Judgment was entered for the plaintiff and upon appeal it was reversed because of error in sustaining the demurrer to the plea of duress. Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384 ( 145 S.E.2d 256). Thereafter the deposition of the defendant Felton Williams was taken, in which he admitted that the defendants had signed the note, that they had made certain payments on it after doing so, and that these payments were claimed as credits in the answer. Based upon this admission plaintiff, waiving its claim for attorney's fees, moved for a summary judgment for principal and interest and it was accordingly entered.

However, the record clearly shows that plaintiff's attorney gave Gouldstone more than a week to decide whether she wanted to execute the promissory note and that the note was sent by mail, thus giving Gouldstone time to seek an attorney or to otherwise determine if the "threat" was genuine. Compare Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384 ( 145 S.E.2d 256) (1965) (plaintiffs alleged they were physically detained by the defendant bank until they signed a promissory note). Although defendants claim that plaintiff's alleged breach of the lease caused their financial problems, thus forcing them to sign the note, "the [defendants] could have pursued other legal remedies, even though they may have seemed unattractive, rather than going forward with the [promissory note]."

Held: Notwithstanding the authorities cited by appellants to show that economic pressure can constitute duress and that this duress was continuous and not waived by appellants (Code Ann. § 20-503; Tidwell v. Critz, 248 Ga. 201 ( 282 S.E.2d 104); Whitt v. Blount, 124 Ga. 671 ( 53 S.E. 205); Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422); Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384 ( 145 S.E.2d 256)), one inescapable conclusion emerges. The actions of the seller Wright might have constituted a breach of the sales contract, and the appellants might indeed have expended substantial sums and incurred the risk of further loss in reliance on the original contract of sale and its terms; it might be true that when the plaintiff laid down new terms the appellants could not or had no time to protest without incurring greater risk, and losing the entire development project.

Duress consists in any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment used for an illegal purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to coercion or tending to coerce the will of another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will." King v. Lewis, 188 Ga. 594, 597 ( 4 S.E.2d 464); Causey v. Matson, 215 Ga. 306, 310 ( 110 S.E.2d 356); Williams v. Rentz Bkg. Co., 112 Ga. App. 384 ( 145 S.E.2d 256). Thus, plaintiff could prove duress by showing that his signing of the release form was contrary to his free will and was induced by (1) an illegal imprisonment, (2) a legal imprisonment effectuated by defendant for an illegal purpose, or (3) wrongful threats by agents of the defendant.