Opinion
No. 97 C 3291
September 29, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff John F. Williams ("Williams") an African American male, brought suit against his current employer, Defendant M.R.C. Polymers ("M.R.C.") for employment discrimination and violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Williams also claims that Defendant violated the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act ("FCCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1673, and committed "theft" by garnishing his wages in excess of the statutory limit, and by failing to remit the garnished wages to the appropriate state authority. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts and was granted summary judgment as to the employment discrimination and Equal Pay Act claims. Williams v. M.R.C. Polymers, No. 97 C 3291, 2000 WL 263977 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 28, 2000). Defendant now renews its motion, seeking summary judgment on the remaining claims. As set forth below, the motion is granted and the case is dismissed
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Williams has been employed by Defendant M.R.C., a plastic recycling business, since May 1994. On May 2, 1997, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that M.R.C. had discriminated against him and garnished excessive amounts from his paycheck. On February 28, 2000, the court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination and violation of the Equal Pay Act. In its original motion, Defendant argued that "there does not appear to be a private cause of action for over-garnishment in contravention of the FCCPA," but presented no authority for that argument and effectively conceded that, on at least five occasions, it exceeded a 55% cap on garnishments from Williams' paychecks. The court accordingly denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on that claim, without prejudice.
In its renewed motion for summary judgment, Defendant has again raised the standing issue, this time presenting authority for its argument that there is no private right of action for enforcement of the FCCPA. In addition, the court's independent research confirms that the overwhelming weight of authorities conclude that, while 15 U.S.C. § 1673 sets out restrictions on the maximum allowable garnishment, there is no private cause of action for enforcement of these restrictions.
Section 1673 is part of Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Section 1673 is explicitly enforced by "[t]he Secretary of Labor, acting through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor." 15 U.S.C. § 1676. The Seventh Circuit has not spoken directly on the question, but at least three circuits have held that there is no private right of action under Subchapter II of this Act. For example, in Snapp v. United States Postal Service, 664 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1982), the court concluded it had no jurisdiction over a debtor's suit to enjoin his employer from complying with the writ of garnishment issued by a Tennessee court, because the FCCPA provisions for garnishment of federal employees' wages did not create a private cause of action. The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that a private right of action did not exist for employees to contest their discharge on the basis that it violated FCCPA. See Smith v. Cotton Brothers Baking Co., 609 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1980) (baker's apprentice discharged within 30 days of garnishment); McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1981) (city employee allegedly discharged because of wage garnishment); LeVick v. Skaggs Companies, 701 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1983) (former employee allegedly discharged because of wage garnishment); cf. Western v. Hodgson, 494 F.2d 379, 380 (4th Cir. 1974) (expressly refusing to reach the question of whether a private right of action exists because the facts of that case would not merit relief in any event).
In reaching their holdings, these courts have noted that section 1676 (also part of Subchapter II) provides that "`the Secretary of Labor . . . shall enforce provisions of this Subchapter.'" LeVick, 701 F.2d at 779 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1676). Such language is significant: As a district court observed, "by entrusting the enforcement of the provisions of Subchapter II to the Secretary of Labor, Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of 15 U.S.C. § 1673 through a civil suit." Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 500 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). The Follette court concluded that plaintiffs could not bring a private action to challenge their employer's practices as depriving them of wages which are exempt from garnishment under the FCCPA. Similarly, in Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F. Supp. 1039, 1039-1040 (N.D.Ia. 1972), the court pointed to the specific provisions of Subchapters I and III of the FCCPA providing for private civil actions for noncompliance. The absence of such provisions from Subchapter II bolsters the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit private actions to enforce the requirements of that Subchapter. In at least two unreported decisions, courts in this district have reached the same conclusion, dismissing lawsuits brought against employers who allegedly violated provisions of FCCPA in carrying out wage garnishment orders. See Perkins v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., No. 90 C 2317, 1990 WL 141425 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 24, 1990) (Duff, J.); Whitney v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 87 C 1082, 1987 WL 11852 (N.D.Ill. June 3, 1987) (Aspen, J.)
In deciding whether a private right of action for violating a federal statute exists, the court must look to congressional intent. Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). In light of the specific enforcement by the Secretary of Labor provided by § 1676, the explicit right of private actions under § 1640 and § 1681(n) and § 1681(o) and the absence of legislative response to past holdings, this court sees no reason to find a private right of action exists.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's FCCPA complaint is dismissed. As discussed in this court's earlier decision, his "theft" claim is properly understood as a claim for conversion, a state law cause of action. Having dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal law claims, the court will exercise its discretion to dismiss his pendent state law claim without prejudice to an action on that claim in state court.
Although Plaintiff has no private right of action under the FCCPA, the court notes disappointment regarding Defendant's withholding records. Although it does not appear that Defendant failed to properly remit wages withheld from the Plaintiff, the Defendant's accounting documents leave much room for doubt. The record is replete with examples of apparent inconsistencies in garnished amounts and amounts paid over to the Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA"). Defendant provides little explanation of how garnishments were calculated, what determined their execution, or the timing of the process. Nor does Plaintiff explain the calculations behind his claims. For example:
(A) Plaintiff presented a letter of reconciliation of garnishments written by Defendant in October of 1996, indicating that no funds were withheld from the Plaintiff from April 11, 1996 to June 27, 1996. (Plaintiff's Motion for Opposing Defendants Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Opposing Motion"), at 27-28.) Yet the Defendant's quarterly breakdown shows that garnishments of $7.35 were made during this time frame. (Defendant's Pre-Trial Exhibits, Exhibit B, at 2.)
(B) Regardless of which, if either, Plaintiff's letter of reconciliation or Defendant's quarterly breakdown is correct, Defendant failed to explain the discrepancy between the amount garnished ($0 or $7.35 per week) and the amount paid to IDPA ($22 per week) as indicated in the letter of reconciliation. (Plaintiff's Opposing Motion, at 28.)
(C) Both parties agree that under the relevant portions of the FCCPA, M.R.C. could garnish no more than 55% of William's disposable income, but the data presented does not accurately identify the wages earned and amounts garnished with respect to this limitation. For example, while Defendant admits to de minimus violations of the limitation on at least one occasion, September 7, 1996, (Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7), the quarterly report presented in Defendant's Pre-Trial Exhibits indicates that the garnishment for the week of September 7, 1996, was well within the said limit. (Defendant's Pre-Trial Exhibits, Exhibit C, at 2.) Defendant claims it deducted a flat amount of $52.50 per week from Plaintiff's wages, which represented 15% of Plaintiff's gross weekly earnings. In an internal memo, however, Defendant sets the amount withheld at $55.20. (Def's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A, September 26, 1997 Memo from Steve Sola to John Williams.) Plaintiff is paid hourly and does not have a standard weekly pay rate. Defendant does not explain how it arrived at the $52.50 figure.
(D) While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay to IDPA various sums withheld from December of 1996 to January of 1997 (Plaintiff's Opposing Motion, at 11), the letter from the IDPA dated April 22, 1998, indicates that the IDPA did receive payments during this time. ( Id. at 29.)
(E) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached a provision of the Order of Withholding relating to the Defendant's obligation to pay over withheld amounts. (Plaintiff's Opposing Motion, at 10.) Defendant asserts that it adhered to state and federal guidelines and that it did pay over to the Clerk of Court or to IDPA all amounts withheld from Plaintiff's pay check, and Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that adequately rebuts that assertion. ( Id.)
The court notes, finally, that Plaintiff's theory that he himself should recover for Defendant's alleged failures has little merit. He urges that because M.R.C. purportedly failed to turn over the money garnished from his wages to the appropriate state agencies and that, as a result, M.R.C. should, "under the law," be fined $100 per day. (Plaintiff's Statement of "Monies in which Defendant Owes Plaintiff," at 3.) Plaintiff calculates the total fine at $117,200. The court notes, however, that if any fine were appropriate, it should be paid to the governmental authority entitled to the payments, not to Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40-1) is granted. Plaintiff's motion opposing summary judgment (Doc. 41-1) is denied. Plaintiff's state claim for conversion or "theft" is dismissed without prejudice to proceeding on that claim in state court. All federal law claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. This judgment is final and appealable.
ENTER.