That invitation, however, "includes those parts of the premises to which the invitee reasonably [might] be expected to go." Starkey v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4801, *15 (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Williams v. Morristown Mem'l Hosp, 59 N.J. Super. 384, 390 (App. Div. 1960); Monheit v. Rottenberg, 295 N.J. Super. at 325; Nary v. Parking Auth. of Dover, 58 N.J. Super. 222, 229 (App. Div. 1959). Therefore, a determination of whether Plaintiff exceeded the scope of her invitation "depends on the surrounding circumstances."

The area of invitation can vary depending on the circumstances, and it "extends to all parts of the premises to which [t]he purpose may reasonably be expected to take him, and to those which are so arranged as to lead him reasonably to think that they are open to him." Williams v. Morristown Mem'l Hosp., 59 N.J. Super. 384, 389 (App. Div. 1960) (quoting Prosser on Torts, s 78, p. 458 (1955)). Whether a Plaintiff has exceeded the reasonable scope of his invitation is generally a question for the jury.

Our authorities describe the trespasser as one who is "neither invited, suffered, nor privileged" to be on another's property. State v. Wouters,71 N.J. Super. 479, 486 ( App. Div. 1962); Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 59 N.J. Super. 384, 389 ( App. Div. 1960). A licensee is a person "who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent."

Such a determination therefore depends on the surrounding circumstances. Williams v.Morristown Memorial Hosp., 59 N.J. Super. 384, pp. 389-390 ( App. Div. 1960) and cases cited. Several considerations lead us to conclude that the area in which Mrs. Giangrasso fell cannot be considered within the scope of the invitation.

Prosser,Torts, supra, at p. 458. See also, Snyder v. I. Jay RealtyCo., supra, 30 N.J., at pp. 314-315; Gudnestad v. SeaboardCoal Dock Co., 15 N.J. 210, 219 (1954); Williams v.Morristown Memorial Hosp., 59 N.J. Super. 384 ( App. Div. 1960); Waters v. Solitare, 131 N.J.L. 212 ( E. A. 1944). In the present case, the jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff's implied invitation was for the purpose of selling merchandise to the defendants or their employees; that with this in mind, he went to the rear doorway, at Lawson's request, only for sufficient time to accomplish the above purpose.

He was not a trespasser. See Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 59 N.J. Super. 384, 157 A.2d 840 (1960). Once the sand and gravel became personalty, National could vest Brabant with its ownership. If National could sell the material subject to payment of royalties, it could transfer ownership to Brabant subject to those same payments.

The cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable. In Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 59 N.J. Super. 384, 391-92 (App. Div. 1960), a plaintiff tripped and fell over a low wire fence he did not see that was there to prevent people from crossing a grass strip. Here, plaintiff was well aware of the slippery condition before her fall.

In New Jersey, the nature of a duty of an owner or occupier of land to those on the premises depends upon the legal status of the plaintiff in regard to the property — that is, trespasser, licensee or invitee. Benedict v. Podwats, 109 N.J. Super. 402, 263 A.2d 486 (App.Div. 1970), aff'd 57 N.J. 219, 271 A.2d 417 (1970); William v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 59 N.J. Super. 384, 157 A.2d 840 (App.Div. 1960). In regard to liability for negligence of an owner or occupier of land to those who enter the owner's premises, those who come by invitation, express or implied, are invitees, those who are not invited but whose presence is suffered are licensees and those who are neither invited nor suffered are trespassers.

It could validly determine that she exceeded that invitation in going to the location of the dumpster on the evening in question. Giangrasso v. Dean Floor Covering Co., 51 N.J. 80 (1968); Hendrikson v. Koppers Co., supra; Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 59 N.J. Super. 384 (App.Div. 1960); Nary v. Parking Auth., 58 N.J. Super. 222 (App.Div. 1960). The jury could have decided, as it apparently did, that plaintiff knew she had no right to use the dumpster for her own purposes and had no more right to open it to see if her property was in it than she had the right to open the closed drugstore to see if her property was contained therein.

Accordingly, Cortright is of little help in the resolution of this motion. See Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 59 N.J. Super. 384 (App.Div. 1960), for a discussion of the Cortright case, generally discrediting its present-day validity. Modern-day tort concepts, in the absence of the act, would allow the case to go to the jury, whether plaintiff be a trespasser or licensee.