Opinion
Civil Action No. 93-5696.
August 12, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before this Court is Plaintiff Henry Williams' Petition for Relief for Breach of Settlement Agreement. Mr. Williams alleges that Defendants have breached the settlement agreement which the parties entered into to resolve this matter. He further contends that this Court retained jurisdiction after the resolution of the action in order to monitor the parties' compliance with the above-mentioned agreement. As a result of this belief, and Defendants' alleged breach of the agreement, he asks the Court to now enter judgment for him and against Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual history is compiled from the Petition of Henry Williams for Relief for Breach of Settlement; Defendants' Answer, the Settlement Enforcement Procedure documents submitted by Plaintiff's counsel; correspondence from counsel for both parties; and the Court Record.
The background of this case was set forth in my earlier Report and Recommendation dated June 27, 1994.
[Mr. Williams and his co-plaintiffs] filed individual law suits against their employer and seven supervisors alleging a long-standing pattern of race-based discriminatory discipline, promotion practices and evaluation procedures. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege retaliation for engaging in protected speech activities in connection with their membership in the Sentinels of Criminal Justice ("Sentinels"), a professional organization developed to improve the function of the criminal justice system and to address other related issues of public concern.
The Sentinels are devoted to the eradication of discrimination within the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and have implemented a public campaign which involves writing letters and memoranda to Board directors and supervisors, lobbying legislators, speaking to the media, testifying at committee hearings, and filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and with the Governor's Office of Administration to achieve this goal. Williams v. PA Board of Probation and Parole, CA No. 93-5696, Report and Recommendation, 3 (E.D.Pa., June 27, 1994).
Concerning Mr. Williams' individual claim of retaliation in this action, I made the following findings of fact:
Mr. Williams ha[d] worked for the Board since 1984 and during the relevant time period ha[d] carried a caseload of approximately 150 cases. Stuart Greenberg supervise[d] Mr. Williams.
Prior to filing the instant lawsuit Mr. Williams had received reprimands regarding his performance.
Sometime in December 1993, Mr. Williams received verbal notice that he would be disciplined for an unidentified problem.
Mr. Williams arranged for George Frazier, the Chief AFSCME steward, to attend any future pre-disciplinary conference since he could not have his attorney attend the conference.
Mr. Shalon notified Mr. Williams by a hand-written note dated December 21, 1993 that by arrangement with George Frazier a pre-disciplinary conference was scheduled for January 4, 1994 at 2:00 p.m.
There is no evidence concerning the purpose for this conference.This conference did not go forward.
The Board employs a full-time warrant officer to handle the daily transport of prisoners from Philadelphia County facilities to state facilities.
The Board has determined that for safety reasons it is necessary that two people handle the transport of prisoners.
Prior to December 1993, the Philadelphia District Office utilized a rotation system under which each unit contributed a parole agent to assist the warrant officer on a daily basis.
This rotation system required that the parole agent temporarily stop performing his parole agent duties and that the other agents in the unit take over supervision of his/her cases.
Prior to December 1993, Mr. Shalon considered eliminating the rotation system and had requested funding for a second full-time warrant officer.
Mr. Williams suggested that management abolish the rotation system and hire a second full-time warrant officer.
Mr. Shalon did not place Carl Osilick, a parole investigator, into the warrant officer position because the Philadelphia District Office had no other parole investigators on staff.
In December 1993, Mr. Shalon decided to appoint Mr. Williams to assist the warrant officer until the Philadelphia District Office received approval to create a second warrant officer position.
Mr. Shalon chose Mr. Williams to serve in this capacity because he felt that his reassignment would have the least impact on the operation of the district office.
Mr. Shalon understood that the parole agents were overworked but determined that abolishing the rotation system would produce more of a benefit to the office than keeping Mr. Williams in the parole agent position.
Mr. Castor felt that the transfer of Mr. Williams would benefit the office, and also allow him to perform a less stressful job without a loss in pay.
Mr. Williams advised Mr. Castor that he objected to being reassigned to assisting the warrant officer.
Mr. Castor directed Mr. Shalon to make the reassignment a temporary ninety (90) day assignment.
Shalon notified Williams by memorandum dated December 23, 1993 that he would assist the warrant officer beginning on January 3, 1994, and that after ninety (90) days he would resume his regular duties as parole agent.
Mr. Williams formally expressed his displeasure with the reassignment in a memorandum to Mr. Castor dated December 30, 1993.
Mr. Marshall determined that Mr. Williams' reassignment did not violate any personnel rules or provisions of the collective bargaining agreement since he continued to be classified as a Parole Agent II and to receive the salary and benefits attendant to that position.
Mr. Williams [would] resume his regular duties as a Parole Agent II upon completion of a ninety (90) day temporary assignment to assisting the warrant officer.
From January 4 through March 2, 1994, Mr. Williams was on sick leave status due to an illness.
Mr. Shalon understood that Mr. Williams intended to be on sick leave status for an extended period of time.
Mr. Shalon did not reassign another parole agent to assist the warrant officer during the period of Mr. Williams' absence.
The Office of Administration's 1993 Report found that the Board used reassignment as a means of discipline only with black agents. Id. at 13-16.
My Report and Recommendation to deny Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction was approved and adopted by the Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr. on October 12, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, the matter was settled upon agreement of the parties and dismissed with prejudice pursuant to then Local Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), the Court retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of execution of a settlement agreement. The case was closed.
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) has been renumbered Local Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1(b).
Over three years later, on December 10, 1998, Mr. Williams filed a Petition for Relief for Breach of Settlement to which Defendants responded. Initially, Judge O'Neill ordered that all discovery concerning the alleged breach was to be completed by May 24, 1999, with the parties filing pretrial memoranda on or before that date. Subsequent extensions were granted, and the discovery deadline was extended to September 1, 1999, again with pretrial memoranda due at the same time; neither party ever filed such a memorandum. Incredibly, on March 2, 2004, five years after the close of discovery and the required filing of pretrial memoranda in regard to the settlement agreement, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to file his pretrial memorandum! The motion was denied on March 16, 2004.
The case was referred to me for post-settlement proceedings, and a Hearing with counsel was held on April 14, 2004.
II. DISCUSSION
On April 28, 1995, upon being informed by counsel that the within case had been settled, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).
AND NOW, TO WIT: this 28th day of April, 1995, it having been reported that the issues between the parties in the above captioned action have been settled and upon Order of the Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure of this Court (effective January 1, 1970), it is
ORDERED that the above action is DISMISSED with prejudice, pursuant to agreement of counsel without costs as provided by Local rule 42(d), subject to retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of execution of this agreement. Holmes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, et al., CA No. 93-5927, Order, (E.D.Pa., April 28, 1995).
L.R.Civ.P. 23(b) [renumbered 41.1(b)] reads:
(b) Whenever in any civil action counsel shall notify the Clerk or the judge to whom the action is assigned that the issues between the parties have been settled, the Clerk shall, upon order of the judge to whom the case is assigned, enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice, without costs, pursuant to the agreement of counsel. Any such order of dismissal may be vacated, modified, or stricken from the record, for cause shown, upon the application of any party served within ninety (90) days of the entry of such order of dismissal.
Subsequent to Judge O'Neill's Order of dismissal, a Settlement Agreement and Release was completely executed by the parties on May 1, 1995. This Settlement Agreement and Release was not incorporated by the Court into its April 28, 1995 Order. None of the Settlement Agreement and Release was made part of the judgment of the Court, which merely dismissed the matter upon counsels' representation that the matter was settled, and a trial would be unnecessary.
The Settlement Agreement and Release, on its own, contains provisions regarding the procedures required in the event of its breach. It reads in relevant part:
6. Plaintiffs each agrees that, in the event that he believes that he has been subjected to discrimination or retaliation at any time after his execution of this Agreement, he shall use the procedure set forth below (hereinafter the "alternative dispute resolution procedure") to resolve his claim or complaint. Plaintiffs each further agrees that the procedure set forth below shall be the exclusive method of resolving complaints of discrimination and/or retaliation which arise subsequent to his execution of this Agreement and that he shall not file any charge or complaint with any local, state or federal administrative agency or court regarding or relating to such complaints of discrimination and/or harassment. . . .
7. The parties further agree that each of the Plaintiffs and the Persons Released may enforce the terms of this Agreement in the event of any breach. The parties further agree that upon any alleged breach of the Agreement, suit to enforce it may be brought in law and/or equity, and/or any of the Plaintiffs may reopen and renew the litigation which is being dismissed by this Agreement, at his option, in addition to all other remedies for breach. Settlement Agreement and Release at 7-8, 11.
Mr. Williams alleges that the Agreement has been breached in that he has been "subjected to repeated, systematic and discrimination and retaliation, based on race and on having prosecuted the earlier litigation, as well as having exercised the First Amendment Rights which were the subject of this action initially". He further states that he was subjected to a bias and hostile work environment that led to his resignation from the Parole Board. Petition of Henry Williams for Relief for Breach of Settlement at 2. He returns to this Court asking that this action be reopened and that "judgment be entered for him and against defendants, together with punitive damages, compensatory damages, attorneys fees; and such other relief as may be appropriate. Petition at 8. Defendants, inter alia, assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and aver that the Court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of execution of the Agreement only and that the parties' compliance with the Agreement was not part of Judge O'Neill's Order. See Correspondence to the Court from Mark Blondman, Esquire dated May 4, 2004. I agree.
The dismissal in the instant case was issued pursuant to L.R.Civ.P. 23(b) [now numbered L.R.Civ.P. 41.1(b)] which provides for dismissal by agreement of counsel and causes that dismissal to be with prejudice subject to retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of execution of a settlement agreement. Should a problem arise concerning the execution of the parties' settlement agreement, a petition may be filed to reinstate the case within ninety days of the date of the Court's Order. The instant petition to reinstate is clearly untimely.
Finding no relief for Mr. Williams in the Court's Local Rules, I look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) A reading of the rule reveals that the only basis for relief from judgment that could possibly apply in this matter would be (6) "any other reason justifying relief[.]" However, Mr. Williams' assertion that the settlement agreement has been breached is no reason to set aside the judgment of dismissal and order that judgment be entered for him and against Defendants, as he asks the Court to do.
F.R.C iv.P. 60(b) reads in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
"Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may only be granted under extraordinary circumstances, where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur." Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977). Such extraordinary circumstances do not exist here where a separate action to enforce the settlement agreement itself could have been pursued, had the alternative dispute resolution procedure not been successful.
In support of his position, Mr. Williams cites Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (1994) as "recent, on point, and controlling". Correspondence to the Court from Robert J. Sugarman, Esquire dated May 4, 2004. However, as the United States Supreme Court opined in Kokkonen:
But the only order here was that the suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement. The situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal-either by separate provision (such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.
. . . . .
Absent such action, however, enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380, 382.
The similarity to the instant action is evident. The Court retained jurisdiction in the present action "for the purpose of execution of this agreement" only.
In addition to the above, it is worth noting that it was over three years after settlement of the instant matter that Mr. Williams filed the Petition which is the subject of this Report and Recommendation. Upon its filing, in an effort to ascertain the nature of the parties' dispute, Judge O'Neill issued a number of procedural orders, one of which set a discovery deadline of September 1, 1999, and ordered Mr. Williams to file a pretrial memorandum by the same date. The Order was ignored by Plaintiff for five (5) years! It was not until March 2, 2004, that he filed a motion to extend time for the filing of his pretrial memorandum, which Judge O'Neill denied in rapid order, citing his Order of dismissal executed in 1995. One need only look to the doctrine of laches for further resolution of this matter.
[T]he doctrine of laches bars relief when the plaintiff's dereliction indicates a lack of due diligence in failing to institute an action and such failure results in prejudice to another (internal quotations and citations omitted). USA v. Melvin Shaw, CA No. 03-4651, slip op. at 3 (E.D.Pa., August 4, 2004).
To say that Mr. Williams showed a lack of due diligence in regard to his pursuit of appropriate action concerning the resolution of this case is an exercise in understatement. So, too, is the fact of prejudice to Defendants by this delay.
I conclude that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, and the case remains closed and dismissed with prejudice. I recommend that Mr. Williams' petition be denied.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Consistent with the above discussion, it is recommended that Plaintiff's petition be DENIED.