Opinion
23-CV-10027 (LTS)
01-04-2024
TEARRE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE, Respondent.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2023 conviction in the New York Supreme Court, New York County. His direct appeal of the conviction is pending. By order dated November 15, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition, without prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court has the authority to review and deny a Section 2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading from the State, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original); see Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Tearre Williams alleges that a jury in the New York Supreme Court, New York County, convicted him of assault in the second degree, and judgment was entered on May 31, 2023, sentencing him to seven years' incarceration, plus five years' post-release supervision. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, First Department, and his appeal is pending. (ECF 1 at 2, ¶ 9(c).)
The petition can be liberally construed as asserting the following grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses; (2) the indictment was defective; (3) Petitioner was denied due process; and (4) the jury's decision was against the weight of the evidence.
DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of state court remedies
Before a petitioner can seek federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). The state judicial system must be given the first opportunity to review the errors raised by a petitioner before a federal court may review a Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 237 (2d Cir. 2003). “[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
Petitioner indicates that his direct appeal from his conviction has not yet been decided. (ECF 1 at 2, ¶ 9 (c).) In order to exhaust his claims on direct appeal, Petitioner must wait for the Appellate Division to decide the outcome of his appeal. If he is adversely affected by the Appellate Division's decision, he must seek leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the highest New York State court. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.20; see United States ex rel. Bagley v. LaVallee, 332 F.2d 890, 892 (2d Cir. 1964).
If Petitioner raises any of his grounds for relief in a collateral motion in the trial court under Section 440 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law and is unsuccessful, he must seek leave to appeal to the Appellate Division before exhaustion is complete. See, e.g., Ramos v. Walker, 88 F.Supp.2d 233, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Because Petitioner's direct appeal is pending, and he has not exhausted his state court remedies by invoking one complete round of the State's established review process for any of his grounds for relief, the Court denies the petition without prejudice as prematurely filed.
The Court notes that a petitioner generally has only one opportunity to bring a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition in federal court. Because this petition has not been adjudicated on the merits, the filing of this petition does not prevent Petitioner from bringing a new Section 2254 petition challenging this conviction. See, e.g., Whab v. United States, 408 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that for a petition to be considered “second or successive,” disposition of the earlier petition must qualify as an adjudication on the merits). Petitioner should be aware, however, that there is a limitations period for bringing a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition, which is generally one year from the latest of four benchmark dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D), (2).
B. Leave to amend denied
District courts generally grant a pro se litigant an opportunity to amend a pleading to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in this petition cannot be cured with an amendment at this time, the Court declines to grant Petitioner leave to amend his petition.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies this habeas corpus petition, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, without prejudice as unexhausted and prematurely filed.
Because the petition at this time makes no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Judgment shall issue.
SO ORDERED.