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holding that a racist remark from the person who reported the plaintiff for an infraction that resulted in her termination was insufficient to prevent summary judgment
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C. A. 3:21-1918-MGL-PJG
03-31-2023
Bridgette Williams, Plaintiff, v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Bridgette Williams brings this employment action against her former employer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, raising claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendant Piedmont Airlines, Inc. (“Piedmont's”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 58.) Williams filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 63), and Piedmont replied (ECF No. 65). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that Piedmont's motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. This case arises from Williams's February 2020 termination from Piedmont's station at the Columbia Metropolitan Airport. Piedmont is a passenger air carrier. Piedmont hired Williams in October 2014 as a part-time gate agent. Williams was promoted to the position of Customer Service Supervisor in May 2017, which entailed supervising agents at the ticketing and departure gate counters. Williams, who is African American, had multiple supervisors during her employment, but relevant here, by June 2019, Williams had two Caucasian supervisors-Chad Lausman, the Shift Manager, and Deirdre Francis, the General Manager. Lausman reported to Francis. Williams's claims are based on her perception that Francis was hostile to Williams, in part, because Williams told Francis that Lausman made a racist comment about other Piedmont employees.
Williams asserts that Francis's hostility toward Williams began when Williams submitted a shift-end report that was copied by email to regional management (who supervised Francis), which outlined issues and needs for the Columbia station. Williams believes that Francis began retaliating against her from that point forward because the email included information that Francis did not want to be seen by regional management. Williams also believes the animosity between her and Francis got worse when Francis rearranged a ticket counter and moved Williams's workspace without communicating with Williams.
In June 2019, Francis selected Lausman to be the Shift Manager over Williams. At that time, Lausman was the Ramp Supervisor, which entailed supervising agents on the tarmac who facilitated boarding, departure, and arrival of aircraft. Francis testified that she selected Lausman because of his tenure with the company; his experience, especially with ramp operations; and his having previously served as Interim Shift Manager. Francis specifically testified that Lausman's strength in ramp operations was a good compliment to Francis's strength in customer service operations. Francis also testified that Williams had less tenure than Lausman, no ramp operation experience, and had not served as an interim shift manager.
Williams, however, believed Francis chose Lausman because Lausman is white, Williams is black, and Francis showed more favoritism toward Lausman. In her interview with Francis for the position, Francis asked Williams if Williams knew of anything about the other shift manager candidates that Francis should know. Williams responded that Lausman had recently referred to a group of ramp agents as “monkeys,” and noted that she objected to Lausman's use of that term. Williams admits that Lausman never made any other comments she perceived as racially derogatory while working at Piedmont. Williams also admits that Lausman's comment was not directed toward her and she was never the subject of a racially derogatory comment while working at Piedmont.
On July 19, 2019, a different shift manager, Jennell Monsegue-Gamaldo, who is African American, issued Williams a “performance coaching” because Williams failed to properly complete a check and drop it in the recordkeeper box. This error was discovered during a routine audit. Williams had been counseled for similar conduct in August 2016. Williams asserts that Francis influenced the performance coaching in retaliation for the email to regional management and the workspace rearrangement. On August 12, 2019, another shift manager, Denise Pryde-McKee, who is Caucasian, issued a more serious Level 1 corrective action to Williams because Williams failed to sign and properly record three refund checks.
In September 2019, Francis selected Williams as the first supervisor in Columbia to receive cross-training in a different supervisor role because Williams had sought a shift manager role but lacked experience in ramp operations. Williams was sent to Charlotte, North Carolina to receive in-person training on ramp operations, which included proper movement of aircraft, the use of “wing walkers” (who guide a plane's movement on the ground), and the five-foot rule (governing the proper distance between aircraft and ground equipment). Upon her return to Columbia, Williams received on-the-job training in ramp operations.
On October 18, 2019, Williams hit an aircraft with a metal baggage cart while working in ramp operations, purportedly because Williams did not follow the five-foot rule. Williams received a Level 3 corrective action, which included a suspension because it was a safety violation that resulted in damage to an aircraft. Williams was required to sign a letter indicating her commitment to safety, in which she agreed to read and fully commit to the operations manual and other policies and procedures, and to continue her ramp training. Williams completed the training and began supervising ramp operations on her own around early February 2020.
On February 13, 2020, Lausman reported to Francis that he observed aircraft being moved on Williams's watch without the proper safety protocols in place. The ramp agents were performing a “tail swap,” where an aircraft parked at the gate is moved to make room for a different aircraft. Safety procedures for a tail swap require that wing walkers be present, agents be briefed on assigned roles and a plan, the swap be supervised by the ramp supervisor or other designated official, and the ramp supervisor be present any time an aircraft or other equipment is in motion. An investigation into the incident by Francis revealed that Williams left the ramp unsupervised to work on a different task, did not conduct a proper briefing of the agents, did not oversee the aircraft's movement, and that the swap was performed without wing walkers. For her part, Williams claimed that she left a lead agent in charge to oversee the swap while Williams attended to another task.
After the investigation, which included written statements from the agents involved and an interview between Francis, Lausman, and Williams, Francis issued a Level 3 corrective action against Williams. (Corrective actions were also issued against two other agents involved in the incident.) Francis recommended that Williams be terminated because this was her second Level 3 corrective action for a safety violation and Williams had recently returned from a suspension in which she signed a commitment to safe practices. Francis's recommendation for termination was approved by a regional manager and Williams was terminated on February 20, 2020. Williams's position was filled by an African American.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Ballinger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257.
In discrimination cases, a party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable jury could rule in the non-moving party's favor. Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). The court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, but the court should examine uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence offered by the moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court must determine whether a party's offered evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of discrimination and look at the strength of a party's case on its own terms. See id. at 148 (stating that “[c]ertainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational fact-finder could conclude that the action was discriminatory”).
B. Methods of Proof in Employment Cases
A plaintiff asserting a claim of unlawful employment discrimination may proceed through two avenues of proof. First, she may attempt directly to prove discrimination with direct or circumstantial evidence. Alternatively, when direct proof is lacking, a plaintiff may proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, developed for Title VII, has been applied to § 1981 claims). Pursuant to this framework, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight, 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010) (Title VII). The defendant's burden “is a burden of production, not persuasion.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Once a defendant meets this burden by producing affidavits or testimony demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, “the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens-disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In other words, if the defendant meets the burden to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was “not its true reason[], but [was] a pretext for discrimination.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 294 (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). Accordingly, the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 294 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) (alterations in original); see also Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (Title VII & 42 U.S.C. § 1981). To meet this “merged” burden, the employee may prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision maker's affidavit is untrue or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
“[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. However, “if the record conclusively reveal[s] some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff create[s] only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred,” summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Accordingly, the court must evaluate “the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 148-49. “Notwithstanding the intricacies of proof schemes, the core of every [discrimination] case remains the same, necessitating resolution of the ultimate question of . . . whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 294-95.
C. Piedmont's Motion
1. Race Discrimination
Piedmont argues that Williams fails to present evidence that could demonstrate that Piedmont's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Williams was pretextual. The court agrees.
Section 1981 provides a federal cause of action to persons who experience intentional race discrimination in private employment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975); Ali v. BC Architects Engineers, PLC, 832 Fed.Appx. 167, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2020). Generally, to establish a prima facie claim of discriminatory discharge under § 1981, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was discharged, (3) she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations at the time of discharge, and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances permitting a reasonable inference of race discrimination. See Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004)); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 787 (4th Cir. 2004) (Section 1981). Ultimately, the plaintiff must show that race was a but-for cause of her discharge. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020); Jones v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., 845 Fed.Appx. 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is not enough to show that race played some role in the defendant's decisionmaking process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comcast Corp., 140 S.Ct. at 1013).
Piedmont argues that under Comcast, Williams's argument and testimony that Piedmont had multiple motivating factors for her termination is necessarily fatal to her claim. Specifically, Piedmont argues that Comcast created a rule that a § 1981 race discrimination fails as a matter of law if the plaintiff claims, argues, or testifies that race was not the only motivating factor in the challenged conduct. Williams does not address this argument in her response. Given the lack of argument on this point and Williams's failure to put forth any evidence that race was a factor in her termination, the court need not address this specific point.
Here, Piedmont has put forth substantial evidence that Williams was not meeting Piedmont's legitimate expectations at the time she was terminated. Williams had been disciplined for two serious safety violations within months of each other, and one coming after she was suspended and given remedial training. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (providing that once the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence).
“When an employer attacks the essential factual premise of the employee's discrimination claim, the same evidence is germane to both the prima facie case and pretext inquiries.” Lyons v. City of Alexandria, 35 F.4th 285, 289 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Williams argues that those disciplinary actions were not merited and were instead based on Francis's animosity toward Williams. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 63 at 6.) Williams provides no explanation why she believes the first Level 3 disciplinary action-for hitting an aircraft with a metal baggage car-was not merited. (Id.) Williams argues the second Level 3 disciplinary action was not merited because company policy gave her the authority to leave the tail swap operation in another employee's hands, and she contends she “had wing walkers.” (Id.) However, Williams provides no citation to the record to establish the existence of evidence supporting these arguments, nor does Williams's argument on its face refute all of the findings in the investigation that led to her termination. See Hux v. City of Newport News, Va., 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Once an employer has provided a non-discriminatory explanation for its decision, the plaintiff cannot seek to expose that rationale as pretextual by focusing on minor discrepancies that do not cast doubt on the explanation's validity, or by raising points that are wholly irrelevant to it.”). For instance, Francis's investigation concluded that Williams did not tell the other employee (Dwayne Lewis) that she was leaving, Lewis could not have physically overseen the tail swap, and Williams could not explain how Lewis would know that he was responsible for overseeing the process. (Francis Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 58-3 at 6.) Therefore, Williams fails to forecast any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Piedmont's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual, her own unsubstantiated belief to the contrary notwithstanding. See Collier v. Charlottesville Sch. Bd., 218 Fed.Appx. 244, 245 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that the plaintiff's own, unsubstantiated assertions are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext); Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 462, 485 (D. Md. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff could not establish pretext even though the plaintiff disagreed with the employers' perception of the confrontation because the employee put forth no evidence that the decision-maker did not actually have that perception).
Moreover, Williams fails to forecast any evidence that race played any role in her termination. See Comcast Corp., 140 S.Ct. at 1019. The record is undisputed that Williams was replaced by an African American, an issue that Williams does not address in response to Piedmont's motion, and one that is generally fatal to establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. See Miles, 429 F.3d at 486-88 (stating that generally a plaintiff asserting a discriminatory discharge claim must show she was replaced by someone outside her protected class to make a prima facie case, but concluding that limited exceptions to this requirement exist). Nor does Williams otherwise point to any evidence that the circumstances of her termination give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 485. To the contrary, her argument that the disciplinary actions taken against her “based solely upon animosity from” Francis, (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 63 at 6), would appear to preclude a finding that race played any role in her termination, much less a but-for cause of her termination. See, e.g., Jones, 845 Fed.Appx. at 214-15 (stating that “it is not enough to show that race played some role” in the adverse employment decision, and finding that the plaintiff's theory that his employer favored another employee could not state a claim for racial discrimination without evidence tethering that favoritism to race) (internal quotation marks omitted). Williams makes no attempt to explain why Francis's purported “animosity” was race-based, and her deposition testimony undermines such an argument. Williams testified that Francis's animosity stemmed from the email Williams sent to management that included information Francis did not want shared with management, and Williams admitted that incident had nothing to do with race. (Williams Dep. 146-48, ECF No. 58-2 at 67-69.) Therefore, Williams fails to forecast evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she would not have been terminated but for her race.
2. Hostile Work Environment
Piedmont argues Williams cannot put forth evidence that she was subjected to a severe or pervasive conduct to establish a hostile work environment claim. The court agrees.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim based on race, the plaintiff must show that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff's race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer. See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015); Ali, 832 Fed.Appx. at 172 (applying the same test to § 1981 claims). “A hostile environment exists ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.' ” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
Here, the only race-based incident Williams points to in support of her hostile work environment claim is Lausman's comment about monkeys. Generally, an isolated incident of harassment is insufficient to show that the harassing conduct is severe and pervasive. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile' or ‘abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.”); id. at 21 (“[M]ere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in [an] employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); but see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (stating an isolated incident of harassment can support a hostile work environment claim if it the incident is “extremely serious,” for example, where a supervisor twice directed a racial epithet at the plaintiff in anger) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
However, Williams does not argue that the Lausman comment was so serious that it alone supports her claim. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 63 at 7.) Instead, she argues that Francis also “singled her out” by interfering with her workspace, reprimanded for her sharing information with management, and disciplined her despite her complying with company policies, and that Lausman also “tailed” her to the exclusion of other employees. (Id.) But as previously explained, Williams puts forth no evidence that these incidents had anything to do with her race. See, e.g., Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that the plaintiff's perception that her employer disliked her and made her job more difficult and stressful was not enough to support her hostile work environment claim, absent evidence that the employer's actions were racial in nature).
And notably, Lausman's comment was not directed at Williams, and Williams testified that after she objected to Lausman's comment, Lausman never made a racist comment thereafter. (Williams Dep. 96, ECF No. 58-2 at 38.)
Therefore, Williams fails to forecast evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Williams was subjected to racial harassment that was severe and pervasive.
3. Retaliation
Piedmont argues that Williams cannot make a prima facie case of retaliation, and even if she could, she cannot show that Piedmont's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her was pretextual. Specifically, Piedmont argues that Williams cannot put forth evidence showing a causal relationship between the protected activity and her adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case. Piedmont also argues that Williams puts forth no evidence that her termination based on two Level 3 safety violations was pretext for discrimination. The court agrees.
In response to Piedmont's motion, Williams asserts for the first time that she was retaliated against when she was denied a promotion. As Piedmont points out in reply, Williams did not assert a retaliatory failure to promote claim in her Complaint, and thus, such a claim is not before the court. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (providing a party may only amend its pleading with the opposing party's consent or the court's leave); Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 262 Fed.Appx. 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)).
The requisite elements for a prima facie case of retaliation typically include: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer acted adversely against him or her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016) (Section 1981); Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 229 (4th Cir. 2008). Here, Williams claims that she was retaliated against for reporting Lausman's racist comment to Francis when she was disciplined and terminated. However, Francis did not discipline Williams the first time until four months after that interview and she did not recommend Williams's termination until eight months later. Therefore, Williams cannot rely on temporal proximity to establish causation here, see generally Perry v. Kappos, 489 Fed.Appx. 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2012), and Williams does not point to any other facts could show that Francis sought to retaliate against Williams for reporting a racist comment made by Lausman.
Williams argues that she can demonstrate a causal connection because Lausman made the racist remark and was the person who reported Williams for not supervising the tail swap, which led to her last corrective action and termination. See generally Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011) (providing that a cat's paw theory of liability seeks to hold an “employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision”). However, Williams puts forth no evidence to refute Piedmont's assertion that it correctly determined in the investigation of the tail swap incident that Williams committed safety violations that were so serious they justified her termination. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing that to succeed on a cat's paw theory of liability, the plaintiff cannot merely show the subordinate had a substantial influence on the challenged decision, rather, the plaintiff must show “sufficient evidence that the subordinate employee possessed such authority as to be viewed as the one principally responsible for the decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer”). And as explained previously, Williams fails to forecast any evidence that Piedmont's stated non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretextual, despite Williams's unsubstantiated assertion that her corrective actions were not merited. In other words, even if Lausman's purported animus could be imputed to Piedmont, she cannot show that Lausman's animus was the but-for cause of her termination. Consequently, Williams fails to forecast sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Piedmont retaliated against her.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends Piedmont's motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 58.)
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).