Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3694 Section "T"(1)
June 14, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Columbus Chris Williams, filed the above captioned pro se and in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants Sheriff Jerry Larpenter, the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, and the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex Medical Department. At plaintiffs request, he was subsequently allowed to amend his complaint to add as defendants Warden Joe Null, Tom Collins, Randy Pijor, Ed Byerly, Patti Reeves, Mark Rhodes, and Charles Gary Blaize. Based on a subsequent request from plaintiff, Patti Reeves, Mark Rhodes, and Charles Gary Blaize were dismissed from the lawsuit. In this action, plaintiff alleges that he was placed in a lockdown cell without running water and was provided inadequate medical care while incarcerated at the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex.
Rec. Doc. 1.
Rec. Docs. 13, 19, 21, and 22. Plaintiff later moved to add Curtis LeBouef as a defendant; however, that motion was denied. Rec. Docs. 51 and 52.
Rec. Docs. 40, 50, and 55. Plaintiff also moved to dismiss Joseph Waitz, Jr., from the lawsuit; however, Waitz was never named as a defendant.
Rec. Doc. 1.
On April 4, 2002, defendants Ed Byerly and the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge.
Rec. Doc. 37.
Rec. Doc. 42.
Rec. Doc. 54.
Standard for Summary Judgment
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the United States Supreme Court indicated that the party seeking summary judgment must point out the absence of evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. See Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001). The party opposing summary judgment, and who bears the burden at trial, must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). "`[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.'" Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted))."[C]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden." Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994)). "After the nonmovant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted." Caboni v. General Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Duhe, 274 F.3d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 2001) ("If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial, there ceases to be a genuine issue as to any material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
Placement in a Lockdown Cell Without Running Water
Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in a lockdown cell without running water for cursing an officer. Defendants Byerly, who is the medical administrator at the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex, and the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government contend that they had no involvement in that incident. Indeed, plaintiff has not made any allegations that the actions or inactions of those defendants in any way contributed to or resulted in his placement in a lockdown cell without running water. Plaintiff frankly concedes that fact, stating: "There is no time that I indicated that Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government or Mr. Edward Byerly had placed me in Lockdown or for having the water completely turned off while I was in lockdown."
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, § IV.
Rec. Doc. 37.
Rec. Doc. 42.
Because the parties agree that defendants Byerly and Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government were neither directly nor indirectly involved in plaintiffs placement in a lockdown cell without running water, summary judgment in favor of those defendants on that claim is warranted.
Inadequate Medical Care
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that "[t]he medical staff" stopped giving him his medication because he "had not taken some pills." The medications plaintiff was allegedly denied were for his blood pressure, cholesterol, sinus condition, allergies, insomnia, a fungal condition, and diabetes. In a status conference held on February 4, 2002, plaintiff stated that the withholding of medication occurred during an approximate twenty-day period between May and August, 2001, and during an approximate nineteen-day period between September and December, 2001. To date, plaintiff has not identified any harm he suffered as a result of those alleged incidents.
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, § IV.
Rec. Doc. 12. In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, however, plaintiff appears to narrow the period to September 15 through December 9, 2001. Rec. Doc. 42. However, for the purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered the entire period from May through December, 2001.
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants contend that plaintiff was routinely seen by medical department staff for a variety of complaints and monitoring of his medical conditions. They further note that plaintiff routinely refused medication and their efforts to monitor his medical conditions. In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes that he at times refused his medications. However, plaintiff takes the position that the medications should nevertheless have been offered to him despite his refusals, and he alleges that this was not done.
Rec. Doc. 37.
Rec. Doc. 42.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the record is unclear as to whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner during the period in question. However, knowing plaintiffs status is not crucial to resolving his claim because the standard for inadequate medical care for a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment is basically the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit has noted that there is "no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs, including medical care." Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The right enjoyed by both is not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the penal authorities. See Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (pretrial detainee); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999) (convicted prisoner).
"For an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Harris, 198 F.3d at 159 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has further noted:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. . . . [T]he plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. . . . [T]he failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.
Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Furthermore, while deliberate indifference to medical needs is actionable under § 1983, negligence and medical malpractice are not. "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
As noted, plaintiff complains that his medication was withheld twice during his incarceration: for an approximate twenty-day period between May and August, 2001, and for an approximate nineteen-day period between September and December, 2001. However, the medical records filed with this Court show that, as defendants contend, plaintiff routinely refused medication. For example, the records reflect that during the eight-month period at issue plaintiff refused medications and/or insulin on the following dates: 5/14, 5/19, 5/22, 5/26, 5/28, 5/30, 7/17, 8/14, 8/15, 8/16, 8/19, 8/29, 8/30, 9/21, 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/5, 10/6, 10/7, 10/8, 10/20, 10/21, 11/16, and 11/21. In addition, plaintiff submitted to the penal authorities a number of written statements regarding his refusal to take his medication, including the following:
The medical records referenced herein appear in the federal record at Rec. Doc. 47.
I will allow myself to die — no medication, no food, no water — watch — death is a blessing. (Request for Medical Attention Form dated Sept. 21, 2001)
Tell that son of a bitch — Judge Gaidry that he cannot control my life. If I want to die — I will allow myself to die — no medication, no food, no water — watch. (Inmate Request Form dated Sept. 21, 2001)
No more food, no medication, no water. Blood sugar now at 69 — see me at hospital or die — that a promise — Chris. (Undated Inmate Request Form)
No food, no medication, no water. (Request for O.T.C. Medication dated Sept. 26, 2001)
Need pain pills for back and neck — need medication doctor ordered. No medication until I see a doctor. A back doctor. Not a G.P. (Request for Medical Attention Form dated Oct. 1, 2001)
Even on those occasions when plaintiff accepted his medications, he did not always take them. On October 23 or 24, 2001, penal authorities discovered that plaintiff had in fact been hoarding his medications, including Depakote, Vistaril, Risperdal, and diabetes medications. The authorities then contacted Dr. Haydel, who ordered that plaintiffs medications be discontinued based on his noncompliance and refusal to take them.
The Court also notes that plaintiffs noncompliance and attempts to frustrate monitoring of his health were nothing new. The record reflects that in October, 2000, the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government filed with the Louisiana Thirty-Second Judicial District Court an ex parte motion alleging that plaintiff refused to submit to routine diagnostic testing for blood sugar, blood pressure, and vital signs. The state court issued an order allowing the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government "to draw blood and perform other diagnostic testing, as necessary, and to take whatever steps are necessary to insure the safety and well being" of plaintiff. Rec. Doc. 47.
In contrast to defendants' voluminous medical records documenting the efforts to meet plaintiffs medical needs, plaintiff has offered only conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions in support of his claim. Moreover, plaintiffs contention that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs is ludicrous. The medical staff consistently sought to monitor plaintiffs health, and he routinely refused to cooperate. Medications were consistently offered to plaintiff, and he routinely refused or hoarded them. The medical records clearly indicate that substantial medical department staff and resources were devoted to attempts monitor and treat plaintiffs medical conditions, despite his repeated noncompliance and his efforts to impede his care. If anything, defendants showed significantly more concern over plaintiffs health than plaintiff himself. In light of these facts, and the fact that plaintiff has failed to allege that any harm resulted from the medical care provided or allegedly withheld, no reasonable juror could find that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs serious medical needs. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs inadequate medical care claim.
Conclusion
For the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and that plaintiffs claims against defendants Ed Byerly and the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.