Opinion
98 Civ. 3971 (GBD)
June 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants wrongfully arrested her in violation of her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the constitution. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. Plaintiff opposes this motion. For the following reasons, the individual defendants' motion is denied and the County defendant's motion is granted.
Background
On August 2, 1995, defendants Lhoutan, Vitulli and Neidhart, Westchester County probation officers in the Special Operations Unit, went to 3963 Bell Avenue, Bronx, New York, in order to execute a bench warrant for the arrest of Sherrel Williams for violation of probation. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1-4; Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1-4.) Sherrel lived at this address with her mother, Carvell Williams, and plaintiff, Tricia Williams, Sherrel's sister. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 3; Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 3.) The complaint attached to the beach warrant listed Tricia Williams as a co-defendant with Sherrel Williams in the action for which Sherrel was on probation, listed Tricia's date of birth as approximately 1.5 years earlier than Sherrel's, and listed her residence as the same address at which the bench warrant was to be executed. (Defs.' Notice of Mot. Exh. A.) Between six and seven in the morning, the probation officers knocked on the door of the residence and Carvell Williams answered. (Lhoutan Dep. at 44; Vitulli Dep. at 89; C. Williams Dep. at 14.) The probation officers requested to speak with Sherrel and waited as Carvell Williams went upstairs to determine if Sherrel was home. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 6; Def. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 6.) At some point, the probation officers entered the residence and encountered plaintiff. (Lhoutan Dep. at 75; Neidhart Dep. at 63-64; Vitulli Dep. at 102-03; C. Williams Dep. at 29, 32-33; T. Williams Dep. at 30.) Believing plaintiff to be her sister, Sherrel Williams, the probation officers attempted to take plaintiff into custody. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 7-9, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 7-9.) Plaintiff resisted, asserting that she was not Sherrel, and a struggle ensued. Id. The probation officers subdued plaintiff, arrested her and took her from the residence. Id. After determining that plaintiff was not Sherrel Williams, plaintiff was released from custody later that day.
Discussion
Under Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact for trial exists if, based on the record as a whole, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A district court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party by resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Tomka v. Seiler Corp. 66 F.3d 1295, 1304 (2d Cir. 1995). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1304. Nevertheless, the party opposing the motion bears the ultimate burden of proving that there is evidence which creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Twin Laboratories v. Weider Health Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990). The nonmoving party cannot meet this burden by simply relying on mere conclusory allegations, speculation, or conjecture. Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986).
The individual defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they are protected by qualified immunity. Under this defense, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages in the performance of discretionary functions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense from liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). As such, the objective reasonableness test is designed to dispose of many qualified immunity cases on summary judgment. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1995); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1987). In this circuit, courts must employ a three-tiered analysis of qualified immunity cases.
First, purely as a matter of law the defense should be sustained if the court finds that it was not clear at the time of the official acts that the interest asserted by the plaintiff was protected by a federal statute or the Constitution . . . Second, even if the interest asserted by the plaintiff was clearly of a type generally protected by federal law, the defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law if it was not clear at the time of the acts at issue that an exception did not permit those acts . . . Third, even if the contours of the plaintiffs federal rights and the official's permissible actions were clearly delineated at the time of the acts complained of, the defendant may enjoy qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his acts did not violate those rights.
Robison, 821 F.2d at 920-21 (citations omitted). See also Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). The individual defendants argue that they are immune under the third tier. Under this tier, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment if
the defendant `adduce[s] sufficient facts [such] that no reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to, the plaintiffs, could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant' to believe that he was acting in a fashion that did not clearly violate an established federally protected right.
Robison, 821 F.2d at 921 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J. sitting by designation)) (alterations in original).
The complaint alleges that plaintiff was arrested without probable cause. (Complaint ¶ 16.) This allegation, if true, would constitute a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). However, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if "the undisputed facts and all permissible inferences favorable to the plaintiff show either (a) that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believed that probable cause existed, or (b) that officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Robison, 821 F.2d at 921 (citations omitted). While "[d]isputes over reasonableness are usually fact questions for juries . . ., in qualified immunity cases, [courts] are not concerned with the correctness of the defendants' conduct, but rather the `objective reasonableness' of their chosen course of action given the circumstances confronting them at the scene." Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d at 421.
Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of the arrest warrant for Sherrel Williams. Plaintiff argues that the individual defendants failed to "act with reasonable caution and ordinary prudence in determining the identity of the arrestee. . . ." (Complaint ¶ 15.) Therefore, the issue to be determined is whether the individual defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was Sherrel Williams.
The individual defendants assert that the arrest was reasonable under the circumstances. The individual defendants allege that they possessed and reviewed a description of Sherrel Williams, went to Sherrel's residence, and encountered plaintiff, who they allege generally fit Sherrel's description, in a bedroom with the name "Sherrel" written on the door. They further allege that plaintiff asserted that she was not Sherrel but would not provide identification when requested to do so by the officers, that plaintiff physically attacked them, and her mother remained silent and did not offer to verify plaintiffs identity during the physical struggle that ensued. (See generally Vitulli Dep.; Neidhart Dep.; Lhoutan Dep.)
If the individual defendants' version of events was undisputed, this Court could determine that their actions were objectively reasonable, and they would be entitled to summary judgment. "Probable cause exists `when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.'" Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d at 102-03 (emphasis added) (citing Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996)). Similarly, "(w)hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest." Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
However, this Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the individual defendants' actions because plaintiffs version of events vastly differs from that of the individual defendants. According to plaintiff and her mother, Carvell Williams, both Tricia and Sherrel's names were written on the door of the bedroom where the individual defendants encountered plaintiff, the individual defendants did not ask plaintiff for identification, and the individual defendants initiated the physical struggle after plaintiff asserted that she was Tricia, not Sherrel. They further allege that Carvell Williams attempted to show plaintiffs identification but the probation officers refused to examine the items offered by Carvell Williams to prove plaintiffs identity. (See generally T. Williams Dep.; C. Williams Dep.) This Court cannot determine the objective reasonableness of the individual defendants' actions, particularly since they had reason to know that Sherrel had a sister who was close to her in age and lived at the same residence. This Court, therefore, cannot grant summary judgment in the individual defendants' favor where the facts are in such serious dispute. See. e.g., Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F. Supp. 940, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted).
The County defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under the standard set forth in Monell v. New York city Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, municipal defendants cannot be held liable for the actions of individual officers strictly under the theory of respondeat superior. Id. In order to state a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant under this standard, the plaintiff must allege that her constitutional rights were violated pursuant to an official policy or custom. Id. at 690-91. Plaintiff alleges that the County defendant caused the violation of her constitutional rights by "knowingly, intentionally, recklessly or, with deliberate indifference and callous disregard," failing to "instruct, train, supervise, control, discipline and investigate" the individual defendants. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also argues that there was an unofficial custom of making arrests of youthful offenders without obtaining an identifying photograph which led to a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
A plaintiff may state a claim for failure to train under § 1983 "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In this circuit, there are three requirements a plaintiff must meet to prove deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals in order to successfully state a claim for failure to train or supervise. A plaintiff must show that: (1) "a policymaker knows `to a moral certainty' that her employees will confront a given situation"; (2) "the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation"; and (3) "the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights." Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff points to no evidence to support her conclusory claim of failure to train.
The only specific claim articulated against the County defendant stems from the lack of a photograph in Sherrel Williams' probation file. Plaintiff argues that there was an unofficial policy or custom of the probation department's Special Operations Unit of executing bench warrants on youthful offenders without first obtaining the requisite identifying photograph. The Probation Department Operations Manual ("Operations Manual") states that when warrants are issued for a violation of probation, the entire case file is to be transferred to the Special Operations Unit and the file to be transferred must contain a photograph of the offender. (Pl. Aff. Ex. A at 4-12-1.) Additionally, "complete procedures regarding warrant enforcement . . . [are located in] Administrative Memorandum 8-89." (Pl. Aff. Ex. A at 4-12-2). Administrative Memoranda 8-89 ("AM 8-89") provides methods to acquire a photograph, i.e. "through the original arresting agency, from other law enforcement agencies, or from the Department of Correction Identification Unit." (Defs.' Notice of Mot. Ex. I at 3.)
Sherrell Williams' probation file did not contain a photograph because she was a juvenile when she was convicted and her records were sealed under Criminal Procedure Law § 725.15. All official records of a juvenile offender sealed pursuant to § 725.15 are deemed "confidential and must not be made available to any person or public or private agency." N.Y.C.P.L. § 725.15. According to the individual defendants, it is possible to obtain a court order to unseal a juvenile record and obtain a photograph, but they do not always attempt to do so before executing a bench warrant. (Lhotan Dep. at 22-23; Neidhart Dep. at 28-30; Vitulli Dep. at 35-37.)
Plaintiff asserts that the County knew that probation officers routinely executed bench warrants without a photograph in the file as required by the Operations Manual, and that their failure to do anything about this practice exhibits a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of these individuals. However, plaintiff offers no support for her assertion that the County had knowledge of such a routine practice, or any evidence that there had been other instances where the wrong person was arrested due to the lack of a photograph in the probation file. A "single incident alleged in a complaint, . . . especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, generally will not suffice to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy." Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1045 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff also fails to recognize an exception to the photograph requirement. AM 8-89 states that the Criminal Procedure Law supercedes all departmental directives regarding the handling of warrant cases for violations of probation. (Def.'s Notice of Mot. Ex. I at 1.) Therefore, files. transferred to the Special Operations Unit are not required to have a photograph where the juvenile records are sealed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 725.15. Neither the Operations Manual, AM 8-89, or Criminal Procedure Law § 725.15 require probation officers to obtain a court order to unseal juvenile records and obtain a photograph before executing a warrant. The Operations Manual merely required that files transferred to the Special Operations Unit contain a photograph. Plaintiff has not cited any departmental provisions placing the onus on probation officers to utilize the judicial process to obtain a photograph where a file is transferred without a photograph due to the youthful offender status of the subject. Without evidence that there was a departmental policy or custom resulting in unreasonable arrests without probable cause, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the County displayed a deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied and the County defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.