Opinion
Case No. 10-CV-1113-JPS.
October 21, 2011
ORDER
On December 9, 2010, defendant Milwaukee Public Schools removed this case from the Milwaukee County Circuit Court to this court based on federal question jurisdiction. (Docket #1). This action is a civil action that appeals a November 12, 2010 due process hearing decision rendered by the State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. On July 13, 2011, this court entered an order noting that, though the defendant was served with a complaint, six months had passed with no answer or other responsive pleading filed by the defendant. (Docket #3). Accordingly, the court warned the parties that it would dismiss the case unless a responsive pleading by the defendant or a motion for default by the plaintiffs was filed within 21 days of the date of the order. (Order at 2). On July 21, 2011, the plaintiff, Dominique Williams, filed a motion for default judgment. (Docket #4). On that same day, the clerk entered the defendant's default. On August 3, 2011, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint. (Docket #5). On August 4, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer. (Docket #6). In this motion, the defendant noted that its failure to answer the plaintiff's complaint was due to defense counsel's mistaken belief that the defendant was not required to file an answer in this matter because it is an appeal of a due process hearing. (Mot. Leave to File Answer ¶ 1). On August 30, 2011, the court issued another order granting the defendant leave to file a motion to vacate entry of default within 20 days of the date of the order. (Docket #10). On September 16, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to vacate entry of default. (Docket #11).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) allows a court to set aside an entry of default for good cause. A party seeking to vacate an entry of default prior to the entry of final judgment must show: "`(1) good cause for the default; (2) quick action to correct it; and (3) a meritorious defense to the complaint.'" Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 810 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Seventh Circuit has a well-established policy favoring a decision on the merits over a default judgment, and has established lenient standards for the application of Rule 55(c). Id. at 631.
Here, the court finds that the defendant has satisfied each of the three criteria to vacate the entry of default. First, although the defendant should have taken measures to ensure it was following the appropriate procedures in federal court, there is no evidence that it acted willfully when it failed to respond to the plaintiff's complaint. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has stated that "Rule 55(c) requires `good cause' for the judicial action, not `good cause' for the defendant's error." Sims v. EGA Products, Inc., 475 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2007). The opportunity for the court to consider the substance of this appeal — the appropriate placement of a student with special education needs — provides this court with good cause to vacate the entry of default. Next, the defendant also acted in a timely fashion to have the default order set aside. It filed its motion within the time frame set by the court in its August 30, 2011 order granting the defendant leave to file such motion. Lastly, the court finds that the defendant has made a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense. In her complaint, the plaintiff seeks to overturn the decision of the state administrative law judge. In such an action under the IDEA, the district court's decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). According to the defendant, in the administrative law judge's decision, he found against plaintiff and in favor of defendant on all four of the issues addressed at the hearing. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the administrative law judge's opinion is wellsupported by the testimony and evidence, and the defendant's answer provides the factual basis for its defense. Given the lenient standard the Seventh Circuit has established for the application of Rule 55(c), the court finds that the defendant's answer, when read in conjunction with its motion to vacate, cannot be characterized as "so conclusory as to be fatal." See Cracco, 559 F.3d at 631. Accordingly, because the defendant has met the three criteria necessary to vacate the entry of default, the court will grant the defendant's motion in this respect.
Additionally, because the defendant filed its answer within the time frame set by the court in its July 13, 2011 order — which indicated that it would dismiss the case unless a responsive pleading was filed by the defendant within 21 days of the order — the court will grant the defendant's motion for extension of time to file answer. Furthermore, the court will deny the plaintiff's two motions for default judgment in light of the court's decision to vacate the entry of default in this matter and the defendant's demonstration that it is ready and able to defend this action on the merits. Lastly, to aid the court in its resolution of this matter, the court will set a briefing schedule for the parties.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to vacate entry of default (Docket #11) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for extension of time to file answer (Docket #6) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Docket #4) be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's second motion for default judgment, motion to deny leave to file untimely answer, and motion for hearing (Docket #9) be and the same is hereby DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties in this action shall proceed in accordance with the following briefing schedule:
1. Plaintiff shall file a brief within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, setting forth the outcome of the administrative proceedings, a brief statement of the relevant facts, a statement setting forth the specific errors allegedly committed at the administrative level which entitle the plaintiff to relief, and the relief sought.
2. Defendant shall file a brief in opposition within thirty (30) days of service of plaintiff's brief, responding specifically to each error raised by the plaintiff and raising any relevant matters not put at issue by the plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff shall file a reply brief within fifteen (15) days of service of defendant's brief in opposition, responding to the matters raised in the defendant's brief.
4. Unless otherwise noted, all briefing shall be in accordance with the local rules.