Opinion
No. 4:18-CV-32-BR
02-18-2020
HENRY WILLIAMS, II, Plaintiff, v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss of Defendant Pitt County Board of Education (the "Board"), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [DE-38]. Plaintiff Henry Williams, II filed a response in opposition to the motion [DE-41], and the Board filed a reply [DE-42]. The motion is ripe for decision and is referred to the undersigned for a memorandum and recommendation to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Civ. R. 72.3(c). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion be allowed.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging claims of employment discrimination based on his race and age, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). [DE-1-3]. Williams, who is African-American, was employed as a bus driver by the Pitt County Board of Education. Id. He alleged that (1) Rodney Curry, a mechanic supervisor who is white, referred to Williams and other African-American employees as "boys," refused to call them by their proper names or sit near them, yelled at them for no reason, called Williams "stupid," and refused to make necessary repairs to the heating and air conditioning systems on Williams's bus, and (2) Joey Weathington, a transportation manager who is white, treated Williams "more harshly than the white employees and more harshly than younger employees," called Williams a troublemaker after he complained about Curry's conduct, and assigned younger employees newer buses but "always put [Williams] in old, broken down buses." Id. at 4-6.
Williams's retaliation claim was dismissed because he did not allege retaliation in his EEOC charge, thereby failing to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim. Williams v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:18-CV-32-BR, 2018 WL 6981219, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2018), adopted by 2019 WL 137583 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2019), appeal dismissed and remanded, 773 F. App'x 699 (4th Cir. 2019). Williams's race and age discrimination claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim because he did not allege facts demonstrating an adverse employment action. Id. at *5. Williams's hostile work environment claim was dismissed because he did not alleged facts demonstrating sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct. Id. at *7-8. Williams's retaliation and hostile work environment claims were dismissed without prejudice. Williams, 2019 WL 137583, at *1.
Williams filed a motion to reopen his case and to appeal. [DE-25, -26]. The court denied the motion to reopen and docketed the motion as a notice of appeal. [DE-27]. Williams's appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to allow Williams to amend his hostile work environment claim. [DE-33]. Pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals, Williams was provided an opportunity to amend his hostile work environment claim. [DE-36].
On September 19, 2019, Williams filed a one page document entitled Amendment, indicating he sought to appeal the court's dismissal order or to amend his claims under Title VII and the ADEA. [DE-37]. Williams also filed forty-six pages of documents, which included correspondence from Williams related to the EEOC proceeding, [DE-37-1] at 3-6, 9-11, 14; a law enforcement report related to an incident where a bullet struck Williams's bus, id. at 7-8; an excerpt from the Board's policies regarding authority to suspend a bus driver with notes from Williams, id. at 12; correspondence from Weathington to Glen Buck in human resources related to a citation Williams received while operating a school bus, id. at 13; copies of Williams's original complaint, id. at 23-28, 41-46; a list of claims and allegations, id. at 1-2, 20-22; other administrative filings related to this case, id. at 15-19, 29, 36; a statement dated December 15, 2016 documenting a meeting that occurred with Williams, Weathington, and Buck, id. at 30-35; and a statement dated November 21, 2016 documenting an incident between Williams and Curry, id. at 37-40.
The Board moved under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. [DE-38]. Williams responded with a one-page filing asking the court to continue the case and seeking to appeal the court's January 8, 2019 order allowing the motion to dismiss the original complaint. [DE-41]. Williams also filed seventy-four pages of documents, including correspondence from Williams related to the EEOC proceeding, [DE-41-1] at 1-16, [DE-41-2] at 3-6, 9-12, [DE-41-3] at 3-8; a copy of a traffic citation Williams received on July 31, 2017, [DE-41-1] at 17; a law enforcement report related to an incident where a bullet struck Williams's bus, [DE-41-2] at 7-8; correspondence from Weathington to Buck related to a citation Williams received while operating a school bus, [DE-41-3] at 1; an excerpt from the Board's policies regarding authority to suspend a bus driver with notes from Williams, id. at 2; copies of Williams's original complaint, [DE-41-1] at 18-20, [DE-41-3] at 18-23, [DE-41-4] at 6-11; a list of claims and allegations, [DE-41-1] at 21, [DE-41-2] at 1-2, [DE-41-3] at 15-17; other administrative filings related to his case, [DE-41-3] at 9-14, 24, [DE-41-4] at 1; a statement by Williams dated December 15, 2016 documenting a meeting that occurred with Williams, Weathington, and Buck, [DE-41-3] at 25-30; and a statement by Williams dated November 21, 2016 documenting an incident between Williams and Curry, [DE-41-4] at 2-5. The Board filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. [DE-42].
II. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) —Failure to State a Claim for Hostile Work Environment
The Board seeks dismissal of Williams's amended complaint, arguing it fails to meet the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and fails to state a claim for hostile work environment. Def.'s Mem. [DE-39] at 5-9. The Board asserts the amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of Williams's claim for relief; the attachments to the amended complaint are confusing, vague, and sometimes unintelligible; and the amended complaint, liberally construed, fails to state a claim for hostile work environment. Id.
A court may dismiss an action which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the facts pleaded in the complaint, and the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff's factual allegations are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court is required to consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Although for the purposes of [a] motion to dismiss [a court] must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials 'attached or incorporated into the complaint'" and "may take judicial notice of public records without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Vlasaty v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:17-CV-578-D, 2018 WL 4515877, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2018) (citations omitted).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary "in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). At the pleading stage, "while a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The court must evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint drafted by a pro se party under a flexible standard. Johnson v. Allen, No. 7:18-CV-14-D, 2018 WL4289456, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2018). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). Nevertheless, the complaint must still "contain more than labels and conclusions," and the court "cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has held that, "in order to determine whether the claim of a pro se plaintiff can withstand a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate to look beyond the face of the complaint to allegations made in any additional materials filed by the plaintiff." Garrett v. Elko, 120 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 1997).
A hostile work environment is characterized by a workplace "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In order to state a claim for hostile work environment, plaintiff must allege facts that tend to show "the offending conduct (1) was unwelcome, (2) was because of [his] [age or race], (3) was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work environment, and (4) was imputable to [his] employer." Berry v. S. States Coop., Inc., No. 5:17-CV-635-FL, 2018 WL 4365499, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (quoting Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011)); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Trans., No. 5:15-CV-606-FL, 2017 WL 4012676, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2017) (citing one standard under both Title VII and the ADEA to state a hostile work environment claim). An employee must also show that his protected characteristic under Title VII or the ADEA was the "but for" cause of the alleged harassment. Coleman v. Altec, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-954-D, 2018 WL 4289610, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2018) (citing Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007)).
"To determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive, the court considers a variety of factors, including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Berry, 2018 WL 4365499, at *2 (quoting Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011)). "Sufficiently severe conduct can constitute harassment, even if the conduct occurs in only one instance." Id. (citing Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280-81). "However, '[a]ctivities like simple teasing, offhand comments, and off-color jokes, while often regrettable, do not cross the line into actionable misconduct.'" Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2010)). "[C]allous behavior by [one's] superiors or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with [one's] supervisor . . . do not rise to the level of actionable harassment." Chang Lim v. Azar, 310 F. Supp. 3d 588, 599 (D. Md. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee's terms and conditions of employment and to create an abusive working environment, the court examines the allegations both subjectively and objectively." Coleman, 2018 WL 4289610, at *3 (citing Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 21-22). "First, the employee must subjectively consider the conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter his conditions of employment." Id. (citing Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (per curiam)). "Second, a court views the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the employee's position to determine whether it is objectively severe or pervasive." Id. (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271). "The objective component helps courts 'to police the baseline for hostile environment claims.'" Id. (citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). "Title VII does not create 'a general civility code for the American workplace,'" Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998), but rather the alleged conduct must "amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment," Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). To be actionable, "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," based on the protected characteristic, must permeate the work environment in a manner "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions" of the plaintiff's employment and to "create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quotations omitted).
Williams's amended complaint and the accompanying documents, liberally construed, allege facts related to three separate incidents. First, on November 21, 2016, Williams had an altercation with Curry over whether Williams's bus, No. 176, had been repaired and was ready to be placed in service. [DE-37-1] at 37-40. Williams was told by a mechanic that his bus was "fit" and in the "ready line," and the mechanic also asked Williams to tell Curry to exchange bus No. 536 for No. 176. Id. at 37. When Williams conveyed the message to Curry, Curry screamed at him for no reason and "went on and on" in a very loud and disrespectful manner. Id. at 37-38. Curry then removed bus No. 176 from the ready line to keep Williams from driving it. Id. at 38. Williams also alleged Curry is disrespectful to men of Williams's age and "racial" to African-Americans in general. Id. at 38, 40.
Next, on December 15, 2016, Williams had a meeting with Weathington and Buck to discuss the altercation between Williams and Curry and an incident on December 9, 2016, when a bullet struck Williams's bus while he was transporting students. Id. at 30-35. Williams heard Weathington and Buck talking before the meeting and believed the outcome of the meeting was predetermined against him. Id. at 31. Weathington and Buck asked Williams questions about the incident with Curry, tried to make Williams look like a liar, and accused Williams of trying to get witnesses to lie about what happened. Id. at 32. Weathington said a witness wrote a statement indicating the November 21 interaction between Curry and Williams was "normal" and "everything was ok," but he would not show Williams the statement and falsely told Williams he would need a lawyer to obtain it because there was a state investigation. Id. at 33. The shooting of Williams's bus was never discussed. Id. at 32. After the meeting, Weathington shouted at Williams and called him a troublemaker. Id. at 34. Williams asserted that Weathington showed him no respect even though he is older than Weathington, and Weathington and Buck talked to African-Americans as if they were nothing. Id. at 35.
Finally, on January 5, 2017, Weathington took Williams's regular bus and gave him an old bus that had no heat or air conditioning, which Curry refused to repair, all because Williams complained about Curry's discriminatory conduct. Id. at 27.
In addition to these discrete incidents on November 21, 2016, December 15, 2016, and January 5, 2017, Williams also alleged that the discrimination was "ongoing before [and] after these dates." Am. Compl. Suppl. Docs. [DE-37-1] at 26; Compl. [DE-1-3] at 4. Williams generally alleged that (1) Curry referred to him and other African-American employees as "boys" and refused to call African-American employees by their proper names, refused to sit near Williams and other African-American employees, yelled for no reason, and called Williams "stupid"; and (2) Weathington treated Williams "more harshly than white employees and more harshly than younger employees." Am. Compl. Suppl. Docs. [DE-37-1] at 26-27; Compl. [DE-1-3] at 4-6.
Williams's amended complaint and accompanying documents fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment based on his age and race. Williams's account of the incidents of November 21, 2016, December 15, 2016, and January 5, 2017 portrays rude and callous behavior on the part of Curry and Weathington, and Williams suggests that their behavior was attributable to his race and age. However, Williams's conclusory statements are insufficient to demonstrate that the unwelcome conduct was because of Williams's race and age. In the specific incidents described by Williams, there are no allegations that Curry or Weathington used slurs or other incendiary language and no allegations from which the court could infer that the offensive conduct was motivated by age or race. See Walton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 5:17-CV-85-BR, 2017 WL 4080459, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2017) (dismissing claim of hostile work environment based on age where the alleged offensive conduct was sexual in nature, and there were no allegations from which the court could infer that the offensive conduct was motivated by the plaintiff's age), aff'd, 765 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2019); Battle v. Burwell, No. PWG-14-2250, 2016 WL 4993294, at *16 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 2016) (finding conclusory allegation that discrimination was based on race and gender was insufficient to state a hostile work environment claim where there were no factual allegations from which to infer the complained of acts were motivated by race or gender). Furthermore, these three incidents, as alleged by Williams, are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to satisfy the high standard to state a claim for hostile work environment. See Dortch v. Cellco P'ship, 770 F. App'x 643, 645 4th Cir. 2019) ("The standard for proving an abusive work environment is intended to be a high one because it is designed to 'filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.'") (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). These incidents may demonstrate a workplace lacking in civility but not one "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition to the three specific incidents described by Williams, he generally alleged the discrimination was ongoing before and after those dates and that Curry referred to him and other African-American employees as "boys," refused to call African-American employees by their proper names, refused to sit near him and other African-American employees, yelled for no reason, and called him "stupid," and Weathington treated Plaintiff more harshly than white employees and younger employees. Am. Compl. Suppl. Docs. [DE-37-1] at 26; Compl. [DE-1-3] at 4. As the court recognized in considering the prior motion to dismiss Williams's initial complaint, referring to an African-American employee as "boy," under certain circumstances, has been found sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim. Williams, 2018 WL 6981219, at *7 (citing Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (holding that referring to employees as "boy" could be evidence of discriminatory intent when considered with factors "including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage," and reversing the Court of Appeals decision that the use of "boy" alone was not direct evidence of discrimination)); White v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "boy" was one term of many that could create a triable issue of fact on hostile work environment claims when used against employees). However, the Fourth Circuit has held that "'conclusory statements, without specific evidentiary support, cannot support an actionable claim for harassment,' Causey v. Ball, 33 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998), and that allegations '[un]substantiated by accounts of specific dates, times, or circumstances,' are too 'general' to suffice, Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1994)." EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 676 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding a plaintiff's general statements that a co-worker used a racial slur "a bunch of different times" was insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim); see Brown v. Wake Cty. Gov't, No. 5:16-CV-806-D, 2017 WL 2982971, at *6 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2017) ("[T]hreadbare allegation that [plaintiff] was "treated differently" than Hispanic coworkers, [] is too vague to state a claim under Title VII.").
In cases where hostile work environment claims have survived a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs pleaded specific instances of extremely offensive conduct that are lacking here. See Franks v. Coleman, No. 4:19-CV-90-BO, Am. Compl. [DE-28] ¶ 16, 2020 WL 424946, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2020) (denying in part a motion to dismiss a hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff alleged that defendant Coleman referred to plaintiff as "boy" in December 2016 and referred to plaintiff as being psychotic; defendant Cox, along with defendant Ragland, referred to plaintiff's hair as rhino lining; and in November 2016, defendant Ragland pointed his loaded service weapon at plaintiff's head and called plaintiff a "nigger" in the presence of other Beaufort County Sheriff's Office employees); Snelling v. Wake Cty., No. 5:16-CV-640-BO, Am. Compl. [DE-11] ¶¶ 10-11, 2016 WL 6746693, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2016) (denying a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that "[b]eginning in January 2015, Ms. Jones, Ms. Scott and Mr. Taylor all began to refer to Plaintiff as 'boy,' 'nigger,' and 'fag.' These three co-workers made these disparaging remarks to Plaintiff on a daily basis and continued to do so until Plaintiff was discharged from employment," and the "remarks . . . created a hostile work environment."). Williams's allegations related to the November 21, 2016, December 15, 2016, and January 5, 2017 incidents demonstrate unprofessional conduct but not the type of extremely serious conduct found in cases like Franks or Snelling. Williams's general allegations that he and other African-American employees were called "boys" and treated more harshly than white or younger employees, without more, lack the necessary context to evaluate whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a hostile work environment claim. See Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 277 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that context matters in determining whether the use of a racial epithet has created a racially hostile work environment) (citations omitted). Therefore, Williams's general allegations fail to state a hostile work environment claim because they lack sufficient factual matter, i.e., specific dates, times, or circumstances, to satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In evaluating Williams's initial complaint, the court found the allegations "relate[d] troubling workplace conduct, but lack[ed] the necessary facts to 'nudge[] [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]'" Williams, 2018 WL 6981219, at *8 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see Berry, 2018 WL 4365499, at *3 (allowing motion to dismiss for failure to state a hostile work environment claim where general assertions that harassing conduct occurred on "a frequent basis" and "on a number of earlier occasions" were too general to support a harassment claim) (citing Gilliam, 474 F.3d at 143); Bazemore v. Best Buy, No. CV PJM 18-264, 2018 WL 3117542, at *3 (D. Md. June 25, 2018) (allowing motion to dismiss pro se complaint for failure to state a hostile work environment claim, where "[g]eneral allegations of racial slurs, without specific references to detail, context, date, or circumstances, are insufficient to establish a hostile work environment."). Williams's amended complaint and accompanying documents failed to remedy the pleading deficiencies found in his initial complaint. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for hostile work environment be allowed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [DE-38] be ALLOWED and Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until March 3, 2020, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
Submitted, this the 18th day of February 2020.
/s/_________
Robert B. Jones, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge