Opinion
No. CV05 400 95 47 S
April 6, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The present action is a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, Clarence T. Williams, against his grandson, Tymajen Smith, and his mother, the plaintiff's daughter, Brenda Smith, seeking to set aside a quitclaim deed of property to the grandson on the grounds of fraud. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that on December 29, 2004 he signed a document which he believed, based upon representations by his grandson, was a property management agreement and was unaware that the document was actually a quitclaim deed to property located at 620 Seaview Avenue in Bridgeport. The plaintiff further alleges that he was never advised by his grandson that the document was not a property management agreement. The sole relief claimed in the complaint is a request to enjoin the defendants from conveying or encumbering the property, a judgment declaring that the deed was null and void, immediate possession of the property, attorneys fees, cost of suit and other equitable relief.
Fraud is not to be presumed but must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence. Miller v. Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 53 (1981). "The elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment." Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 685 (2005).
The plaintiff is an elderly gentlemen who in the past has been quite generous to certain members of his family. Indeed as to the property involved in the present action, the plaintiff, who was himself in need of funds at various times, allowed his granddaughter and her two children to live in the property without collecting any rent. While the plaintiff, at various times, may have received assistance in handling his financial affairs, there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was not capable of managing his own affairs; the evidence is to the contrary.
There is no doubt that on December 29, 2004 the plaintiff signed a quitclaim deed which was dated, witnessed, acknowledged, and filed on the Bridgeport land records on that day. He admits that he executed the document but claims that he never read the document and that he signed it because he was told by his grandson that the document was a property management agreement under which the grandson would manage various properties owned by the plaintiff. There was considerable testimony by various family members that discussions were held concerning the defendant grandson being a property manager but there was no mention of him owning the property. The deed was re-recorded on March 8, 2005 because a description of the property was not contained in the filing on the land records on December 29, 2004. There was evidence submitted by the plaintiff that at a later date a real estate agent contacted him about the possible sale of the property and when the real estate agent checked the land records she informed the plaintiff that he was not the owner of the property but the property was in the name of the grandson.
While there are facts that tend to support the position advocated by the plaintiff, the defendant grandson testified that the transfer of the property by quitclaim deed was discussed with the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was attempting to relieve himself of expenses relating to the property since it was non-income producing and in need of repairs.
There are also other documents signed by the plaintiff. On December 28, 2004, the day prior to the signing of the quitclaim deed, the plaintiff also executed a document entitled Quitclaim Agreement. Under that agreement the plaintiff certified that he was voluntarily transferring the property to the defendant grandson who "will assume responsibility for the property, (620 Seaview Avenue, Bridgeport, CT 06607), and the mortgage payments and in return remove myself, Clarence Williams, from ownership of the title . . ." The plaintiff claims that the title of the document, i.e. Quitclaim Agreement, was covered up and he did not see the heading when he signed it. In April of 2005 the plaintiff also executed another document together with his daughter and grandson authorizing the grandson to negotiate for the sale of three parcels of land as a package, one parcel owned by each party. The defendant grandson could not have signed such an agreement as a owner unless he did in fact own the property involved in this litigation.
A party cannot avoid obligations merely by saying he did not read what he signed. Kornblau v. McDermant, 90 Conn. 624, 629 (1916). "The general rule is that where a person of mature years who can read and write, signs or accepts a formal written contract affecting his pecuniary interests, it is (that person's) duty to read it and notice of its contents will be imputed to (that person) if (that person) negligently fails to do so; but this rule is subject to qualifications including intervention of fraud or artifice or mistake not due to negligence, and applies only if nothing has been said or done to mislead the person sought to be charged or to be put a (person) of reasonable business prudence off . . . guard in the matter." First Charter National Bank v. Ross, 29 Conn.App. 667, 671 (1992). In view of the fact that the plaintiff has signed three separate documents, at three separate times, and claimed representations by the defendant grandson is claimed to exist in only one of those documents, the court cannot find that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proof as to setting aside the transaction on the grounds of fraud. There is also a claim advanced in the complaint against the plaintiff's daughter, Brenda Smith, who does not claim an ownership interest in the property. The court finds no evidence justifying the relief claimed in the complaint being imposed against Brenda Smith. Accordingly, judgment may enter in favor of the defendants on the complaint.
The court is not here to decide what is fair and just as to issues not raised in the complaint. However there was evidence that the plaintiff continued to make mortgage payments on the property subject to the Quitclaim Deed and also made other payments for other bills, such as water bills. There was no attempt to quantify those bills only that the defendant grandson never paid any bills relating to the property. It appears to the court that the defendant grandson has not fulfilled the obligations imposed upon him by the Quitclaim Agreement executed on December 28, 2004. Nor has there been any attempt to do so. Such a failure might provide a basis for setting aside the transaction. However, such a claim has not been raised in the pleadings and there is no basis for asserting that the defendant grandson should have been prepared to defend against such a claim. Therefore the court does not reach that issue because the pleadings do not encompass such claim.