Opinion
C. A. PC-2019-10884
06-18-2021
OLIVIA WILLIAMS v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
For Plaintiff: Catherine Sansonetti, Esq. For Defendant: Iwona R. Ramian, Esq., Deborah A. Barclay, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Catherine Sansonetti, Esq.
For Defendant: Iwona R. Ramian, Esq., Deborah A. Barclay, Esq.
DECISION
MATOS, J.
This action concerns an appeal under G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g) by plaintiff Olivia Williams against defendant Rhode Island Department of Human Services (DHS) regarding an Administrative Hearing Decision (Decision) issued by Appeals Officer Karen Walsh (Appeals Officer), which denied Ms. Williams' waiver request for additional postsecondary funding.
I
Facts and Travel
At the time of the Decision, Ms. Williams was a twenty-three-year old person with a physical disability. (Decision at 10.) She lived with her parents and had been a social security income (SSI) recipient. Id. at 11. According to Ms. Williams' testimony, she received SSI payments of $771 per month and a stipend related to an internship of $2000 per month until May 2019. Id. However, her receipt of her stipend "place[d] her income higher than allowed" to receive SSI benefits. Id. The stipend lasted until May 2019. Id.
Ms. Williams' diagnoses are omitted to protect her privacy.
Ms. Williams applied for a Rhode Island Office of Rehabilitation Services (ORS) grant as a high school senior in 2013 for the purpose of funding her undergraduate education, which she received. Id. ORS provides vocational rehabilitative services (VRS) to individuals with disabilities to help them prepare for gainful employment. Id. Such services include grants to fund educational pursuits. Id. Ms. Williams' ORS grant paid entirely for her undergraduate education, which amounted to $148,000. Id. at 16. Ms. Williams graduated from the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) in May 2018 with a bachelor's degree in Applied Arts and Sciences. Id. Thereafter, Ms. Williams entered an online master's degree program at RIT. Id.
Ms. Williams informed ORS of her pursuit of an online master's degree on June 7, 2018. Id. ORS explained that it would receive less in Federal funding in the future and that Ms. Williams may lose her grant while a master's student. Id. Later, on June 29, 2018, Ms. Williams' mother informed ORS that Ms. Williams' parents had saved $10,000 for her master's degree. Id. Ms. Williams' financial aid award demonstrated that she was eligible to receive a $5000 scholarship and unsubsidized graduate student loans of $20,500 for the upcoming academic year. Id. However, Ms. Williams also testified that because she was in a purely online master's program, she became ineligible for financial aid and unable to receive student loans. Id. Therefore, Ms. Williams requested ORS to fund the entirety of her master's education. Id.
In November 2018, after Ms. Williams had begun her master's program and the parties had had various communications regarding the funding of her degree, ORS denied Ms. Williams' waiver request to receive additional funding. Id. at 18. Ms. Williams appealed the denial on November 20, 2018. Id. The Appeals Officer conducted a hearing on February 20, 2019 and rendered her Decision on September 27, 2019. Id.
In her Decision, the Appeals Officer did not make a finding regarding if Ms. Williams was an SSI recipient at the time ORS denied her waiver request. Id. at 23. The Decision states:
"The appellant's attorney makes a post hearing argument that the appellant, as an SSI recipient, cannot, be required to financially contribute to her education. . . . This hearing officer's review of the evidence and testimony finds that the record lacks clarity as to whether the appellant is currently an SSI benefits recipient at the time her waiver request was submitted and denied. . . . [T]he appellant testifies she is not currently an SSI recipient. . . . Thus, the record is unclear with regard to arguments specific to SSI recipients, as there is a lack of clarity about whether the appellant was actually considered a recipient at the time of the financial determinations . . . . For these reasons, no finding will be made on the issue of whether an SSI recipient would be excluded from financially participating towards her educational costs." Id.
Ms. Williams appealed the Decision on November 12, 2019. The parties filed a letter on March 24, 2021 stating that they agree that the action has been fully briefed and the Court may decide the matter on the pleadings.
II
Standard of Review
Under § 42-35-15(g), the Court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." The Court may affirm an agency's decision or remand for further findings. See § 42-35-15(g). When an administrative finding is:
"(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error of law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion[, ]"
the Court "may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced[.]" See id.
"In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, the Superior Court is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision." Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 804-05 (R.I. 2000) (quotation omitted). "If there is sufficient competent evidence in the record, the court must uphold the agency's decision." Id. at 805 (quotation omitted). While the Court defers to factual findings made below, the Court reviews questions of law de novo. See Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 487 (R.I. 2018).
III
Parties' Arguments
Ms. Williams argues that the Appeals Officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously and made an error of law and the Decision should therefore be reversed. (Pl.'s Mem. at 9-10; Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 7-9.) Ms. Williams contends that (1) DHS may not apply a financial needs test or require an SSI recipient to financially participate in the cost of VRS; (2) the $10,000 that Ms. Williams received from her parents was mischaracterized as a "comparable benefit"; (3) DHS placed an unlawful maximum dollar limit on the amount Ms. Williams could receive; (4) DHS lacked articulable standards to determine a waiver in its postsecondary education and training policy; and (5) the Appeals Officer erroneously failed to make a finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI recipient status. (Pl.'s Mem. at 9-13; Pl.'s Reply at 1-9.)
DHS argues that the Appeals Officer based her Decision on competent evidence and should therefore be affirmed. (DHS Resp. Br. at 14.) Specifically, DHS contends that (1) there was no absolute cap on the amount of funding Ms. Williams could receive; (2) DHS properly considered Ms. Williams' waiver requests; and (3) DHS is not required to pay for all vocational rehabilitative services, even for SSI recipients. Id. at 14-33.
IV
Analysis
a. Financial Needs Testing and Requiring SSI Recipients to Participate in VRS
Ms. Williams' first argument is that DHS does not maintain a written policy that applies uniformly to all individuals in similar circumstances and impermissibly applied a financial means test. (Pl.'s Mem. at 9.) Section 361.54(a) of title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that "[t]here is no Federal requirement that the financial need of individuals be considered in the provision of vocational rehabilitation services." States "may choose to consider the financial need of eligible individuals . . . for purposes of determining the extent of their participation in the costs of vocational rehabilitation services[.]" 34 C.F.R. 361.54(b)(1). If the state chooses to consider financial need, the state must maintain written policies that explain the method for determining financial need and that specify the types of VRS for which the financial need test applies. See 34 C.F.R. 361.54. "The policies must be applied uniformly to all individuals in similar circumstances" and be reasonable "[b]ased on the individual's financial need, including consideration of any disability-related expenses paid by the individual," and "[n]ot so high as to effectively deny the individual a necessary service[.]" See id.
Here, DHS maintained the VRS cost participation policy standards enumerated in 218-RICR-50-00-1.13. The policy standards provide that, "In accordance with 34 C.F.R. 361.54 . . . ORS will determine the financial need of those individuals not receiving SSI/SSDI disability benefits to determine the extent of their participation in the cost of vocational rehabilitation services." See 218-RICR-50-00-1.13. "Income and resources of the family are used in this determination when the applicant/eligible individual is part of the family unit, and must take into consideration any disability-related expenses paid for by the individual." Id. The policy standard states that the methodology to determine financial needs is by comparing an individual's income to their expenses. Id. "The difference between income and expenses is subtracted from the allowable gross weekly amount. The percentage of that excess over the allowable gross weekly income will be applied to total cost of the services." Id. The policy standards exempt seven forms of VRS. Id. The policy standards specify the ten types of VRS services to which the financial need test applies. Id. Finally, the policy standards provide an exception to the financial needs test for individuals who receive SSI benefits. Id. Thus, because 218-RICR-50-00-1.13 meets the requirements of 34 C.F.R. 361.54 for states to apply a financial needs test in determining a non-SSI recipient's participation costs in VRS, Ms. Williams' first argument is unpersuasive.
As shall be discussed infra, the Appeals Officer declined to make a finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI status.
b. "Comparable Benefit"
Ms. Williams' next argument is that the Appeals Officer mischaracterized the $10,000 that her parents saved for her graduate education as a "comparable benefit." (Pl.'s Mem. at 10-11; Pl.'s Reply at 3-6.) "Comparable services and benefits" is defined in 218-RICR-50-00-1.4(10) as "services and benefits, including accommodations and auxiliary aids, that are provided or paid for in whole or in part, by other Federal, State, or local public agencies." See 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(8) ("Comparable services and benefits means services and benefits, including accommodations and auxiliary aids and services, that are . . . [p]rovided or paid for, in whole or in part, by other Federal, State, or local public agencies, by health insurance, or by employee benefits[.]")
Here, the Appeals Officer found that Ms. Williams' parents "put aside" $10,000 for Ms. Williams' pursuit of a master's degree. (Decision at 16.) There was conflicting evidence as to whether this amount was a gift or a loan; Ms. Williams testified that she has no outstanding loan balances due but also that the $10,000 constituted a loan from her parents. Id. at 21. However, the Appeals Officer did not characterize the $10,000 as a "comparable benefit" in the Decision. Id. at 21-22. Under 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(b), "[t]he student is not required or obligated to accept a loan to reach an unmet need for school or training, but are encouraged to do so, as ORS does not typically cover all of the costs associated with attending college." Further, under 218-RICR-50-00-1.13(A)(1)(c), financial needs testing considers "Total Cash Assets, including checking and savings accounts, certificates, stocks, and bonds[.]" Thus, this argument likewise is unpersuasive because the Appeals Officer did not characterize the $10,000 as a comparable benefit, and the financial needs test considers all cash assets of a VRS applicant.
c. Absolute Dollar Limit
Ms. Williams further argues that ORS impermissibly placed an arbitrary absolute dollar cap limit on the amount of VRS available. (Pl.'s Mem. at 11-12; Pl.'s Reply at 1-3.) Under 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(a), a state must develop and maintain written policies that "may not establish any arbitrary limits on the nature and scope of vocational rehabilitation services to be provided to the individual to achieve an employment outcome." Further, 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(c) provides that:
"(1) The State unit must establish and maintain written policies to govern the rates of payment for all purchased vocational rehabilitation services.
"(2) The State unit may establish a fee schedule designed to ensure a reasonable cost to the program for each service, if the schedule is-
"(i) Not so low as to effectively deny an individual a necessary service; and
"(ii) Not absolute and permits exceptions so that individual needs can be addressed.
"(3) The State unit may not place absolute dollar limits on specific service categories or on the total services provided to an individual."
In addition, under 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2)(i):
"ORS may participate in sponsoring an advanced degree program if the person has tried and been unable to find employment in the field of choice with an undergraduate degree; and graduate work will significantly enhance the opportunities in the field of choice. The VR Counselor and the individual seeking services must explore other vocational options, consider other transferable skills, and the person's undergraduate degree, and determine that no job realistically exist. If ORS agrees to provide support for an advanced degree, the in-state preference will be applicable, with up to a maximum of $5,000* per academic calendar year. Room and board will not be covered for those living within 30 miles of a state college or university. If greater than 30 miles, and room and board is approved, the maximum allowable amount is $2,000* per academic calendar year. An Administrative Waiver may be considered."
Individuals may seek an administrative waiver if their needs exceed the $5000 maximum allowance. See id.
In Tucker v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, No. PC-2017-4015, 2019 WL 3281729, *5 (Jul. 16, 2019), the court held that ORS policy does not place an absolute dollar limit on graduate studies funding because the policy allows for waiver applications "under 'individualized extenuating circumstances'" (citing ORS Policy Sec. 115.28(IV)(B)). The plaintiff in Tucker received a waiver for both tuition and room and board. See Tucker, supra. Thus, because the waiver process allowed the plaintiff in Tucker to receive more than the graduate tuition and book limit, the court in Tucker reasoned that the dollar limit was not arbitrary or capricious and conformed to 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(c). See id.; see also Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, 683 F.Supp.2d 201, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, 602 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2010), and aff'd, 373 Fed.Appx. 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that limiting tuition assistance for disabled individuals for the tuition cost of an in-state, public institution accords with the policy to serve the greatest possible number of clients while maximizing the use of limited resources).
Ms. Williams attempts to differentiate the holding of Tucker on two grounds. (Pl.'s Reply at 6.) First, she argues that she was not provided with a policy that favored in-state tuition but, instead, an unmovable limit of $5000 in tuition. Id. Second, that as an SSI recipient, Ms. Williams cannot be forced to participate in her own VRS. Id. However, the Appeals Officer declined to make a finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI status. (Decision at 18; 23.) Ms. Williams also had the option to file for a waiver to receive more than $5000 in VRS, which she did, and which resulted in this action; thus, because of the availability of the waiver application, ORS did not create an arbitrary or capricious limit in violation of 34 C.F.R. § 361.50.
d. Articulable Standards
Ms. Williams also argues that DHS did not have standards to determine whether to grant a waiver request. (Pl.'s Mem. at 13.) However, this argument ignores the waiver review procedure that ORS maintains. (DHS Resp. Br. Ex. 8.) The procedure provides that a person receiving ORS services may request a waiver orally or in writing and describes how ORS personnel would route the request. Id. The procedure also contains a five-step administrative review process for waiver requests. Id. The procedure finally states how ORS staff and an applicant may proceed after the acceptance or denial of the waiver request. Id. The purpose and intent of the procedure is to ensure "the provision of comprehensive [VRS] for individuals with disabilities" and that "clients have informed choice and equal access to services[.]" Id. Ms. Williams also completed a form, with an attached personal statement, that described the purpose and intent of the administrative waiver process and how a ruling or decision would be rendered. See DHS Resp. Br. Exs. 10; 12. Thus, because ORS had a written procedure in place to ensure provision of services to disabled individuals through the waiver review procedure, this argument fails.
e. Finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI status
Finally, Ms. Williams argues that the Appeals Officer erred by not making a finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI status. (Pl.'s Mem. at 9-10; Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 7-9.) There is no requirement for an appeals officer to make a finding regarding SSI status. See 218-RICR-50-00-1.9(D)(3) ("A written decision, including the findings of fact and the grounds for the decision, will be sent to both parties within thirty (30) days of the completion of the Hearing."); see also 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 186 (an administrative officer may make administrative determinations regarding disabilities under the Social Security program); Ted Mello, M.A. Legal Rights of Individuals with Disabilities: Vocational Rehabilitation Services and other Work-Related Issues, Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, § 5.10.2 (2nd ed. 2015) (under Massachusetts regulations, a hearing officer's decision may only be overturned or modified based "on clear and convincing evidence, that the decision of the impartial hearing officer is clearly erroneous on the basis of being contrary to the approved State plan, the Act, Federal vocational rehabilitation regulations, or State regulations and policies that are consistent with Federal requirements"). An Appeals Officer making findings "must be comprehensive and analytical, although they do not have to discuss every piece of evidence or articulate every thought process, as long as a minimal level of articulation is met and the [decision] provides a 'logical bridge' between the evidence and the conclusions reached." 4 Social Security Law and Practice § 53:11 (footnotes omitted). Under the deferential language of § 42-35-15(g), absent a clear showing of an arbitrary or capricious ruling or an error of law, the Court shall affirm the Appeals Officer's findings. See 42-35-15(g).
Here, Ms. Williams testified that she monthly received $771 in SSI payments and $2000 per month in a stipend until May 2019. (Decision at 11.) Ms. Williams also testified that "her parents are paying for college." Id. Ms. Williams graduated from her undergraduate program with no debt and did not have an outstanding balance in her master's program. Id. at 14. The Appeals Officer declined to make a finding regarding Ms. Williams' SSI status because Ms. Williams received a stipend at the time that "increased [Ms. Williams'] income to an amount higher than the maximum allowed for receipt of SSI benefits[.]" Id. at 23. The stipend remained in effect until the end of the 2018-19 academic year, approximately three months after hearing before the Appeals Officer in February 2019. Id. The Appeals Officer concluded that "the record [was] unclear . . . about whether the appellant was actually considered a recipient [of SSI] . . . due to her receipt of stipend monies, not SSI benefits, from the Spring of 2018 through the Spring of 2019." Id. Thus, the Appeals Officer's finding that Ms. Williams' SSI recipient status "lacked clarity" is not arbitrary or capricious nor an error of law because the Appeals Officer considered the contradictory facts surrounding Ms. Williams' SSI status and declined to make a finding. See Local 23, Providence, Rhode Island IATSE v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, No. PC-1975-2547, 1979 WL 196138, *2 (Aug. 7, 1979) ("Action is not arbitrary and capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances." (quotation omitted)).
V
Conclusion
The Court finds that the Appeals Officer did not make an arbitrary or capricious finding or an error of law. Accordingly, the Court affirms the Decision as Ms. Williams' rights have not been prejudiced. Counsel shall submit the appropriate judgment for entry.