Williams v. Price

Full title: BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. JANETTE PRICE, Respondent

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Mar 29, 2002

CIVIL CASE NO. 01-CV-74016-DT (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2002)

Opinion

CIVIL CASE NO. 01-CV-74016-DT

March 29, 2002

TX OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS .

PAUL D. BORMAN, United States District Judge.

Petitioner, an inmate at the Riverside Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his conviction for second degree murder, M.C.L.A. 750.317; M.S.A. 28.549; armed robbery, M.C.L.A. 750.529; M.S.A. 28.797; and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. M.C.L.A. 750.227b; M.S.A. 28.424(2). For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is SUMMARILY DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court will also deny petitioner a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

I. Background

The habeas petition states that petitioner was convicted in the Detroit Recorder's Court on April 6, 1988 of the above offenses. Petitioner's direct appeals ended with the state system when the Michigan Supreme Court denied him leave to appeal on October 30, 1990. People v. Williams, 88647 (Mich.Sup.Ct. October 30, 1990).

Almost six and one half years later, petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief in the Detroit Recorder's Court on April 9, 1997. The motion was denied by the trial court on July 17, 1998. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Williams, 220765 (Mich.Ct.App. June 8, 2000). The Michigan Supreme Court completed post-conviction review by denying petitioner leave to appeal on December 27, 2000. People v. Williams, 620 N.W.2d 858 (2000).

The present application for writ of habeas corpus was filed with this Court on October 17, 2001.¹ On October 23, 2001, the Court ordered petitioner to show cause why his habeas petition should not be dismissed for failing to comply with the one year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). After being granted an extension of time to respond to the order to show cause, petitioner filed a response to the order to show cause on March 25, 2002.

1 Under the prison mailbox rule, this Court will assume that petitioner actually filed his habeas petition on October 17, 2001, the date that it was signed and dated. See Neal v. Bock, 137 F. Supp.2d 879, 882, fn. 1 (E.D. Mich. 2001).

II. Discussion

The petition for writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed because it has not been filed within the one year statute of limitations. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which was signed into law on April 24, 1996, amended the habeas corpus statute in several respects, one of which was to create a statute of limitations for habeas actions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) imposes a one-year statute of limitations upon petitions for habeas relief:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was originally recognized by the Supreme Court if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

A federal court will dismiss a case where a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus does not comply with the one year statute of limitations. Thomas v. Straub, 10 F. Supp.2d 834, 835 (E.D. Mich 1998).

Petitioner's direct appeals with the Michigan courts were completed on October 30, 1990, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. Petitioner's conviction therefore became final, for purposes of § 2244(d)(1), when the ninety day time period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6^th Cir. 2000). Petitioner's judgment became final on January 31, 1991, when he failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Thomas v. Straub, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 835. However, because petitioner's state court proceedings became final prior to the effective date of the habeas reform law, petitioner had one year from April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, to file his application for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 693 (6^th Cir. 2000). Petitioner therefore had until April 24, 1997 to timely file his petition in compliance with the statute of limitations unless the one year period was somehow tolled.

In the present case, petitioner filed a state post-conviction motion for relief from judgment with the Detroit Recorder's Court on April 9, 1997. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) expressly provides that the time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief or other collateral review is pending shall not be counted towards the period of limitations contained in the statute. Corbin v. Straub, 156 F. Supp.2d 833, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2001). This tolling provision is applicable to state prisoners like petitioner whose one year limitations period for seeking federal habeas relief began to run on the AEDPA's enactment date of April 24, 1996. Lucas v. Carter, 46 F. Supp.2d 709, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1999).

In the present case, petitioner's post-conviction motion tolled the one year limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, petitioner did not file this motion until April 9, 1997. By the time that petitioner filed his state post-conviction motion, three hundred and fifty (350) days had run on the one year statute of limitations. Although the time during which a properly filed application for collateral review is pending in the state courts is excluded from the one year limitations period, the limitations period is not reset upon the conclusion of state collateral review. Neal v. Bock, 137 F. Supp.2d 879, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Thus, although the filing of the motion for relief from judgment may have tolled the running of the one-year statute, it would not cause the statute to begin running anew when the state court denied the motion. See Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515, 519 (6^th Cir. 2001). Therefore, petitioner did not have one year following the denial of his post-conviction motion for relief from judgment to file his petition with this Court, as he suggests, because the one year limitations period under the AEDPA begins to run at the conclusion of the direct review of a habeas petitioner's conviction, and not on the date which a habeas petitioner has exhausted all of his state post-conviction remedies. See Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6^th Cir. 2001). The tolling of the AEDPA's one year statute of limitations ended in this case when the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment on December 27, 2000. Hudson v. Jones, 35 F. Supp.2d 986, 988-989 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Petitioner only had fifteen (15) days remaining from this date, which would have been no later than January 11, 2001, to timely file his petition with this Court. Because the instant petition was not filed until nine months later on October 17, 2001, the petition is untimely and was not filed in compliance with the AEDPA's one year statute of limitations.

Petitioner has offered several reasons, both in his application for writ of habeas corpus and in his response to the order to show cause, why the statute of limitations should be tolled. The one year limitations period under the AEDPA is considered a statute of limitations which is subject to equitable tolling, and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite which would bar review by the federal courts if not met. Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6^th Cir. 2001). In Dunlap, the Sixth Circuit adopted the test for equitable tolling set forth in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988) and indicated that five factors should be used to determine whether it would be appropriate to equitably toll the statute of limitations in a habeas case:

(1) the petitioner's lack of notice of the filing requirement;

(2) the petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement;

(3) diligence in pursuing one's rights;

(4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and,

(5) the petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim.

Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008.

The Sixth Circuit also noted that the doctrine of equitable tolling should be used "sparingly." Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008-1009. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[a]bsent a satisfactory explanation for his failure to timely file his habeas petition", a petitioner would fail to exercise due diligence in pursuing his claim, and thus would not be entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. Id. at p. 1010.

Petitioner first argues that he could not timely file his habeas petition with this Court, because he first needed to exhaust his state court remedies prior to filing the instant petition. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period on this basis. Because the tolling provisions of § 2244(d)(2) already accommodate the exhaustion requirement that petitioner faced, he would not be entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2^nd Cir. 2000); See also Franklin v. Bagley, 27 Fed. Appx. 541, 542-543 (6^th Cir. 2001) (limitations period not equitably tolled due to the fact that petitioner was attempting to exhaust all of his state court remedies prior to filing his federal habeas petition, absent a showing of due diligence). Because petitioner waited six and a half years following the denial of his direct appeals to seek state post-conviction relief, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he acted with due diligence in attempting to exhaust his state court remedies prior to filing his habeas petition.

In his application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner appears to argue that he did not timely file either his application for state post-conviction relief or his petition for writ of habeas corpus, because he did not understand how to file a criminal appeal and did not have help in doing so. A habeas petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on the basis of his "alleged helplessness" due to a lack of academic and legal education. Turner v. Smith, 70 F. Supp. 2 d 785, 787 (ED. Mich. 1999). Ignorance of the law alone is also insufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, Moore v. Hawley, 7 F. Supp.2d 901, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1998), nor would the lack of professional legal assistance toll the limitations period in this case. Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp.2d 650, 655-656 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The fact that petitioner lacked the legal sophistication to pursue his claims in either the state or federal courts is not an extraordinary circumstance that would equitably toll the statute of limitations. Hood v. Galaza, 47 F. Supp.2d 1144, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 1999).

Petitioner's primary argument in favor of equitable tolling is his claim that his mental illnesses precluded him from being able to timely file either his state post-conviction motion or his application for writ of habeas corpus. In support of this claim, petitioner contends that he was diagnosed between the months of January of 1996 and May of 1996 with having chronic dysthmia and adjustment disorder. Petitioner also claims that he has been placed on suicide watch in the past, has been hospitalized for his mental illnesses at various times, and has been prescribed unspecified psychotropic medications. Petitioner alleges that he is still under psychiatric care and is still receiving medications for his mental illness at this time. Petitioner has attached a letter dated March 7, 2002, from Sherri Hernandez-Cruz, a registered nurse from the Michigan Department of Community Health's Corrections Mental Health Program. In this letter, Ms. Hemandez-Cruz states that petitioner was first diagnosed with a mental illness upon his arrival at the Huron Valley Center Hospital on January 19, 1996. Since that time, petitioner has been admitted on seven occasions to an acute care setting because of "self harm ideations and/or behaviors" for a total of three hundred and fourteen days. Petitioner has also had three placements into a Residential Treatment Program (RTP), where petitioner is currently housed. The letter indicates that petitioner has been on a variety of antidepressants and mood stabilizing medications since January 19, 1996, although again, the letter does not specify the medications. Petitioner's current diagnosis, as he indicated, is chronic dysthmia and adjustment disorder. Significantly, the letter states that petitioner is still being treated in a mental health setting due to his "continual symptoms of depression and self harm ideations."

Where a habeas petitioner's mental competence is at issue and the record indicates a "genuine basis for concern", it is proper for a district court to toll the AEDPA's limitations period, at least until a district court makes a competency evaluation. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9^th Cir. 1998). However, a habeas petitioner's mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll the statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. Instead, the alleged mental incompetence must somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to timely file a habeas petition. Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (317 (3^rd Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a habeas petitioner must allege more than the "mere existence of physical or mental ailments" to invoke the equitable tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations. Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp.2d 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Instead, a habeas petitioner has the burden of showing that mental health problems rendered him or her unable to file a habeas petition during the one year limitations period. Id. Equitable tolling based on mental incapacity is limited to "exceptional circumstances." Smith v. Saffle, 28 Fed. Appx. 759, 760 (10^th Cir. 2001)( citing to Biester v. Midwest Health Services, Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10^th Cir. 1996)). The general federal rule is that a statute of limitations is tolled by reason of mental illness "only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them." Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7^th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

As an initial matter, petitioner has not clearly indicated the dates that he was hospitalized for his mental illnesses. Either Ms. Cruz or petitioner has highlighted five different placements for petitioner in the Michigan Department of Corrections since January 19, 1996, but this does not clearly indicate if these were the times that petitioner was actually hospitalized for his mental illness. However, the Court notes that the last highlighted placement, to "DWH" or Duane Waters Hospital, ended on August 20, 1996. It is unclear whether petitioner was ever hospitalized for his mental illness after that date. Petitioner, however, does not allege that the conditions in any of the mental hospitals that he was placed in were so restrictive that they prevented him from preparing his state post-conviction motion or his habeas petition. Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp.2d 171. Moreover, the fact that petitioner has been receiving psychotropic medications "would actually weigh more in favor of his being able to function than not." See United States ex. rel. Wright v. Carter, 1998 WL 142414, * 2 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 1998).

The biggest difficulty with petitioner's argument that his mental illnesses should toll the limitations period is that during the time that he was suffering from his various mental illnesses, he was nonetheless able to file a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment in the state trial court and subsequently had the ability to file an appeal from the denial of that post-conviction motion with the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. The exceptional circumstances that would justify equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity are not present when the party who seeks the tolling has been able to pursue his or her legal claims daring the period of his or her alleged mental incapacity. Smith v. Saffle, 28 Fed. Appx. at 760. Because petitioner was able to seek post-conviction relief in the state trial and appellate courts during the period of his mental illnesses, he was not so mentally incompetent as to warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period for bringing his habeas petition. Id. In addition, the Court notes that petitioner is still being treated for these mental illnesses. In spite of his continued treatment, petitioner was able to file the instant petition, as well as a response to the order to show cause. Because petitioner was able to pursue his federal habeas petition in this Court during the pendency of his mental illness, it appears that petitioner's illness does not prevent him from managing his legal affairs and acting upon them. Hennington v. Johnson, 2001 WL 210405, * 4, fn. 9 (N.D. Tex. February 28, 2001). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on the basis of his mental incapacities.

III. Conclusion

The current habeas petition is barred by the AEDPA's one year statute of limitations contained in § 2244(d)(1). Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the current petition. The Court will also deny petitioner a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) and F.R.A.P. 22(b) state that an appeal from the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus may not be taken unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued either by a circuit court or district court judge. If an appeal is taken by an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court judge shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why a certificate of appealability shall not issue. F.R.A.P. 22(b). To obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claims, a certificate of appealability should issue, and an appeal of the district court's order may be taken, if the petitioner shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petition should be allowed to proceed further. In such a circumstance, no appeal would be warranted. Id. A district court has the power to deny a certificate of appealability sua sponte. Allen v. Stovall, 156 F. Supp.2d 791, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2001).

The Court will deny petitioner a certificate of appealability. Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether this Court was correct in determining that petitioner had filed his habeas petition outside of the one year limitations period. The Court will also deny petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis, because the appeal would be frivolous. Allen v. Stovall, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 798.

IV. ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner will be DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis.