Williams v. Murray

16 Citing cases

  1. Hulsey v. Carter

    588 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 2 times
    In Hulsey, there was no evidence that the natural father agreed to the plaintiff's adoption by the natural mother's new husband.

    See Franklin v. Gilchrist, 268 Ga. 497 ( 491 S.E.2d 361) (1997); Welch v. Welch, 265 Ga. 89 ( 453 S.E.2d 445) (1995). See Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977); Welch, 265 Ga. at 91 (Carley, J., dissenting). However, there is no evidence of record that appellant's natural father ever agreed to her adoption by Carson.

  2. O'Neal v. Wilkes

    439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    In O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga. 850 (1) (439 S.E.2d 490) (1994), this court reiterated the principle that a contract for adoption must be between parties competent to contract for the disposition of the child.

    "Some showing of an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents, performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up custody, performance by the child by living in the home of the adoptive parents, partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into the home and treating [it] as their child, and ... the intestacy of the foster parent."Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977), quoting Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973). The only issue on this appeal is whether the court correctly determined that Page was without authority to contract for O'Neal's adoption.

  3. Sanders v. Riley

    296 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    The child, who is often an adult by that time, is allowed to invoke the doctrine of virtual adoption “to avoid an unfair result from the application of intestacy statutes.” Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 276, 236 S.E.2d 624 (1977). “Before a recovery based upon an alleged oral contract to adopt will be authorized, proof of such contract must be made out so clearly, strongly and satisfactorily ‘as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the agreement.’ ”

  4. Franklin v. Gilchrist

    491 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 1997)   Cited 2 times

    The Franklins introduced no evidence to show that their natural father ever agreed to their adoption by Mr. Washington and no evidence to account for the failure to obtain their natural father's agreement prior to his death. See Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977). Compare Anderson v. Maddox, 257 Ga. 478 ( 360 S.E.2d 590) (1987) (wherein the children's father was dead at time of the adoption agreement between their mother and the cousin of their deceased father).

  5. Willis v. Kennedy

    476 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    To establish a cause of action for virtual adoption, there must be some evidence to prove the existence of a definite and specific contract to adopt based upon sufficient legal consideration. Davis v. Bennett, 263 Ga. 714 (2) ( 438 S.E.2d 73) (1994); Chambers v. Chambers, 260 Ga. 610, 612 ( 398 S.E.2d 200) (1990); Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 (1) ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977). At trial, appellant presented evidence that over the years Cox had occasionally introduced appellant to others as his daughter, had referred to appellant's child as his granddaughter, and may have referred to appellant as his daughter in a 1969 unexecuted will.

  6. Davis v. Bennett

    438 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    To sustain a verdict finding virtual or equitable adoption, the evidence must establish the existence of a definite and specific contract to adopt based upon sufficient legal consideration. Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977); Lee v. Green, 217 Ga. 860 ( 126 S.E.2d 417) (1962). The evidence presented at trial relating to the Bennetts' claim that Steve Davis contracted to adopt them as his own children consisted of nothing more than their testimony that they considered Steve Davis to be their father and that Minnie White cared for Davis during a period when he was ill. No evidence was presented of an agreement between Willie Bennett Davis and Steve Davis comprehending or intending an adoption, and the Bennetts both testified that they never talked with either Steve Davis or their mother about an adoption.

  7. Chambers v. Chambers

    398 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 2 times
    In Chambers, the plaintiff was born to a woman who was confined in a mental institution and placed in the deceased's home by a welfare agency; there was no evidence that the deceased agreed to adopt the plaintiff; the deceased filed a petition in court to have the child's name changed but specifically stated that the deceased was not adopting the child; and there was an affidavit from the mother denying that she voluntarily gave up custody or agreed for the plaintiff to be adopted.

    "some showing of an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents, performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up custody, performance by the child by living in the home of the adoptive parents, partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into the home and treating [it] as their child, and ... the intestacy of the foster parent."Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977), quoting from Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Rhodes v. Quantrell, 227 Ga. 761 ( 183 S.E.2d 207) (1971).

  8. Lee v. Gurley

    389 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    "Some showing of an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents, performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up custody, performance by the child by living in the home of the adoptive parents, partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into the home and treating it as their child, and the intestacy of the foster parent."Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977). The trial court granted the judgment n.o.v. after determining there was no direct evidence of an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents.

  9. Anderson v. Maddox

    360 S.E.2d 590 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that the testimony of a single witness, the plaintiff's aunt, that the plaintiff and his brother “went to live with [the decedents] as [their] children because they—I guess it was a mutual agreement. They [were] going to take them as [their] children and raise them,” was sufficient to preclude summary judgment on a virtual adoption claim

    " In Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977), we listed the elements required to establish a virtual adoption. The first listed, and only element in issue here, is: "`Some showing of an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents.'"

  10. Ponder v. Ponder

    304 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    Considering only the sufficiency and not the weight of the evidence, we find it sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276 (1) ( 236 S.E.2d 624) (1977); Hazlip v. Morris, supra; Anthony v. Garrett, 236 Ga. 485 (7) ( 224 S.E.2d 347) (1976). 2.