Opinion
1:22-CV-00249-SPB
08-02-2023
QUINCY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. DEREK OBERLANDER, MR. MILLER, MS. PARRIN, SGT HOLLIS, SGT SHRADER, OFFICER PETERSON, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CORRECTION DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN RE: ECF NO. 17
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed on behalf of Defendants Parrin, and Shrader [ECF No. 17] be GRANTED.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Quincy Williams (“Williams”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), commenced this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Derek Oberlander, Mr. Miller, Ms. Parrin, Sgt. Hollis, Sgt. Shrader, and Officer Peterson, each of whom is employed at the DOC's State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest), where Williams was previously confined. After all Defendants filed an Answer to Williams' Complaint, see ECF No. 16, two Defendants, Parrin and Shrader, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). See ECF No. 17. The motion has been fully briefed and is before the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Scope of Record and Standard of Review
The record considered by the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is comprised of the pleadings, exhibits attached to or relied upon in the plaintiffs complaint, matters of public record, and “undisputedly authentic documents attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs' claims are based on the documents.” Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F.Supp.2d 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(c) are reviewed under the same standard as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Turbe v. Gov't of V.I, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cephalon, Inc., 159 F.Supp.3d 550, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Under this standard, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations of the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, the court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, “a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to raise the plaintiffs claimed right to relief beyond speculation. Id. Because Williams is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). If the court can reasonably read Williams' pro se pleading to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Pro se litigants such as Williams, however, must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
C. Factual Allegations and Claims
The following facts are derived from Williams' Complaint and the exhibits that Williams has attached to or relied upon in his Complaint.
Williams has attached the following documents to his complaint: Inmate Request to Staff (Miller) dated May 18, 2021 (ECF No. 9-1); Inmate Request to Staff (Miller) dated May 25, 2021 (ECF No. 9-2); Inmate Request to Staff (Oberlander) dated May 28, 2021 (ECF No. 9-3); Inmate Request to Staff (Oberlander) dated July 8, 2021 (ECF No. 9-4, p. 2); Inmate Request to Staff (Oberlander) dated August 25, 2021 (ECF No. 9-4, p. 3); Inmate Request to Staff (Oberlander) dated September 30,2021 (ECF No. 9-4, p. 4); Inmate Request to Staff (Perrin) dated July 1, 2021 (ECF No. 9-5); and Misconduct Report No. D563173 (ECF No. 9-6).
In May of 2022, Williams wrote to Defendant Miller, the unit manager of the prison block where Williams was being housed. ECF No. 9, ¶8. Williams complained that the housing unit was run by the “Blood Gang.” Id. According to Williams, the gang was preventing him from using the telephone. Id. Williams contacted Miller again days later, this time to complain that he could not access the unit's kiosk because “it belonged to the Bloods,” and that members of the gang had threatened his safety. Id., ¶ 9. Williams then wrote to Defendant Oberlander and informed him that he “was in danger.” Id., ¶ 10.
Over the next several months, Williams continued to write and speak to Defendants Miller and Oberlander and requested that he be moved to a different cell because of repeated harassment by gang members. In July of 2022, Williams wrote to Defendant Parrin seeking her assistance in getting him moved to a different unit because his “life was in danger.” Id., ¶ 12. Parrin advised Williams to meet with a counselor for external clearance review for I-block or seek employment elsewhere in the prison for F-block. ECF No. 9-5, p. 2.
Harassment from the gang continued. Williams alleges that “on one occasion,” he was surrounded by gang members and Defendants Hollis and Peterson, instead of intervening, told Williams that they “had bet on who would win in a fight between him and the Bloods.” Id., ¶ 13. Williams reported this conduct to Defendants Oberlander and Miller. Id.
After learning that the gang had put a “hit” on him, Williams attempted to speak with the gang leader, identified by Williams as “Inmate Equilin.” Id., ¶ 14. An altercation ensued between Williams and gang members during which Williams was injured. Id., ¶¶ 15-16. Williams was then placed in the restrictive housing unit (“RHU”) and was issued a misconduct by Defendant Shrader which faulted Williams for “throwing closed fist strikes and kicks at I/M Equilin.” Id., ¶ 18; ECF No. 9-6, p. 2 (Misconduct Report). Williams claims that Shrader falsified the misconduct because Equilin, not Williams, started the fight. Id.
Williams was subsequently transferred from SCI-Forest to the State Correctional Institution at Albion. Id. He alleges that he continued to suffer from “severe headaches” because of injuries sustained during his fight with the gang members. Id., ¶ 18. He also claims to be living in “constant fear of another attack.” Id.
Williams' Complaint generally asserts that the Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but it does not identify specific claims or causes of actions. Based on Williams' factual allegations, the Court construes his Complaint as asserting an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants based on their alleged failure to protect him from danger presented by other inmates and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Shrader based on his filing of an allegedly false misconduct against Williams. Only the claims against Parrin and Shrader are presently before the Court on their motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 17.
D. Analysis and Discussion
Defendants Parrin and Shrader argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because (1) Williams has not alleged facts to support that Parrin knew or had reason to believe that any other inmate or inmates presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Williams; and (2) Williams' claim that Shrader issued him a false misconduct report, without more, does not state a cognizable constitutional claim. See ECF No. 18, pp. 4-5, 9.
1. Defendant Parrin is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Williams identified Parrin as a “unit manager at SCI-Forest,” whose responsibilities included “supervision of housing units.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 4. The lone allegation against Parrin is that, “On July 1, 2022, [Williams] wrote to Defendant Parrin and asked her if she would move him to her Unit because his ‘life' was in danger.” Id., ¶ 12. Williams' inquiry to Parrin was in the form of a Request to Staff Member and is attached to the Complaint. See ECF No. 9-5. Williams wrote to Parrin, stating “I would like to move on I block of [sic] F-Block. Please I'm in fear for my life. It's just too much trouble over hear [sic] and I see parole at the end of the year. I'm trying to avoid trouble.” Id., p. 2. Parrin responded and offered Williams some advice: “Get with your counselor for outside clearance review (for I) or seek employment in maint./dietary (for F).” Id. This minimal interaction and Williams' vague reference to fear for safety and “trouble” do not support a failure to protect claim against Parrin.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Hobson v. Tiller, 2021 WL 2191283, at *10 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2021)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2190818 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2021) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). This general duty includes the responsibility to “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Heavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To state a viable failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must plead facts to support that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk; and (3) the defendant's deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff to suffer harm. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). See also Davis v. SCI Dallas Kitchen Staff Workers, 2023 WL 2470007, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2023). “The standard for deliberate indifference is subjective; thus, the prison official must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Hobson, 2021 WL 2191282, at *10 (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)). The facts alleged in Williams' Complaint do not satisfy this standard for the claim against Parrin.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that more than “an out-of-the-blue and unadorned 'I'm-in-trouble' entreaty is necessary to substantiate a claim of failure to protect based on an inmate's complaint of a threat of violence.” Id., at * 12 (quoting Ned v. Kardin, 779 Fed.Appx. 75, 76 (3d Cir. 2019)). Ned v. Kardin is instructive. There, the plaintiff told the prison officials that he was not getting along with his cellmate and asked to be moved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that such an allegation was insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. Ned, 779 Fed.Appx. at 76.
Here, the pleadings do not support that Williams provided Parrin with any information beyond his generalized concerns for his safety and references to unspecified “trouble” in his housing unit. See ECF No. 9-5, p. 2. Nothing in the Complaint supports that Parrin was aware of any gang activity or that she had prior knowledge of any threats of gang violence against Williams. While the potential for violence is frequently an unfortunate circumstance of prison life, neither the Complaint nor its exhibits indicate that Parrin had any knowledge of any particular threat to Williams' safety. Williams' entreaty to Parrin was nothing more than an unspecific, “out-of-the-blue, ‘I'm in trouble'” statement. Ned, 779 Fed.Appx. at 76. Without warning of any specific threat, Parrin could not have known that Williams faced any imminent danger. See, e.g., Lee v. Clark, 2020 WL 8768344, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2020). Williams' communication with Parrin about his personal safety and unspecified “trouble” on the block presents precisely the type of allegation that courts have routinely found inadequate to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Williams v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 2019 WL 2745759, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2019), aff'd in relevant part, vacated in part, remanded, 844 Fed.Appx. 469 (3d Cir. 2021) (general allegation that prison housed plaintiff with “violence-prone inmates” insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim). See also Hobson, 2021 WL 2191282 at *12 (citing Williams). Accordingly, Parrin is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Williams' Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.
2. Defendant Shrader is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Although Williams maintains that “all above named Defendants violated Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights,” as to Defendant Shrader, he asserts only that he issued him a misconduct “despite ... investigating the incident and ‘ocular proof from video footage showing that inmate Equilin punched Plaintiff first.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 18. Williams alleges that Shrader “falsified the misconduct by stating that the Plaintiff punched inmate Equilin and inmate Equilin fought back.” Id. Williams attached Shrader's misconduct report to the Complaint. See ECF No. 9-6. Shrader's report stated:
On the above date and time, I/M Williams (KL4519) was seen by this officer on GB unit under the CB stairs throwing closed fist strikes and kicks at I/M Equilin (LK 2487), at which time I/M Equilin fought back. A this [illegible] ... a multiple I/M on I/M fight involving multiple inmates.Id. p. 2. As a sanction for the misconduct, Williams was placed in disciplinary custody for a period of 60 days. Id. p. 4.
Because Shader's alleged involvement with Williams occurred after the incident between Equilin and Williams, the Complaint cannot be read as asserting a failure to protect claim against him. Likewise, Williams' factual allegations against Shrader do not “rise to the level of deprivation needed to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.” Hall v. SCI Fayette, 2023 WL 2867862, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2023) (citing Ingram v. Donate, 2008 WL 2780648, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2008); and Booth v. Pence, 354 F.Supp.2d 553, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff'd, 141 Fed.Appx. 66 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Jones v. Boone, 2023 WL 2563081, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2023) (“a false misconduct charge, standing alone, does not qualify as an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (citation omitted).
Williams' allegations similarly fail to support a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The filing of a misconduct, even if later proven to be false, “is not a constitutional violation so long as the inmate is provided with due process.” Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.Supp. 922, 931 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1992), cert de nied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, as a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Williams had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in disciplinary custody. A protected liberty interest in avoiding restrictive detention may arise from only (1) state law or (2) the Due Process Clause itself. See Asquith v. Dep't of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). A state can create a constitutionally protected liberty interest where the alleged deprivation or change in prison conditions “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Prison conditions are “atypical and significant” when a sentenced inmate may not reasonably expect to encounter such a condition as a consequence of his conviction. Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997). In deciding whether a protected liberty interest exists, a court must engage in a fact-specific inquiry into “the duration of the ... confinement and the conditions of that confinement in relation to other prison conditions.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir.2003). Here, Williams has alleged no facts to support that the conditions of his confinement in disciplinary custody imposed any atypical or significant hardship on him. See Bleau v. Diguglielmo, 2009 WL 764881, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009). Nor did the duration of his disciplinary custody impose an atypical or significant hardship. In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff prisoner's 30-day placement in disciplinary custody did not impose an “atypical and significant hardship” that would have created a liberty interest. The Sandin Court reached this conclusion based on its findings that “disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,” and general population inmates experienced “significant amounts of ‘lockdown time.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. After Sandin, the Third Circuit held that seven months in disciplinary custody did “not, on its own, violate a protected liberty interest.” See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir.2002). See also Sims v. Vaughn, 189 Fed.Appx. 139, 141 (3d Cir.2006) (67-day placement in the RHU did not involve atypical or significant hardship); Davis v. United States, 182 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (3d Cir.2006) (60 days in disciplinary custody did not constitute atypical or significant hardship).
Furthermore, in this case, the evidence attached to Williams' Complaint confirms that he was properly notified of the charges associated with the misconduct, that he was afforded a hearing regarding the misconduct, and that he appealed the hearing examiner's guilty finding. See ECF Nos. 9-6, p. 2 (Misconduct Report); p. 3, (Appeal); p. 4 (Program Review Committee Appeal Decision); p. 6 (Second Appeal); p. 7 (Superintendent's Level Misconduct Appeal); p. 8 (Appeal to Central Office); p. 10 (Response from DOC Chief Hearing Examiner). Thus, Williams was provided with and utilized all the due process to which he was entitled. As a result, his claim that Shrader wrote a false misconduct report fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See, e.g., Murray v. McCoy, 2023 WL 2285877, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2023). Accordingly, Shrader's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted.
E. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Parrin and Shrader's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be GRANTED and judgment entered in their favor and against Plaintiff Williams.
III. Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).