observed the squat rack vibrate or move on a few occasions, but he had never reported his observations or complained to any correction officers about the instability of the squat rack (Ex. 27, pp 29, 80). He also continued to use the squat rack despite his observations.
Claimant concedes that the testimony of inmates Royan Smith and Luis Sierra presents conflicting accounts as to when claimant released the barbell (Claimant's Post-Trial Memorandum, p 17). Smith testified that claimant's knees were bent and that he was leaning slightly forward when he released the barbell (Ex. 29, p 24). Smith further testified that the barbell "fell on the squat rack and the whole thing tipped over" (id. at 24-26). Sierra testified at his deposition that claimant went down into a squat and that he could not bring the weight back up so he let the weight go and "the weight fell" and hit the back of the squat rack and it flipped (Ex. 33, p 7).
It is noted that Smith provided two written statements regarding claimant's accident. The first statement does not mention any complaints made by Smith to defendant's staff about the squat rack (Ex. 23). Smith's second statement, however, states that prior to claimant's accident, Smith "suggested to [Correction Officer] Kevin Buttimer that the squat rack should be bolted to the floor. He told me that the squat rack was fine" (Ex. 24). When questioned on cross-examination as to why Smith's second statement differed from his first, Smith testified that he corrected his first statement after meeting with claimant's counsel and that the meeting prompted Smith to make a second statement which referenced Smith's complaint to Correction Officer Buttimer. Upon further questioning on cross-examination, Smith could not specify any time frame regarding when he communicated his complaint to Correction Officer Buttimer.
Luis Sierra's testimony was called into question by defendant's Exhibit B which indicates that, despite Sierra's testimony as to his eyewitness account of claimant's accident, Sierra was assigned as a food service worker from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on the date and during the time of claimant's accident.
Claimant also presented the testimony of Jeremy Weckerle, an inmate who used the facility gym almost daily prior to claimant's accident. Weckerle is 5 feet, 11 inches tall and weighs approximately 215 pounds and engages in boxing and working out with a heavy bag on a regular basis (T:44). Weckerle testified at his deposition that "you should always use a spotter" (T:59). Weckerle never complained to correction officers about the instability of the squat rack and never observed it tip over prior to claimant's accident (T:60). Weckerle's testimony, as set forth below, is contrary to claimant's testimony that claimant successfully performed seven repetitions with 495 pounds before his accident.
References to the trial transcript are preceded by the letter "T."
Weckerle recalled that on the date in issue, he observed claimant with "an impressive amount of weight" on his back to perform a squat lift and Weckerle wanted to see if claimant could lift it (T:46). Weckerle testified that he was "pretty sure" that claimant did one repetition and was "going for another and I was like oh cool and I turned around I started hitting the bag again and that's when I heard a crash and I turned around and I caught like the tail end of the fall of the squat rack flipping over and I saw him come down on the barbell" (T:46). Weckerle further testified, "I saw the like basically the tail end of the fall where he was going back the squat rack was coming back and he, he landed I guess it was his neck landed on top jolted his head on top right on the barbell" (T:47).
Jason Gatling was incarcerated at Mid-State approximately six months prior to claimant's accident. Gatling used the gym three to four days a week during that six-month period and used the squat rack approximately once a week (T:64-67, 70-71). He testified that he always used a spotter when lifting heavy weight, which to him was 225 pounds (T:76). Prior to claimant's accident, Gatling had acted as a spotter for claimant when claimant lifted in the range of 300 pounds (T:81-82).
Gatling had never released the barbell onto the horizontal part of the squat rack and never saw anyone else ever do that (T:75). Gatling testified that on two occasions he complained to different correction officers that the squat rack was "loose" and their response was "just be careful" (T:83-86). Gatling could not identify the correction officers to whom he had complained nor could Gatling specify when he had made such complaints. Gatling did not file a complaint or grievance and continued to use the squat rack despite his observations (T:97).
Sean Coleman, a power-lifting expert, testified on behalf of claimant (T:139). Coleman maintained that the use of spotters, while mandatory in training competitions, was discretionary with a weight lifter who was not training in competition (T:140-141).
Defendant presented the testimony of Correction Officer Kevin Buttimer, the recreation supervisor at the time of claimant's accident. He testified that the squat rack and the cow matting had been used at the facility for more than 20 years without incident (T:218-220). The cow matting was placed over the concrete floor. Buttimer never observed the squat rack shake, shimmy or rock when in use (T:221). He further testified that it was "possible" that Smith had complained to Buttimer about the squat rack, however, Buttimer had no specific recollection of any complaints about the squat rack either from Smith or any other inmate (id. ). Buttimer also testified that if he had been made aware of any issue with the squat rack, he would have discussed the issue with his boss and the staff and the squat rack would have been removed if necessary (T:227).
Correction Officer Ralph Pezzula, who had been at the facility for 20 years, testified that the squat rack was used on the cow matting for 20 years without incident or any complaints (T:310). Correction Officers William A. Rueger (T:180), Mark Weller (T:330, 332-333) and Robert Caivana (T:343), who were assigned to the facility gym from 2011 through 2013, testified that they had never observed any issues with the squat rack and that the inmates had never complained to the officers about the squat rack. Specifically, the officers testified that they did not observe any instability with the squat rack nor did they ever observe it tip. Correction Officer Ralph Ciaccia, the supervising sergeant at the time of claimant's accident, testified consistently with the other correction officers (T:356-367).
Ryan Obernesser testified on behalf of defendant as an expert in physical fitness, strength conditioning exercises and the proper use of a squat rack (T:276). He testified that spotters are utilized for safety in the event that the lifter is unable to lift the weight (T:291). He testified that it was possible that claimant had performed a "bell salva maneuver," which Obernesser explained creates an internal pressure in your body when you hold your breath to keep everything stiff and that sometimes a lifter passes out because of the increased pressure and lack of oxygen (T:290-292). He also explained how a lifter experiences fatigue while performing a routine of pyramid training such as claimant had been performing at the time of his accident (T:289-291).
Analysis
It is well established that the State has a duty to maintain its facilities in a reasonably safe condition (see Preston v. State of New York , 59 NY2d 997 [1983] ). "In connection with its operation of a gymnasium, it [the State] must use the same level of care to assure that its equipment is reasonably safe and free from hazards" ( Valentine v. State of New York , 192 Misc 2d 706, 707 [Ct Cl 2002] [inmate injured on allegedly malfunctioning exercise machine failed to establish that machine was defective or that the State had notice and an opportunity to repair the purported defect] ). The State, however, is not an insurer of the safety of its inmates and negligence cannot be inferred solely from the occurrence of an accident (see Killeen v. State of New York , 66 NY2d 850 [1985] ). Nor is it the State's duty to provide unremitting surveillance of its inmates under all circumstances (see Sanchez v. State of New York , 99 NY2d 247, 256 [2002] ).
In order to prevail on his claim, claimant must show: the existence of a foreseeably dangerous condition; that the State created the condition or had either actual or constructive notice of the condition; that the State failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable time; that such condition was a proximate cause of claimant's accident; and that claimant sustained damages (see Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History , 67 NY2d 836 [1986] ; Mercer v. City of New York , 223 AD2d 688 [2d Dept 1996], affd 88 NY2d 955 [1996] ).
Proof of prior accidents at the same place and under substantially similar circumstances may be offered to establish foreseeability of danger and notice to the State and it was incumbent upon claimant to offer such evidence (see Racalbuto v. Redmond , 46 AD3d 1051, 1052 [3d Dept 2007] [one dissimilar accident at the same location in 11 years does not put the municipality on notice of a dangerous condition which needs to be addressed]; Chunhye Kang-Kim v. City of New York , 29 AD3d 57, 60 [1st Dept 2006] [it was incumbent upon plaintiff to show prior similar accidents at the site to establish notice to the municipality] ).
In this matter, the squat rack with the cow matting was used for more than 20 years without any accidents or incidents of injury prior to claimant's accident (T:216, 220; see Zammiello v. Senpike Mall Co. , 5 AD3d 1001 [4th Dept 2004] [where allegedly dangerous condition existed for a number of years, the absence of prior accidents may indicate that the condition is safe] ). There was also an absence of any written complaints or documented grievances regarding the squat rack prior to claimant's accident. Contrary to claimants's arguments, the Court does not find that Correction Officer Buttimer's testimony, that it was "possible" that Royan Smith had suggested to Buttimer that the squat rack should be bolted to the floor, established proof of actual notice to defendant regarding a dangerous condition presented by the squat rack and the cow matting (Claimant's Memorandum, pp 10-11). Rather, the Court finds that, upon consideration of all the evidence presented by the parties, including listening to the witnesses testify and observing their demeanor as they did so, the credible evidence established that there were no complaints reported to the correction officers regarding the squat rack or its instability prior to claimant's accident. Additionally, despite claimant's arguments that the squat rack should have been bolted to the floor, the evidence established that the squat rack was not designed to be bolted to the floor. The testimony of claimant's witnesses and defendant's witnesses established that no one had ever witnessed the squat rack flip prior to claimant's accident. Given the absence of any accidents or incidents with the squat rack prior to claimant's accident, the Court is not persuaded by claimant's arguments that defendant was negligent in its inspection or maintenance of the squat rack or that defendant's placement of the squat rack on the cow matting increased any instability of the squat rack. Thus, the Court finds that claimant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that defendant had either actual or constructive notice that the squat rack was defective or that defendant created a dangerous condition or had notice of a foreseeably dangerous condition by the squat rack's placement on the cow matting (see Valentine , 192 Misc 2d 706 ).
With regard to the issue of proximate cause, it is well established that:
"[w]here the facts proven show that there are several possible causes of an injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the result of one cause as the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery, since he has failed to prove that the negligence of the defendant caused the injury."
( Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo , 278 NY 1, 7 [1938] ; see Bernstein v. City of New York , 69 NY2d 1020, 1021-1022 [1987] ). The facts surrounding claimant's accident are somewhat unclear. Claimant himself concedes that his version of the facts as to when he released the barbell differs from the testimony of the inmate witnesses called to testify on his behalf, namely Royan Smith and Luis Sierra. The Court further notes that the testimony of Jeremy Weckerle, another inmate witness called on behalf of claimant, adds yet another version of the facts leading up to claimant's accident. Without a clearly established factual basis regarding the accident, the evidence and the opinions of claimant's experts: David J. Quesnel, Ph.D., P.E.; Peter Chen, P.E. and Ronald Fijalkowski, Ph.D., are purely speculative as to how any alleged defect or instability of the squat rack was a proximate cause of claimant's accident and resulting injuries (see Zammiello , 5 AD3d 1001 [expert opinion regarding causation was without the requisite factual basis and therefore was too speculative to constitute competent expert proof of causation] ). In this regard, the Court credits the testimony of defendant's expert, Lawrence Day, Ph.D., that there were major flaws in the analyses done by claimant's experts as well as with their testing given that the exact angle at which claimant released the barbell is unknown and that the angle impacts the velocity of the barbell. According to Day, the angles used by Fijalkowski in calculating velocity were not representative of the actual test done in the videos presented by claimant (T:416-419). Day noted that in the videos offered by claimant, the model squat rack tips forward. Whereas, the actual accident photographs indicate that the squat rack did not tip forward; it tipped at an angle. Day explained that, in order for the squat rack to tip diagonally, there had to be a transverse force acting on the squat rack, other than the forces that were horizontal or downwards vertically. As Day noted, "this particular accident depends on the confluence of a very, very, very particular unusual circumstances all coming together in order to result in the squat rack tipping diagonally in particular" (T:422-423). Claimant's experts did not offer any opinions regarding such transverse force and their tests did not employ any transverse force on the squat rack that would cause it to tip sideways or diagonally (T:415-416).
Quesnel was initially retained by claimant and thereafter, due to health reasons, Chen replaced Quesnel as claimant's expert.
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Additionally, Day opined that claimant's experts made a number of fundamentally flawed assumptions in their analysis resulting in inaccurate conclusions. For example, Peter Chen never measured the coefficient of friction between the material that the squat rack is made out of and the actual worn cow matting, resulting in a different value (T:390-391). There were also discrepancies between claimant's experts as to the degree that the cow matting was compressed (T:392). Day pointed out the inapplicability of the plow effect relied on by Chen and also called into question the opinions of claimant's experts as to the speed of the barbell due to their erroneous assumptions that the barbell slid without friction and did not roll (T:391-392, 399). Day also noted that Quesnel's assumption that the coefficient of restitution equals one was incorrect as that would mean "that literally every bit of original kinetic energy of the first object [the rolling barbell] is transferred as kinetic energy to the second object [the weight rack]" (T:400). Day stated that, "[i]n real life that never ever happens" and the assumptions of claimant's experts negatively impacted their calculations regarding velocity (T:399-404). Additionally, Fijalkowski's assumption that the claimant's back can be viewed "as an inclined plane that is frictionless and that a barbell will slide not roll down" was flawed according to Day because the values as to the horizontal velocity are too high (T:409-411). Thus, the Court finds that the testimony of defendant's expert, Lawrence Day, effectively diminished any weight to be accorded to the testimony of claimant's experts on the issue of proximate cause.
The Court finds that there is another explanation for the cause of claimant's accident other than any negligence attributable to defendant. The rules posted in the facility gym stated: "DO NOT DROP OR SLAM WEIGHTS" and "ALWAYS USE A SPOTTER" (Ex. 18). While claimant testified that he was unaware of the posted rules, the Court finds that, given claimant's frequent use of the gym on a regular basis for one year prior to his accident, his claimed lack of awareness of the posted rules is not worthy of belief. Notably, claimant refused the use of a spotter on the date of his accident despite the posted rules and his experience of having dropped weight in the past when he failed to use a spotter. Thus, the Court finds that the evidence established that it is just as likely that the cause of claimant's accident was his own inability to control the 495 pounds of weight without the aid of a spotter to assist claimant in reracking the barbell by placing it between the pegs located at each end of the squat rack, thereby equally supporting the balanced weight of the barbell (see Lee v. Maloney , 270 AD2d 689, 691 [3d Dept 2000] ), defendant not liable where experienced weight lifter was held to have assumed the risks of dropping barbell without the aid of a spotter). Thus, the Court finds that there is a lack of credible evidence to establish claimant's burden of proof that any alleged negligence attributable to defendant was a proximate or contributing cause of claimant's accident and resulting injuries.
In this matter, the Court also finds that the doctrine of assumption of the risk is applicable. Under this doctrine, "by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation" ( Morgan v. State of New York , 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997] ). Consent by participation in the activity is to risks which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation ( Turcotte v. Fell , 68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986] ). While participants are not deemed to have assumed concealed or unreasonably increased risks, if the risks are perfectly obvious or known to the participant, then the participant has consented to them and the property owner has satisfied its duty of care, which is to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be ( Morgan , 90 NY2d at 484 ; Turcotte , 68 NY2d at 439 ; Philius v. City of New York , 161 AD3d 787, 788 [2d Dept 2018] ).
Claimant used the facility gym and the squat rack regularly for a year prior to his accident. Therefore, he is held to have assumed the obvious and inherent risks of using the equipment at the facility based upon his frequent use of the equipment (see DiBenedetto v. Town Sports Intl., LLC , 118 AD3d 663 [2d Dept 2014] [user of the fitness facility and its treadmill assumed obvious and inherent risks of using treadmill since she used the treadmill four days a week. The risks were found to be obvious and apparent to her given her frequent use of the facility and its treadmill.]; Thomas v. Broadway Pilates, Ltd. , 52 AD3d 232 [1st Dept 2008] [by voluntarily participating in fitness and exercise program for five years using defendant's equipment, participant consented to and was aware of the risks associated with such activity] ).
Claimant also contends that the squat rack placed on the cow matting was visibly unstable; nonetheless claimant continued to use the equipment on a regular basis despite his observations. Accordingly, another basis for finding that claimant consented to the risks associated with using the squat rack on the cow matting is based upon the fact that the risks were not concealed and were perfectly obvious and known to claimant (see Marcano v. City of New York , 99 NY2d 548 [2002] [inmate assumed the risk of injury when he swung on a set of parallel bars constructed over a concrete floor as the defects were open and obvious]; Legac v. South Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist. , 150 AD3d 1582, 1584 [3d Dept 2017] [baseball player had adequate opportunity prior to his accident to observe the "less than optimal conditions of the gymnasium ... and how baseballs reacted to the particular flooring of the gymnasium;" therefore he consented to the open and obvious risks that were readily appreciable]; Jurgensen v. Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. , 126 AD3d 1423, 1425 [4th Dept 2015] [plaintiff assumed risk of "shaky" base where she testified that she noticed the base was "a little more shaky" than usual prior to her fall and yet continued to participate in cheerleading with a shaky base]; Williams v. Clinton Cent. School Dist. , 59 AD3d 938 [4th Dept 2009] [the risk posed by cheerleading on a bare wood gym floor as opposed to a matted surface was obvious and thus assumed by plaintiff who voluntarily engaged in cheerleading; defendant did not unreasonably increase the risks to plaintiff by failing to provide mats] ).
The Court also rejects claimant's arguments that defendant created a dangerous condition and increased the instability of the squat rack by placing it on the cow matting (see , Ferrari v. Bob's Canoe Rental, Inc. , 143 AD3d 937, 939 [2d Dept 2016] [defendant did not create any additional risk or cause a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers inherent in canoeing] ).
Awareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum; rather it is to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the participant ( Morgan , 90 NY2d at 486 ). It is also not necessary to the application of assumption of risk that the participant foresee the exact manner in which the injury occurred, so long as there was an awareness of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results ( Maddox v. City of New York , 66 NY2d 270, 278 [1985] ). As noted by the Court of Appeals in Morgan (90 NY2d at 487 ), "the primary means of improving one's sporting prowess and the inherent motivation behind participation in sports is to improve one's skills by undertaking and overcoming new challenges and obstacles." For example, in Butt v. Equinox 63rd St., Inc. (139 AD3d 614 [1st Dept 2016] ), an experienced weight lifter who had previously bench pressed 220 pounds was held to have assumed the risks inherent in attempting to bench press an additional 10 to 20 pounds. Among the risks inherent in participating in a sport are "the risks of becoming injured due to fatigue" ( Morgan , 90 NY2d at 484, citing Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ. , 73 NY2d 650, 659-660 [1989] ). In Benitez (73 NY2d at 659-660 ), the Court of Appeals held that a 19-year-old student athlete who had voluntarily played football while fatigued and then suffered a broken neck with a paralyzing injury assumed the risks associated with fatigue and injury, which are inherent in team competitive sports like football. The Court of Appeals stated that the "plaintiff put himself at risk in the circumstances of this case for the injuries he ultimately suffered" ( id. at 659 ). The Court of Appeals further held that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of showing that some negligence or inaction by defendants was a substantial cause of the events which produced his injury.
Claimant was self-described as an expert in weight lifting. He was experienced in squat lifting and had performed squat lifting exercises regularly on the squat rack at the facility for a year prior to his accident. While a participant in a sporting activity need not foresee the exact manner in which his injury occurred for the doctrine of assumption of risk to be applicable, prior to the accident claimant had dropped a barbell while squat lifting without the aid of a spotter and therefore the potential for injury in this activity was foreseeable (see Kirby v. Drumlins, Inc. , 145 AD3d 1561 [4th Dept 2016] [participant need not foresee the exact manner in which injury occurred, the participant need only be aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results]; Bryant v. Town of Brookhaven , 135 AD3d 801 [2d Dept 2016] [experienced golfer who played on golf course on numerous prior occasions assumed the foreseeable risk of slipping on railroad tie that was wet from morning dew] ). Therefore, the Court finds that claimant assumed the risk that "a heavily weighted bar might slip out of his control and injure him despite the assistance that a fully attentive spotter might be able to provide." ( Lee , 270 AD2d at 691 [an experienced weight lifter was held to have assumed the risks inherent in sport of weight lifting which included the risk of dropping barbell without the aid of a spotter]; see also Osmond v. Hofstra Univ. , 161 AD3d 1096 [2d Dept 2018] [participant assumed the risks inherent in activity which were known, apparent and reasonably foreseeable consequences of participation] ).
In sum, the Court finds that claimant assumed the risks inherent in squat lifting 495 pounds without a spotter while using the equipment that was as safe as it appeared to be.
Finally, the Court rejects claimant's argument that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case and warrants an inference of negligence to be drawn against the State. First, while the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence to be drawn against a defendant, it does not compel such inference. Second, the doctrine is applicable only when a claimant has established the following three elements: (1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the instrumentality causing the event is within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the event was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the claimant ( Dermatossian v. New York City Tr. Auth. 67 NY2d 219, 226 [1986] ). In this matter, claimant has not established the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because claimant has not satisfied all three elements. Most significantly, the instrumentality was not within defendant's exclusive control because inmates have had access to the squat rack on the cow matting for more than 20 years prior to claimant's accident (see Bodnarchuk v. State of New York , 49 AD3d 581 [2d Dept 2008] [res ipsa loquitur not applicable where other workers and the public had access to the area where claimant fell on a metal grate] ). Second, the event is not of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence (see Imhotep v. State of New York , 298 AD2d 558 [2d Dept 2002] [res ipsa loquitur not applicable in correctional facility where bulletin board that fell was affixed to the wall for eight years prior to its fall; it cannot be said to fall in the absence of negligence and the instrumentality was under the general control of persons other than defendant, such as another inmate] ). Third, claimant's conduct of releasing the barbell without placing it on the squat rack between the end pegs with the weight evenly distributed, contributed to the event which caused claimant's injury. Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to this case.
In sum, the Court finds that claimant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries claimant sustained in the accident.
Defendant's motion to dismiss, made at the conclusion of trial, is now GRANTED. All other motions and objections not ruled upon are DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED DISMISSING CLAIM NO. 122732.