Opinion
No. 1:98CV259-D-D
June 2, 2000
OPINION
Presently before the court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration, the court finds that Rotomec SpA's motion shall be granted and Rotomec America, Inc.'s motion shall be denied.
A. Factual Background
On March 10, 1998, the Plaintiff was injured while working on the embossing unit of a printing machine at a GenCorp facility in Columbus, Mississippi. The machine was manufactured, at least in part, by the Defendant Rotomec SpA, an Italian corporation, in Italy in 1981. Shortly after manufacture, the machine was sold to General Tire and Rubber Company (General Tire) in Reading, Massachusetts, by Rotomec America, Inc., a Connecticut corporation and the North American sales agent for its parent company, Rotomec SpA. In 1983 or 1984, General Tire and Rotomec America contracted to relocate the machine to a facility in Columbus, Mississippi. On August 13, 1993, Rotomec America performed a service call on the machine in Columbus.
The Plaintiff filed the current action on January 19, 1999. Both Defendants now seek to have the court dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. 12(b)(2) Standard
When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the district court's jurisdiction over the defendant. Allred v. Moore Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1997). In a no-hearing situation, the plaintiff satisfies this burden by presenting a prima facie case that this court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants under both Mississippi's long-arm statute and the due process principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Allred, 117 F.3d at 281; Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint and must resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211.
C. Discussion
In federal diversity actions, the reach of federal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants is measured by a two-step inquiry. First, the law of the forum state must provide for the assertion of jurisdiction; second, the exercise of jurisdiction under state law must comport with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985).
1. Mississippi's Long Arm Statute
Mississippi's long arm statute, codified at section 13-3-57 of the Mississippi Code, spells out the circumstances under which Mississippi courts may properly exercise in personam jurisdiction. Section 13-3-57 provides in pertinent part that "any non-resident person . . . who shall . . . commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident . . . of this state . . . shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi [and therefore be subject to the jurisdiction of Mississippi's courts]." Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57.
In Mississippi, a tort is not considered complete until an injury has occurred; if the injury occurs in the state, then the tort is committed, at least in part, in this state, and the exercise of in personam jurisdiction of the nonresident tortfeasor is appropriate. Allred, 117 F.3d at 282; Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enters., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 220, 222-23 (N.D.Miss. 1989).
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants manufactured, sold and installed a printing machine that was not reasonably safe, that was in a defective condition, and that was unmerchantable. The Plaintiff's injury, specifically burns and injuries to his left arm and wrist, occurred in Mississippi, purportedly as a result of the Defendants' actions.
The court finds, and the Defendants do not dispute, that the Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under the "tort" prong of Mississippi's long-arm statute. Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1168; Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, pursuant to Mississippi's long-arm statute, this court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate over both Defendants.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Resolution of the issue regarding the reach of Mississippi's long-arm statute does not end the court's inquiry, however. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when that defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
As for minimum contacts, it is not unfair to require a nonresident to defend itself in the courts of the forum state if it engaged in activities that will "support an inference that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed [itself] of the benefits of conducting business in the forum." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1170. Further, the defendant's contacts with the forum state must be such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
The minimum contacts prong of the inquiry may be further subdivided into contacts that give rise to either "general" or "specific" jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). General jurisdiction applies where a defendant's activities in the state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," even if the cause of action is unrelated to those activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
When the exercise of general jurisdiction is inappropriate, as it is here, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if the suit "is related to or arises out of" the defendant's contacts with the forum state; even a single purposeful contact may be sufficient. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1172; Brown, 688 F.2d at 333-34. Likewise, an act done outside the state that has consequences within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the defendants knew that their acts would have an impact on the plaintiff in the forum state or if it was highly likely that such effects would follow from the nonresident defendant's conduct. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). The court now turns to the Plaintiff's specific allegations as to each Defendant.
a. Rotomec America
The Plaintiff asserts that General Tire contracted with Rotomec America to relocate the subject printing machine to Mississippi; Rotomec America subsequently performed at least one service call on the machine in Mississippi. Also, Rotomec America admittedly does regular business in roughly half of the fifty states, including Mississippi.
The court finds that such contacts qualify as the minimum contacts necessary to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1172; Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 1999). Due to this finding, the court must now evaluate the fairness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rotomec America and ensure that it is reasonable to require Rotomec America to defend this suit in Mississippi. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
Once it has been shown that a defendant has purposefully established adequate minimum contacts within the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is deemed fair unless the defendant presents a compelling case that the court's exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184-85, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, if a defendant purposefully avails itself of the benefits and protection of the forum state's laws by engaging in activity outside the state that bears reasonably foreseeable consequences in the state, maintenance of the lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1982). Here, the court finds that its exercise of jurisdiction in this matter is neither unfair nor unreasonable. Rotomec America has not shown that litigating this matter in Mississippi presents an unreasonable burden on it. Given the extent of their contacts with this state in connection with the machine that injured the Plaintiff, Rotomec America could have reasonably foreseen being haled into Mississippi's courts. Further, the State of "Mississippi has an exceptionally strong interest in providing a forum for the redress of injuries to its residents occurring within its borders and caused by an allegedly defective product shipped from outside the state." Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1173.
In sum, when the Plaintiff's uncontroverted assertions are accepted as true and the factual differences are resolved in his favor, the court concludes that the Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rotomec America is constitutionally permissible. Therefore, its motion to dismiss shall be denied.
b. Rotomec SpA
The Plaintiff asserts that this court possesses specific personal jurisdiction over Rotomec SpA under, inter alia, the stream of commerce theory. For the reasons set forth below, the court disagrees and shall grant Rotomec SpA's motion to dismiss.
The Plaintiff also argues that personal jurisdiction over Rotomec SpA is proper under an "alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil" theory. The sole evidence the Plaintiff offers in connection with this claim is that Rotomec America was a wholly owned subsidiary of Rotomec SpA. The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that corporate ownership, standing alone, is insufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil in this manner. United States v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 505 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1974); North Am. Plastics v. Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 592 F. Supp. 875, 877-78 (N.D.Miss. 1984). As such, this theory is of no assistance to the Plaintiff.
In products liability actions, when a defendant manufacturer has no direct contacts with the forum state, minimum contacts are evaluated under the stream of commerce theory. Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987); Sorrells v. RR Custom Coach Works, 636 So.2d 668, 674 (Miss. 1994). In articulating this theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court held that merely placing a product into the stream of commerce is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction; the defendant must have made a "purposeful effort" to "serve, directly or indirectly, the market for [their] product" in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
By manufacturing the printing machine, in Italy, and selling it to General Tire, in Massachusetts, Rotomec SpA placed the machine in the stream of commerce. The Plaintiff has not, however, offered any evidence that Rotomec SpA made a purposeful effort in Mississippi to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for their product. As such, the court finds that Rotomec SpA has not established sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Mississippi so as to permit this court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over it in this case.
D. Conclusion
In sum, the court finds that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant Rotomec America;its motion to dismiss shall be denied. The Plaintiff, however, has failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction as to the Defendant Rotomec SpA; its motion to dismiss shall be granted.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendant Rotomec SpA's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (docket entry 48) is GRANTED;
(2) the Plaintiff's claims against Rotomec SpA are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
(3) the Defendant Rotomec America, Inc.'s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (docket entry 47) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the ____ day of June 2000.