Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-4908 (JBS).
Filed: January 8, 2004
Mr. Michael Williams, #424345944645A, Southern State Correctional Facility, Delmont, NJ, Plaintiff pro se.
Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, By: David M. Ragonese, DAG Trenton, NJ, Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Achinko, Brainard, Fronterhouse, Nunn, Probst, and Ruggiero, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Williams is a New Jersey State inmate who is presently incarcerated at Southern State Correctional Facility ("SSCF") in Delmont, New Jersey, and was previously incarcerated at South Woods State Prison ("SWSP"). On or about October 11, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Corrections, and South Woods State Prison. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.On January 28, 2003, this Court screened the pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, dismissed the Complaint against Defendants State of New Jersey, New Jersey Department of Corrections, and South Woods State Prison, and ordered that Plaintiff file an Amended Complaint within 45 days of the entry of the Order, or the Complaint would be dismissed in its entirety.
On March 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in which he named Stanley Nunn, former Administrator of SWSP; Donna Johnson (now known as Fronterhouse), Investigator, Special Investigation Division ("SID"); Gregory Achinko, Investigator, SID; Senior Corrections Officer Eric Brainard; Senior Corrections Officer James Probst; and Matthrew Ruggiero, Disciplinary Hearing Officer. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated; specifically, he claims negligence and deliberate indifference to his safety.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants knew, or should have known, that Williams was at risk of harm due to threats made by other inmates who were transferred to SWSP at the same time as Williams. (Amended Complaint, Statement of Claims). The Amended Complaint recites the following facts:
Upon arrival at Southwood [sic] State Prison, on about November 4, 2001, I spoke to the Admissions Sgt and requested to be placed in Protective Custody because of threat of bodily injury made by other inmates who were transferred with me to Southwood [sic] State Prison. In addition I explained that I am gay, HIV positive, weak and unable to protect myself. The Admission Sgt. then stated that "I will not have you placed in protective custody." The Admissions Sgt then ordered other officers to handcuff me and to escort and place me in detention.
On November 7, 2001, I was escorted from the detention cell to be interviewed by Investigators Johnson and Achanko [sic]. At which time I reiterated what I had previously stated to the Admissions Sgt upon arrival to Southwood [sic] State Prison on about November 4, 2001. I was then assured by the above investigators that nothing would happen to me upon my being placed in the general inmate population. Shortly thereafter, I was escorted from detention, to a cell in the general inmate population, that resulted in being sexually assaulted by an inmate who was assigned to the very same cell with me in the general inmate population.
(Amended Complaint, Statement of Claims).
Plaintiff states that he complained to administration and sought to prevent such a situation from occurring, but argues that the administration did nothing. (Amended Complaint ¶ 7). Plaintiff further argues that there is no administrative remedy available to him. (Id.)
Defendants assert that when Plaintiff was interviewed by SID investigator Fronterhouse on November 7, 2001, Plaintiff stated that he was not being verbally or physically threatened, and he declined Protective Custody. (Affidavit of Donna Fronterhouse at ¶ 4 and Exhibit A). As a result of Plaintiff's decision to decline protective custody, he was placed in the general population on November 7, 2001. Later that same day, he received a disciplinary charge for a violation of prohibited act .051 ("Engaging in sexual acts with others"). According to the Disciplinary Report attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Williams was
engaged in a sexual act with I/M Sayles[.] Both [inmates] had white t-shirts on and were naked from the waist down. I/M Williams was standing directly in front of and facing the cell desk. I/M Sayles was directly behind I/M Williams and also facing the desk. . . . Both [inmates] were told to stop!
A prison disciplinary hearing was conducted on November 15, 2001, and Williams was found guilty of the .051 charge. That adjudication was never overturned.
Plaintiff demands compensatory relief (actual damages to compensate him for the deprivation of his constitutional rights) in the amount of $2 million; and punitive damages (to punish Defendants for their conduct) in the amount of $5 million.
Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies as to all of his claims before filing his civil action in federal court. Defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate because the undisputed facts show that Defendants did not fail to protect Plaintiff and/or are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has submitted no opposition in response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants are correct that Plaintiff is required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing his claim in federal court. However, given that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at South Woods State Prison and any attempt to exhaust those remedies would most likely be time-barred, this Court will not address the exhaustion issue, and instead turns directly to Defendants' arguments in response to Plaintiff's substantive constitutional claim.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, "[T]he nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Country Floors v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061-63 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing district court's grant of summary judgment in a trademark action); Lucent Info. Manage. v. Lucent Tech., 986 F. Supp. 253, 257 (D.N.J. 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of telecommunications provider in trademark action), aff'd, 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 1999); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990). However, where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, as Plaintiff does in the present case, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of" its pleading in order to show the existence of a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted); see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Thus, if the plaintiff's evidence is a mere scintilla or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment.Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061-62.
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim
Claims of failure to protect are brought as violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, which protects prisoners from the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). This constitutional limitation on punishment has been interpreted to impose a duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures "to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).
For an inmate to prevail on his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, two requirements must be met. First, the prisoner must demonstrate "that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This element is satisfied when the alleged "punishment" is "objectively sufficiently serious." Id. Second, the prison officials involved must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 838. Specifically, the inmate must show that the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.
In Farmer, the Supreme Court defined "deliberate indifference" as requiring a showing that the official was "subjectively aware" of the risk: "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 827.
Here, the record does not support an inference that Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff from a sexual assault by another inmate. First, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was engaged in consensual sex with inmate Darin Sayles on November 7, 2001. (See Adjudication of Disciplinary Charge attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint). In evaluating whether a prison-plaintiff alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment has provided sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not consider any facts or evidence which would contradict prison disciplinary proceedings regarding the same incident, unless the finding of guilt has been reversed or otherwise impaired. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1994).
Plaintiff's position that a prisoner sexually assaulted him on November 11, 2001 is contradicted by the results of his prison disciplinary adjudication and must be disregarded. The present record contains evidence of Plaintiff's adjudication of guilt for engaging in sex. Evidence of the guilty adjudication established that the sex was consensual and therefore no assault took place. Williams therefore cannot meet the objective prong of his Eighth Amendment claim.
Second, the record demonstrates further that Defendants acted reasonably in attempting to abate any risk of harm to Plaintiff, and that it was Plaintiff himself who created the risk by refusing protective custody when it was offered. Williams signed statement indicates in his own words that "[I] decline P.C. [Protective Custody]." (Donna Fronterhouse Affidavit, Exhibit A). This statement came after Plaintiff was placed in Temporary Closed Custody upon his arrival at SWSP and only after an interview with SID investigators who questioned him about his safety concerns. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. It was thus at Plaintiff's own request that he was housed in general population, and without more, no deliberate indifference can be inferred. Since the record supports Defendants' contention that they did not fail to protect Plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate and this Court need not address any claims to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, this Court will grant Defendants' summary judgment motion. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants subjected Plaintiff to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm or acted with deliberate indifference. The accompanying Order is therefore entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 11-1] by Defendants Achinko, Brainard, Fronterhouse, Nunn, Probst, and Ruggiero, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b); and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion of today's date;
IT IS on this 8th day of January, 2004, hereby
ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 11-1] be, and hereby is GRANTED.