The Supreme Court created a burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), that governs each of the plaintiffs' remaining claims. See Williams v. Pace Univ., 192 F. Supp. 3d 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Title VI); Orrego v. Knipfing, 564 F. Supp. 3d 273, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (Section 1981 and NYSHRL).
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination under Title VI and Title IX by showing that: “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] suffered an adverse action in pursuit of [his] education by [the] defendant; (3) [he] was treated differently from similarly situated students who are not members of the protected class; and (4) [he] was qualified to continue in [his] educational pursuit.” Williams v. Pace Univ., 192 F.Supp.3d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case for Title VI discrimination by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse action in pursuit of his education; (3) he was treated differently from similarly situated students who are not members of his protected class; and (4) he was qualified to continue in his educational pursuit. Williams v. Pace Univ., 192 F.Supp.3d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted).
Although Graham involves claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act rather than Title VI, courts have looked to Graham when analyzing Title VI discrimination claims based on alleged disparate treatment and rely on its "similarly situated in all material respects" standard. See, e.g., Williams v. Pace Univ., 192 F. Supp. 3d 415, 422, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 38, 39); Patterson v. City Univ. of New York, No. 12-CV-6300 ARR LB, 2014 WL 3511048, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2014) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39); Koumantaros v. City Univ. of New York, No. 03-CIV-10170-GEL, 2007 WL 840115, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39). The same is true for § 1981 cases, which also employ Graham's standard.
nnot demonstrate entitlement to Title VI relief. Kajoshaj v. New York City Department of Education, 543 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Sulehria v. New York, No. 13 Civ. 6990 (AJN), 2014 WL 4716084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014) (the fact that individuals outside of the plaintiff's protected class were hired to the positions he sought does not establish intentional discrimination because there are no facts to show that he was passed over because of his race, color, or national origin); Manolov v. Borough of Manhattan Cmty. Coll., 952 F. Supp. 2d 522, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing a Title VI claim where the plaintiff does not "allege that any defendant referred to his race . . . nor does he recite any other fact from which race[]-based discriminatory intent reasonably could be inferred."). Plaintiff must provide facts demonstrating either that NYLS personnel referred to her race, or that she was similarly situated in material ways to individuals outside of her race. Id.; Williams v. Pace Univ., 192 F. Supp. 3d 415, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that plaintiff could not state a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VI because she did not plead facts showing that she was similarly situated to individuals outside of her protected class that were treated preferentially). She fails to do so.