Opinion
5:24-cv-0721 (BKS/TWD)
07-08-2024
CHARLES WILLIAMS, JR., Plaintiff, v. ERIC LEACH, et al., Defendants.
CHARLES WILLIAMS, JR. Plaintiff, pro se
APPEARANCES:
CHARLES WILLIAMS, JR. Plaintiff, pro se
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint submitted by pro se plaintiff Charles Williams, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff, who is currently confined at the Cayuga County Jail, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.
II. IFP APPLICATION
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 1:09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (“As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”).
Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need. Dkt. No. 2. Because Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and has filed the inmate authorization form required in this District, Dkt. No. 3, he is granted permission to proceed IFP.
Although his IFP application has been granted, Plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges, on or around August 22, 2022, he was followed by Officer Leach. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. As he entered his driveway, located at “21 Derby Ave., cops flashed their lights.” Id. Plaintiff began to exit the vehicle, “Leach screamed, ‘freeze' stiffening Plaintiff at gunpoint while he remained a quarter of the way out.” Id. An individual named Curtis Johnson then exited the house and Officer “Young yelled for Plaintiff to ‘stay put' ....” Id.
Citations to Plaintiff's submissions will refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system. Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Seconds later, the officers “yank Curtis off of the porch where they all tumbled and banged into the open door of the car causing the door to crush Plaintiff's shin bone against the car.” Id. Then, “Leach & Young initiated a physical altercation.” Id. As the officers “slammed and wrestled him unto the pavement the car door squeezed causing Plaintiff to wince & scream in excruciating pain.” Id. The officers “did nothing to help in this emergency.” Id.
Thereafter, “Plaintiff's car was illegally searched by them.” Id. Plaintiff received treatment for his injuries at the Auburn Memorial Hospital, where he was “diagnosed with a hairline fracture on left shin.” Id.
Plaintiff identified Auburn Police Officers Eric Leach, Andrew Young, and Sergeant Micheal Merkley as defendants. Id. at 2-3. The complaint asserts claims for “excessive force,” “negligence,” and “illegal search and seizure.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in relief. Id.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis in original). A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint, a court may look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
V. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “establishes a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 573 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).
To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the challenged conduct: (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). To establish liability under the statute, a plaintiff must plead that each government official defendant violated the Constitution through that official's own individual actions. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. Sergeant Micheal Merkley
“It is well-settled that where the complaint names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted.” Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F.Supp.2d 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff'd sub nom., Dove v. O'Hare, 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff listed Sergeant Micheal Merkley as a defendant in the caption of his complaint, Dkt. No. 1 at 3, but has not asserted any factual allegations against him, see Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the complaint as to Micheal Merkley without prejudice. See, e.g., Drawhorne v. Aloise, No. 6:23-CV-1278 (TJM/TWD), 2023 WL 8188396, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff's claims, without prejudice, as to a defendant listed in the complaint's caption where plaintiff failed to assert allegations against him), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 532572 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024); Cato v. Reardon, No. 9:22-CV-1173 (AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 1307115, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024) (dismissing claims as to an individual “named as a defendant in the caption and list of parties . . . [but] not referenced anywhere in the body of the pleading.”).
B. Excessive Force
Plaintiff first asserts an “8th Amendment” claim for “excessive force.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5. He avers Officers “Leach & Young ripped Curtis from porch, while his hands were up, causing them to topple crashing against car.” Id.
“There are three standards for excessive force depending on when the alleged violation occurred.” Porath v. Bird, No. 9:11-CV-963 (GLS/CFH), 2013 WL 2418253, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. June 3, 2013). “Where . . . the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment ....” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see also, e.g., Shamir v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining, “the use of excessive force renders a seizure of the person unreasonable and for that reason violates the Fourth Amendment.”). “[I]f the alleged excessive force occurs post-arraignment, but before conviction, then Fourteenth Amendment standards apply.” Artis v. Valls, No. 9:10-CV-0427 (GTS/TWD), 2012 WL 4380921, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012); see also, Rodriguez v. City of New York, 594 F.Supp.3d 534, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies . . . to excessive force claims that do not involve ‘an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen.'”) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395) (additional quotations and citation omitted); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (explaining, “[a] ‘seizure' triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen ....'”) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968)) (additional citation omitted). “After conviction, the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary source of substantive protection . . . in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.'” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, n.10 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)); see also Porath, 2013 WL 2418253, at *16 (“Allegations of excessive force occurring after conviction are subject to an Eighth Amendment analysis.”) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671, n.40 (1977) (“the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”)).
Here, the alleged constitutional violation occurred in Plaintiff's driveway, following police instructions to “freeze” and “stay put[,]” and prior to a search of Plaintiff's vehicle. See Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Because it does not appear Plaintiff was arraigned on or convicted of criminal charges prior to the alleged incident, his excessive force claim is properly assessed under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. When analyzing such a claim, the relevant “question is whether the officers' actions [we]re ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139 (1978)) (additional citation omitted).
The undersigned notes, in his complaint, which was drafted utilizing a form complaint for civil rights violations, Plaintiff indicated he was a “[p]retrial detainee” at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2. However, given that the alleged wrongdoing apparently occurred in the driveway of Plaintiff's residence, id. at 4, and that Plaintiff listed his address at the time of filing as the “Cayuga County Jail,” id. at 2, it appears Plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee at the time the incident giving rise to his claims occurred, and instead indicated his confinement status at the time he commenced the instant action.
Liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008), Plaintiff's complaint alleges Auburn Police Officers Leach and Young instructed Plaintiff not to move as he stood beside his vehicle with the door ajar, then “slammed and wrestled” a third party, Curtis Johnson, onto the ground, during the course of which, Leach and Young contacted the door of Plaintiff's vehicle with their own and/or Johnson's bodies, “causing the door to crush Plaintiff's shin bone” resulting in a hairline fracture of said bone. See Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court find Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Eric Leach and Andrew Young survive sua sponte review and require a response. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can withstand a properly filed dispositive motion.
C. Negligence
Plaintiff next purports to assert a claim for “negligence.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5. He avers, “every officer on the scene watched Plaintiff wince, cry, limp and beg for medical attention [officers] Leach & Young were negligent to demand Plaintiff to stay still.” Id.
“It is well settled, however, that negligence is not cognizable as a federal claim under Section 1983.” Gambino v. LaClair, No. 9:20-CV-0162 (DNH/DJS), 2020 WL 13801079, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)) (additional citation omitted); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)); Heredia v. Doe, 473 F.Supp.2d 462, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“the pleadings fail to state facts which constitute anything more than a claim for negligence, for which there is no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citations omitted); Johnson v. Annucci, No. 9:21-CV-0335 (TJM/CFH), 2021 WL 12156681, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2021) (claims grounded in negligence are not actionable under Section 1983) (citations omitted). Therefore, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's negligence claim. See, e.g., Guzman v. McCarthy, No. 9:21-CV-1192 (MAD/ATB), 2022 WL 630873, at *2 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022).
D. Illegal Search and Seizure
Plaintiff's final claim alleges an “illegal search and seizure.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5. In support of his claim, Plaintiff argues he “possessed nothing illegal, nor did anything to warrant a search.” Id. However, the complaint does not specify which defendant or defendants conducted the allegedly unlawful search. See id. at 4 (Plaintiff's car was illegally searched by them.”) (emphasis added), 5.
“Pleadings that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.” Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff has not specified which defendant(s) were involved in the alleged search of his vehicle, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim without prejudice. See, e.g., LaPietra v. City of Albany Police Dep't, No. 9:19-CV-1527 (TJM/TWD), 2020 WL 5891888, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (explaining, “[t]he use of the terms ‘they,' or ‘the police' or ‘officer' as a name for alleged defendants is not adequate to state a claim against a ‘person' as required in § 1983 actions.”) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7021589 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020).
VI. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED, and it is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be ACCEPTED for filing to the extent it asserts claims of Excessive Force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against Defendants Leach and Young; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that except as to the foregoing, the remaining claims asserted in the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.