Williams v. I.R.S

19 Citing cases

  1. Spagnola v. Mathis

    809 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1986)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that federal employee was precluded from bringing § 1985 claim because "the CSRA is the exclusive remedy for aggrieved federal employees advancing non-constitutional claims"

    Id. at 173-74. In Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we refused to dismiss a First Amendment claim by an excepted service employee not covered by the procedures of the CSRA other than resort to the OSC. Reiterating our interpretation of Bush as foreclosing only those constitutional claims for which Congress afforded a "meaningful" statutory remedy, we found Borrell to be "the most instructive precedent" and expressly distinguished Bush because "Williams is differently situated [from Bush]; he has no CSRA-conferred guarantee of an administrative adjudication outside the Service or of direct court review." Id. at 705.

  2. Hubbard v. U.S.E.P.A. Admin

    809 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)   Cited 99 times
    Finding that “Congress specifically chose to oust the district courts of jurisdiction to review government personnel practices” such as whistleblower causes of action

    In Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1984), briefed before the decision in Bush, we vacated and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment against Bartel on her claim for injunctive and monetary relief. Rather than draw speculative inferences from the plaintiff's pro se complaint, we instructed the district court to determine "which [Bartel's] alleged violations are administratively remediable and hence barred in this case" under Bush. 725 F.2d at 1415 n. 21. Bartel left open the very issue we decide today. Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 62, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985), and Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 D.C. Cir. 1984) likewise address different issues. In Williams, we reversed the dismissal of a first amendment claim, but stressed that the plaintiff was seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief not "damages as a substitute for or supplement to civil service remedies."

  3. Williams v. I.R.S

    919 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    Upholding the IRS's private employment approval bar which prevented an IRS attorney from acting a class-counsel in a private class action lawsuit pre- NTEU

    On appeal, we held that the suspension did not violate Williams's statutory or due process rights. Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ( "Williams I"). We remanded the case, however, for a determination as to whether Williams had a "`serious' free association claim."

  4. Harrison v. Bowen

    815 F.2d 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1987)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that the CSRA forecloses judicial review of nonpreference eligible employee's removal

    See Fausto v. United States, 783 F.2d 1020, adhered to, reh. denied, 791 F.2d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 872, 93 L.Ed.2d 827 (1987). Cf. Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 7501(1), which applies to suspensions of 14 days or less). Harrison's supervisor Grinstead evidently believed that she was covered under § 4303(a)-(d).

  5. Kotarski v. Cooper

    799 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1986)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that probationary employee could pursue Bivens action against supervisor

    That conclusion, we suggest, is central to the holding in Bush. See Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702, 705 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Guided by Bush, then, we view the question before us to be whether the congressional and administrative remedies provided for Kotarski as a probationary employee are sufficient to give meaningful protection to his constitutional rights.

  6. Robbins v. Bentsen

    41 F.3d 1195 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that a court should not read a regulation as being in conflict with the statute "where such a reading is unnecessary"

    Finally, Robbins relies on three cases, Krueger v. Lyng, 927 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1991), Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987), and Williams v. Internal Revenue Service, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984), to suggest that where the CSRA has not provided a complete remedy, a Bivens action should be appropriate. That reliance is wholly misplaced.

  7. Spagnola v. Mathis

    859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988)   Cited 179 times
    Holding that "special factors" preclude creation of Bivens remedy for civil service employees and applicants who advance constitutional challenges to federal personnel actions

    On the contrary, time and again this court has affirmed the right of civil servants to seek equitable relief against their supervisors, and the agency itself, in vindication of their constitutional rights.See, e.g., Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Borrell v. United States Int'l Comm. Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Of course, to the extent any of these cases indicates that civil service employees may pursue Bivens remedies for the same violations, they are hereby disapproved.

  8. Moon v. Phillips

    854 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1988)   Cited 14 times
    In Moon v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1988), we observed that "subject to narrow exceptions, a federal employee cannot file a suit for damages against his supervisor for an unconstitutional adverse personnel action when Congress has provided an adequate administrative remedy."

    Bush, 462 U.S. at 385 n. 28, 103 S.Ct. at 2415 n. 28. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Moon, the conduct of Moon's supervisors in directing him to file a false or misleading report does not fall within the general nature of the criminal and outrageous conduct exceptions set out in Bush to justify a judicial, rather than an administrative, remedy. Moon also cites Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980); Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1981); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 284, 78 L.Ed.2d 262 (1983); and Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984). We shall examine those cases briefly.

  9. Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice

    753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985)   Cited 427 times
    Holding that claim should not be dismissed if some type of relief, not limited to relief asked for in the complaint, can be awarded

    Suffice it to say that I would decline to extend the Bush holding to bar a Bivens action by a federal employee who has no statutory forum, including judicial review, for her constitutional claims. Cf. Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (declining to impose Bush as a bar to an action by a federal employee in part because the employee did not enjoy substantive or procedural protections under the relevant civil service law). [82] MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in part):

  10. Reuber v. United States

    750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984)   Cited 178 times
    Holding such an action permissible

    This court later adopted Justice Marshall's position in holding that the district court must consider a civil servant's Bivens claims arising from conduct not administratively remediable by the Merit Systems Protection Board. See Bartel v. Federal Aviation Administration, 725 F.2d 1403, 1415 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Williams v. I.R.S., 745 F.2d 702 at 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Moreover, it is clear that Reuber's defamation action should not be a special factor in this case since it is not a substitute to redress the constitutional wrongs that he alleges.