Opinion
C. A. 4:22-1365-HMH-TER
10-05-2022
ULYSSES WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN HANSEN JANSON Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
The Petitioner, Ulysses Williams (“Petitioner”), appearing pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on April 28, 2022. The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment along with supporting memorandum and exhibits on August 2, 2022. (ECF No. 19). The undersigned issued an order filed August 4, 2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975), advising the Petitioner of the motion and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. (ECF No. 20). On August 11, 2022, Petitioner filed a document entitled motion for summary judgment and included a response to Respondent's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22).
This habeas corpus case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02, DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As previously stated, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment. As matters outside of the pleadings were submitted, the undersigned will treat this motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.” Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
ANALYSIS
The Petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and currently located at Federal Correctional Institution Edgefield (“FCI Edgefield”), filed this petition seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is challenging a disciplinary action taken against him originally at FCC Beaumont, Texas, for an incident report he received on August 16, 2017, charging him with violation of Code 102, Escape from any Non-Secure Institution. Petitioner argues that the disciplinary action should be expunged as he is innocent of the charges. He asserts that he was disabled, went to the hospital, and then missed the bus to the Residential Reentry Center (Halfway House). Petitioner asserts that he called the prison and the Halfway House in accordance with policy and should have had an additional twenty-four hours to arrive at the Halfway House. He further asserts that FCC Beaumont prematurely wrote the incident report before he was due to arrive at the Halfway House, and that the officials at FCI Gilmer failed to conduct a DHO rehearing within sixty-days of his arrival in violation of BOP policy. Peittioner seeks to have the disciplinary action expunged, his good conduct time of twenty-five days restored, and his six months halfway house placement restored.
Any issues with regard to a violation of BOP policy by the DHO hearing not being conducted within sixty days of his arrival at FCI Gilmer, fail. It appears that Petitioner arrived at FCI Gilmer on December 27, 2017, he was issued a copy of the incident report on February 17, 2018, and the DHO hearing was held on March 8, 2018. However, ‘[v]iolations of BOP regulations do not equate to a violation of due process.” Guerra v. Atkinson, No. 4:13-2062-MGL, 2014 WL 1400808, at *7 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respondent raises the affirmative defense of exhaustion. Specifically, Respondent argues that the motion for summary judgment should be granted for Petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking federal court review.
In support of the motion, Respondent submitted the declaration of J. Carter (“Carter”), Legal Assistant for the South Carolina Consolidated Legal Center. (ECF No. 19-1). As a Legal Assistant, Carter has access to information regarding inmates in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Id. Carter declares Petitioner is a federal inmate currently designated by the BOP to FCI Edgefield, South Carolina with a projected release date, with good conduct time, to be April 17, 2023. Id. After being placed on escape status in 2017 for failure to arrive at the RRC as scheduled, Petitioner was designated to FCI Gilmer, West Virginia, where he arrived on December 27, 2017. Id. A review of SENTRY records shows that the only remedy request Petitioner filed regarding his DHO rehearing from March 8, 2018, is Remedy ID No. 114110-A1, which was filed at the Central Office level on March 9, 2022. Id. The Remedy was rejected March 21, 2022, for filing at the wrong level. Petitioner filed no further administrative remedies on the DHO action. Id.
“Unlike petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,which challenge the validity of a state court conviction and sentence, petitions brought under § 2241 generally challenge the execution or implementation of a sentence, such as parole matters, sentence computation, calculation of good-time credits, prison disciplinary actions, and transfers.” Clemmons v. South Carolina, No. 0:08-607-RBH, 2008 WL 2845636, *1 (D.S.C. July 18, 2008). Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts consistently require prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
The BOP's Administrative Remedy Program is found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 through 542.19. The BOP has a three-tiered formal administrative grievance process in addition to an informal resolution process. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 et seq. An inmate may complain about any aspect of his confinement by first seeking to informally resolve the complaint at the institution level. See id.; 28 C.F.R. §542.13. If the matter cannot be resolved informally, the inmate may file a formal written complaint to the warden within 20 calendar days after the date upon which the basis for the request occurred. See id.; 28 C.F.R. §542.14. The matter will be investigated, and a written response provided to the inmate. Id. If dissatisfied with the response, the inmate may appeal to the Regional Director within 20 days of the date of the Warden's response. See id.; 28C.F.R. §542.15(a). If dissatisfied with the regional response, the inmate may appeal to the Central Office within 30 days of the Regional Director's response. Id. Appeal to the Central office is the final level of agency review. See id.; 28C.F.R. §542.15(a). If during this process, the inmate does not receive a response from the Warden, Regional Director, or General Counsel within the allotted time frames including extensions, the inmate may consider such response or appeal as denied and appeal to the next level. See id.; 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Inmates may not appeal issues that were not raised in previous lower level filings or combine appeals of separate lower level responses (different remedy numbers) into a single appeal. See id.; 28 C.F.R. §542.15(b)(2). Thus, each administrative remedy appeal must address the same issues addressed at the lower level in this remedy. See id.; 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)(2). Pursuant to Program Statement (“PS”) 1330.18, Administrative Remedy Program, DHO appeals shall be submitted initially to the Regional Director for the region where the inmate is currently. See PS 1330.18, In his motion for summary judgment also deemed a response, Petitioner does not appear to dispute Respondent's argument that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Petitioner simply argues that Respondent claims the BOP argues that it cannot be held to the policy to have a DHO hearing within sixty-days but then argues that Petitioner should be held accountable for violating policy when he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Petitioner argues that the “BOP can't claim both sides of the fence.” (ECF No. 22). It is clear in the law that Petitioner was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a federal § 2241 petition. Warren v. United States, No. 10-1245, 2011 WL 4435671 at * 2 (D.S.C. June 29, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 4435655 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2011) (“It is well settled that a federal prisoner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies with BOP before filing an action pursuant to § 2241.”)(quoting Henderson v. Warden, Edgefield Satellite Prison Camp, 2009 WL 3317149 at * 2 (D.S.C. Oct. 14, 2009)) (citing Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1999)). Additionally, the “BOP should be afforded the opportunity to correct any alleged errors, to develop its factual record, and apply its expertise to the situation.” Mero v. Phelps, C/A No. 4:20-cv-03615-MGL-TER, 2020 WL 7774378, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 7769784 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2020). Petitioner can only assert the claim in this Court after he has exhausted his administrative remedies. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 through 542.16. Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted for failure to exhaust.
In the petition, Petitioner asserts that he completed Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal forms and attached copies of the appeal forms. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 2, and 6).
Even construing Petitioner's § 2241 Petition as raising a general due process claim regarding his delayed receipt of the DHO Report, such a claim also fails. “It is not the mere fact of the government's delay that violates due process, but rather the prejudice resulting from such delay.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Borda, 171 F.3d 175, 183 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). In the context of an inmate's delayed receipt of the DHO's report, courts have held that inmates do not suffer any prejudice when they receive the DHO's report months after the hearing, and that such a multi-month delay does not constitute a due process violation. Here, Respondent asserts that although it is unclear when Petitioner received a copy of the DHO report, he now has a copy and has been able to challenge his disciplinary action in this Court. As courts have recognized, with respect to a claim that an inmate did not receive the DHO Report, such a claim is rendered moot if the inmate receives the report. Shahan v. Ormond, No. 3:18cv200, 2018 WL 6681210, at *5, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214149, at *14-15 (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2018) (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2018), affd, 778 Fed.Appx. 217 (4th Cir. 2019).
Even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, the claims fail. The Supreme Court held that inmates are entitled to limited due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings to the extent that a protected liberty interest is affected. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in the accumulation of good time credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Therefore, in prison disciplinary proceedings where a prisoner faces the possible loss of good conduct credits, he is entitled to certain due process protections. Id. These include advance written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written decision. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-571. Furthermore, substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Here, Petitioner fails to show a violation of due process in this action; fails to show he did not receive the safeguards delineated in Wolff, supra. Specifically, the undisputed evidence reflects that Petitioner received a notice of the incident report, received a rehearing after previously been tried in absentee, during which he had the opportunity, if he so chose, to receive assistance from a staff representative, to present documentary evidence and witness testimony, and he received written notice of the charge against him prior to the hearing. Petitioner received the DHO Report, albeit delayed which describes the evidence relied upon by the DHO and the reasons for the imposed disciplinary action. (ECF No. 19-1 at 3-18). While Petitioner may disagree with the DHO's findings, there was “some evidence” to support the decision. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correction Institution v. Hill, supra. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED and this claim dismissed. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) be denied for the reasons set forth above.