Opinion
Civil Action 13-1171
11-21-2022
JEFF SCHIRONE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. MARIROSA LAMAS, et al., Respondents.
ECF No. 22
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
DAVID S. CERCONE, DISTRICT JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 22) be denied and that a certificate of appealability also be denied.
II. REPORT
Jeff Schirone Williams, a.k.a. Jafarnia Williams, (“Petitioner”) has filed what has been docketed as a Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 22) seeking relief from this Court's Order dated May 7, 2014, which dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction because it was the second petition that Petitioner had filed challenging his 2007 judgment of sentence out of Allegheny County and he had not obtained authorization to file it from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 21.) In support of the instant motion for relief, Petitioner claims that new case law supports his argument that his petition for writ of habeas corpus is not an unauthorized second or successive petition and he therefore requests that the Court vacate its judgment and review the claims raised in his petition.
A. Relevant Procedural History
The relevant procedural history is taken from the undersigned's Report and Recommendation dated June 16, 2011 in C. A. No. 10-936, the Report and Recommendation dated April 14, 2014 in C. A. No. 13-1171, and the Report and Recommendation dated April 5, 2018 in C. A. No. 16-210.
On January 10, 2007, Petitioner, proceeding pro se with stand-by counsel, was convicted of Kidnapping for Ransome, Corruption of Minors, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. See Commonwealth v. Williams, CP-02-CR-0014658-2004 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania). On June 25, 2007, he received an aggregate sentence of fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years imprisonment. This sentence was made to run consecutively to any sentence he was already serving. Post-sentence motions were filed and denied on July 26, 2007. On appeal, Petitioner requested and was granted remand in order to present after discovered evidence to the trial court. Amended post-sentence motions were filed and denied on April 2, 2008. Petitioner's judgment of sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on May 3, 2010. His application for reconsideration and reargument was denied on June 23, 2010. He did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, nor did he file a petition for state post-conviction relief.
On July 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court at C. A. No. 10-936, wherein he raised the following eight claims:
1. Delay in direct appeal process violated Petitioner's due process and Fifth Amendment rights.
2. Petitioner's due process rights to a fair trial were violated when the trial court allowed an improper rebuttal witness to testify.
3. Tardy disclosure of favorable evidence denied Petitioner a fair trial in violation of his due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Failure to sever unrelated charged denied Petitioner a fair trial in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. The Commonwealth's failure to provide Petitioner with a witness's criminal record and disclose existence of pending criminal charges in violation of Brady.
6. The trial court conducted an inadequate waiver of counsel hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
7. The trial court failed to suppress evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
8. Failures to correct false testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois denied Petitioner a fair trial.
This Court denied the petition on November 15, 2011, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability on February 13, 2012. See Williams v. Lamas, et al., C. A. No. 11-4461 (3d Cir.). Petitioner filed several motions requesting relief from the Court's judgment in that case, all of which were denied, and the Third Circuit similarly denied Petitioner's applications for certificates of appealability in connection with the denial of those motions. See Jafarnia Williams v. Marirosa Lamas, et al., C.A. Nos. 124353 and 13-1882 (3d Cir.).
During the pendency of his habeas proceedings at C. A. No. 10-936, Petitioner returned to state court and filed a timely post-conviction petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). That petition was dismissed on April 11, 2012. On appeal, Petitioner raised five claims, one of which was that he was entitled to four years, three months, and twelve days of time credit.On March 12, 2013, the Superior Court dismissed the claims as moot, meritless, underdeveloped, and/or noncognizable under the PCRA, with the exception of the claim for time credit. Specifically, the Superior Court remanded the case for a hearing on the issue of whether Petitioner should receive time credit on his sentence.
Petitioner was seeking credit for time served in connection with another case; specifically his sentence at ¶ 199193256 for kidnapping and aggravated indecent assault convictions.
On June 26, 2013, a remand hearing was held on the sole issue of time credit. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Petitioner time credit from September 17, 2000 to December 29, 2000 (a period of three months and twelve days). An order issued granting Petitioner the credit against his sentence, and the credit was reflected in an order titled “SENTENCE MODIFIED 6-26-13 FOR TIME CREDIT.”
Said order appears at the end of Petitioner's current motion. See ECF No. 22, pp.8-9.
On August 5, 2013, Petitioner filed an appeal to the Superior Court claiming that he was entitled to additional time credit; specifically for the four years from September 17, 1996 to September 17, 2000. On February 20, 2014, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court's order noting that under Pennsylvania law, Petitioner was not “legally entitled to any credit for time served on his prior sentence” for which the time served was for “offenses wholly unrelated to the current charges.” It further noted that the PCRA court chose to credit Petitioner with three months and twelve days on his current sentence even though it was not legally required to do so and the Commonwealth did not object to this “favorable ruling” on appeal.
During the pendency of his PCRA proceedings, Petitioner filed in the Third Circuit an application to file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the Third Circuit denied on May 20, 2013. See In re: Jafarnia Williams, C. A. No. 13-1991 (3d Cir.).
Despite the Third Circuit's denial of Petitioner's application, Petitioner returned to this Court and filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2007 judgment of sentence. Said petition was filed at the instant case number in August 2013. In his petition, he raised six claims, all relating to his underlying conviction. Five of the six claims were identical to claims that Petitioner had raised in his first petition at C. A. No. 10-936, which had been previously addressed and denied either entirely or in the alternative on their merits. Although Petitioner did not raise any claims relating to the state court's denial of the four years of time credit, Petitioner argued that the modification of his sentence for time credit on June 26, 2013 resulted in a “new judgment” for which he was now in custody, and he thus claimed that, pursuant to Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (2010),his petition was not second or successive. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in which they argued that the petition was, in fact, an unauthorized second or successive petition over which this Court lacked jurisdiction. This Court disagreed with Petitioner's characterization of his petition and the applicability of Magwood to his case, and it thus dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction on May 7, 2014. Petitioner did not seek a certificate of appealability from the Third Circuit, but he did file with the Circuit another application to file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, making the same argument with respect to his sentence and the award of time credit. The Third Circuit also disagreed stating that the modification of his sentence to account for time credit was “markedly different from Magwood” and he did “not cite[] any authority that warrant[ed] extending Magwood's holding” to his case. It therefore denied Petitioner's application on August 28, 2014. See In re: Jeff Schirone Williams, C. A. No. 14-3379 (3d Cir.).
In Magwood, the United States Supreme Court stated that where “there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,' an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive' at all.” Id. at 2802 (internal citation omitted). Magwood involved a prisoner who was sentenced to death. The prisoner challenged his sentence in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 2791. The federal district court granted the writ as to his sentence and mandated that he either be released or resentenced. Id. The state trial court then “conducted a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating evidence afresh” and again sentenced him to death. Id. at 2801. The prisoner filed another application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court challenging the new sentence, and the Eleventh Circuit held that the challenge to the new sentence was unreviewable because it was a “second or successive” challenge under § 2244(b). Id. at 2791-92. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the new “judgment and sentence [was] the result of a complete and new assessment of all the evidence, arguments of counsel, and law.'” Id. at 2801 (quoting the Sentencing Transcript). The Court then held that “because Magwood's habeas application challenge[d] a new judgment for the first time, it [was] not ‘second or successive' under § 2244(b).” Id. at 2792.
Despite the Third Circuit's denial of his application to file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner again returned to this Court and filed a third petition challenging his 2007 judgment of sentence. The petition was filed at C. A. No. 16-210. Petitioner again claimed that his petition should not be considered second or successive because of the modification of his sentence to award time credit in 2013 and also because in 2016 the state court removed fees and costs that had been erroneously imposed. This Court disagreed and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on April 30, 2018. The Third Circuit denied Petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability on August 30, 2018. See Jeff Williams v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, et al., C. A. No. 18-2037 (3d Cir.).
Petitioner next returned to the Third Circuit and filed another application to file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus. That application was denied on June 5, 2019. See In re: Jafarnia Williams, No. 18-3651 (3d Cir.).
Petitioner has once again returned to this Court seeking relief by way of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He appears to challenge this Court's reasoning for dismissing his habeas petition as an unauthorized second or successive petition for which the Circuit had not granted him permission to file. He submits that based on recent case law, this Court should vacate its judgment and review the claims raised in his petition.
B. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances, including (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) because the judgment is void; (5) because the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; and (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Petitioner specifically invokes Rule 60(b)(6). A court may grant equitable relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to such equitable relief,” but the District Court “must consider the full measure of any properly presented facts and circumstances attendant to the [petitioner's] request.” Id. at 122.
In support of his motion, Petitioner appears to invoke Rule 60(b)(1) and requests that the Court vacate its judgment based on a “mistake”. He cites to Kemp v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 1856 (2022), wherein the Supreme Court held that the term “mistake” in that section includes a judge's errors of law, and he appears to argue that this Court made an error of law in dismissing his petition as an unauthorized second or successive petition. Notwithstanding the fact that no such error of law was made, which will be discussed below, Rule 60(b)(1) motions, like all Rule 60(b) motions, must be made “within a reasonable time,” and, at most, one year after the entry of the order under review. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1), (c)(1). Because the Order from which Petitioner seeks relief is dated May 7, 2014, Petitioner's motion is clearly untimely.
Nevertheless, even if Petitioner's motion could be construed as seeking relief under a section of Rule 60(b) not subject to the 1-year time constraint, such as Rule 60(b)(6), Petitioner would still not be entitled to the relief he is requesting. Specifically, Petitioner claims that recent case law supports the proposition that a state court's alteration in sentence to award time credit constitutes a new, intervening judgment such that a federal habeas petition challenging that alteration is not “second or successive” for which leave to file is required by the Court of Appeals. He therefore argues that the state court's award of time credit to him on June 26, 2013 created a new sentence that entitles him under Magwood to file a habeas petition without first seeking leave of the Third Circuit.
In Magwood, the Supreme Court considered whether a petition was successive and subject to § 2244(b)(3)(A) where a petitioner was sentenced to death, had his sentence overturned in a federal habeas proceeding, was resentenced to death a second time in a new sentencing proceeding in state court and then filed a second habeas petition challenging the resentencing. 561 U.S. at 320. The Court held that a petition is successive if it is a second petition challenging the judgment under which the petitioner is being held in custody. Id. at 32021. Because the resentencing proceeding had resulted in a new judgment, the petitioner was in custody pursuant to the new judgment. Id. The petitioner's second petition, therefore, was not a second challenge to the same judgment as his first petition but was, instead, the first challenge to the new judgment that resulted from the resentencing. Id.; see also In re Brown, 594 Fed.Appx. 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2014) (where one of several convictions resulting from a single trial was vacated on habeas review and petitioner was resentenced on the remaining convictions, the resentencing was an “intervening judgment” between the petitioner's two habeas petitions so that the second petition was not subject to § 2244(b)(3)(A)).
Since Magwood, the federal courts have been called upon to determine what type of alteration to a state court sentence creates a new judgment so that a subsequent habeas petition attacking the new judgment is not successive to a previous petition that attacked the initial judgment. It is widely agreed that state court rulings that correct mere “clerical errors” do not create a new judgment and do not authorize a new, second habeas petition. However, the issue of whether an order directing that credit be awarded against a sentence for time previously served is a correction of a clerical error or creates a new judgment for the purposes of § 2244(b)(3)(A) under Magwood has led to conflicting decisions.
Petitioner relies on cases from federal district courts in Florida which have held that a modification to a sentence to properly account for time served creates a new judgment that renders a habeas petition regarding that judgment not successive of an earlier petition challenging the initial judgment. See Walker v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2014 WL 2095370, at *2 (N.D. Fl. May 20, 2014). The Walker court relied in part on Florida law, under which “a sentence that fails to give credit for time served is an illegal sentence,” id., at *1, and ruled that “the amendment was indeed a judgment, subject to appeal just as was the original judgment,” id., at *2. Another federal district court in Florida also rejected the State's contention that an order granting credit for time served was a mere technical change in the earlier judgment rather than a new judgment for habeas purposes on the basis of Florida law. See Esty v. Jones, 2015 WL 4130108, at *8 (N.D. Fl. July 9, 2015). It stated that “Florida law makes . . . clear” that the award of credit for time served “was a substantive change.” Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit has recently held that, under Florida law, an amended sentence entered nunc pro tunc that relates back to the date of the initial judgment is not a “new judgment” for purposes of § 2244. Osbourne v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 968 F.3d 1261, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020). And, even more recently, in a nonprecedential decision, it held that a petitioner's amended sentence to credit him for additional days of jail time did not result in a “new judgment” for purposes of § 2244 when the amended sentence was, effectively, imposed nunc pro tunc. See Miller v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2022 WL 29924, at *2 (Jan 4, 2022). It reasoned that it did not alter the judgment authorizing the petitioner's custody because it did not change or modify the sentence that the petitioner was currently serving except to credit him with additional jail time and it specified that the sentences on all counts were effective as of the date of the original judgment. Id., at *2-3.
Petitioner also relies on case law from the Ninth Circuit, which has found that “[u]nder California law, custody credits are part of that sentence and a court's alteration of the number of credits awarded to a defendant changes both the duration and the legality of his sentence.” Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, it held that “in California, a court's recalculation and alteration of the number of time-served or other similar credit awarded to a petitioner constitutes a new judgment.” Id. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that, under Nevada law, a state court's amended judgment awarding a defendant credit for time served constitutes a new judgment. See Turner v. Baker, 912 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2019).
Despite these cases cited by Petitioner in his motion, the state of the law in this Circuit has not changed since this Court issued its order dismissing the habeas petition in this case on May 7, 2014. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have determined whether, or to what extent, Magwood applies to changes in a sentence that do not, unlike Magwood, involve vacation of the prior sentence and a new sentencing hearing. Furthermore, to the extent any of the cases he relies on in his motion could be favorable to Petitioner, none of them are binding on this Court. While it is true, as Petitioner points out in his motion, that Pennsylvania law considers the failure to properly credit time served in a criminal sentence as required by statute to be an “error [that] involves the legality of the sentence,” Commonwealth v. Tout-Puissant, 823 A.2d 186, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), importantly, this was not a situation where a defendant's sentence was amended because he or she was legally entitled to an award of time credit. Instead, as noted by the Superior Court, Petitioner was not “legally entitled to any credit for time served on his prior sentence” but the PCRA court chose to credit him anyway and the Commonwealth did not object to the “favorable ruling” on appeal. Thus, Petitioner's case is unlike those where the defendants were resentenced upon a finding of an illegal sentence under that state's law. Moreover, and most importantly, the Third Circuit has already determined that Petitioner's situation is “markedly different” from Magwood and that no authority warrants extending Magwood's holding to his case. The cases cited and relied on by Petitioner in his motion certainly do not.
In sum, to the extent Petitioner's motion seeks relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, his motion should be denied because it is untimely. To the extent it could be construed as seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), it should be denied because nothing in it warrants granting Petitioner the relief he is seeking.
Furthermore, the undersigned notes that five of the six claims Petitioner brings in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this case are identical to claims he raised in his habeas petition in C. A. No. 10-936, all of which were denied entirely or in the alternative on their merits. Even if Petitioner could somehow overcome the jurisdictional hurdle to have his claims reviewed, he has presented nothing to alter this Court's conclusion with respect to the disposition of those five claims in C. A. No. 10-936.
C. Certificate of Appealability
A certificate of appealability should be denied because reasonable jurists would not debate the denial of Petitioner's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 22) be denied and that a certificate of appealability also be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Local Rule of Court 72.D.2, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.