Opinion
23A-SC-2560
08-20-2024
Wendy Williams, Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff, v. Indy Developmental Residential Services, LLC, Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Terry Tolliver Brattain Minnix Tolliver Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Stacy L. Kelley Glaser &Ebbs Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Washington Township Small Claims Court of Marion County The Honorable Steven G. Poore, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49K07-2108-SC-1956
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Terry Tolliver Brattain Minnix Tolliver Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Stacy L. Kelley Glaser &Ebbs Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Najam, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Wendy Williams appeals, alleging the trial court erred when it declined to award her attorney's fees. Indy Developmental Residential Services (IDRS) cross appeals, claiming the trial court erred in its award of money damages to Williams. We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Williams' request for attorney's fees. But we also conclude the trial court's award of damages was, in part, unsupported by the evidence, and we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to adjust the damages award. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] IDRS is a "support of living and support services" provider for "individuals with intellectual developmental disabilities." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 67. In 2021, IDRS became licensed through the Bureau of Developmental Disabilities Services (BDDS) to provide Community Integration and Habilitation (CIH) waivers. CIH waivers are available to "children and adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities" and "provide person-centered individualized supports that assist individuals in living in their own home or family home and have full access to the benefits of community living." https://www.in.gov/fssa/ddrs/developmental-disability-services/ [https://perma.cc/Y6GC-7NQN] (last visited August 13, 2024).
BDDS has since become the Bureau of Disabilities Services per Indiana Code section 12-11-1.1-1 (2023). But because its name was BDDS at the time this dispute originated, we adhere to that name. BDDS is a subset of the Division of Disability and Rehabilitative Services (DDRS), which is a division of the Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA).
[¶3] In June of 2021, Williams met with Patricia Breaziel, the owner of IDRS, and Debra Meyer, an FSSA case manager, about leasing her home at 6416 Evanston Avenue to Sherra Patton, Christine Chapman, and Penny Riggs ("Tenants"). Each of the Tenants was a recipient of a CIH waiver from BDDS and needed housing, which required Meyer's permission.
We refer to Patton, Chapman, and Riggs as "Tenants" only for convenience. While they occupied the premises, they had no relationship with Williams, who dealt only with IDRS. The trial court found that the evidence failed to establish IDRS was acting as their agent and that they were incapable of negotiating a lease, and thus dismissed them as defendants.
[¶4] Following the meeting, Williams and Breaziel engaged in negotiations, namely a discussion about payment of monthly rent and utilities. Breaziel indicated that IDRS would collect rent and utility payments from Tenants and then distribute the payments directly to Williams and the utility companies.
[¶5] On June 30, Williams signed a written agreement for the lease of her property. Then on July 8, Breaziel presented the lease to Patton's mother, who is also Patton's guardian, for her signature on behalf of her daughter. Chapman and Riggs never signed the lease, and Williams never spoke to or negotiated with any of the Tenants during this time. Tenants began occupying Williams' home on July 9, 2021, and resided there until they vacated the premises in April of 2022. During that period, Tenants' caretakers, family members, and friends would visit, and IDRS staff members were always present on site.
[¶6] On August 30, 2021, Williams filed a claim against IDRS and Tenants. Later, after a hearing, the trial court dismissed Tenants, leaving IDRS as the only defendant. On February 3 and March 3, 2023, the trial court held a bench trial. And on June 5, the trial court issued its judgment, finding that, among other things, there was an oral agreement between Williams and IDRS. The trial court awarded $4,946.84 in damages to Williams but declined to award attorney's fees. Both parties filed motions to correct error, which were denied. This appeal ensued.
We commend the trial court for its detailed findings in this case.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[¶7] Both parties argue the trial court erred in its judgment: Williams in regard to attorney's fees and IDRS in regard to damages. "The clearly erroneous standard applies to appellate review of facts determined in a bench trial with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility." Kalwitz v. Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d 741, 748 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). "This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law." Id. "In determining whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." Id.
II. Oral Agreement
[¶8] In the present case, the trial court entered findings. The special findings requirement of Trial Rule 52(A) does not apply to small claims proceedings. Ayers v. Stowers, 200 N.E.3d 480, 484 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (citing Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878 (Ind. 1995)). But "[i]n an appeal from a small claims judgment, a trial court's special findings aid our review by providing us with a statement of the trial court's reasoning, [although] they do not alter the nature of our review." Ayers, 200 N.E.3d at 484. Here, we examine the trial court's findings regarding the oral agreement in controversy. The findings state, in relevant part:
32. The evidence established that [Williams] never negotiated with [Tenants]. ....
37. The evidence establishes that [Williams] was under the impression at all times that she was negotiating and contracting with [IDRS].
....
42. The evidence establishes at a minimum that [Williams] had an oral agreement with [IDRS] to rent the subject property so that [IDRS] could provide housing for disabled [Tenants]. ....
46. [IDRS] treated the tenancy as a tenancy between [Williams] and [IDRS] while [Tenants] occupied the leased premises.
47. [IDRS] by its conduct recognized that the agreement, whether oral or written, required payment of monthly rent in the amount of $1,250 and the obligation to pay utilities.
48. The court finds that the month to month tenancy existed between [Williams] and [IDRS] for the leased premises based upon an oral agreement.Appellant's App. Vol. Two, pp. 22-23.
[¶9] An oral agreement may be binding and valid so long as it contains "an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a manifestation of mutual assent." Nuell, Inc. v. Marsillett, 164 N.E.3d 768, 776 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). Yet, the parties' "[c]onduct can recognize the existence of a contract." Radio Picture Show P'ship v. Exclusive Int'l Pictures, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1159, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985).
[¶10] Williams and Breaziel, on behalf of IDRS, engaged in negotiations at the outset of this tenancy. Their discussions encompassed only the payment of rent in the sum of $1,250.00 per month and the payment of utilities. Ultimately, they reached an understanding that IDRS would collect rent and utility payments from Tenants and then distribute the payments directly to Williams and the utility companies. And IDRS did, in fact, facilitate the payment of rent and utilities over the duration of this tenancy. When Tenants moved into the premises, IDRS wrote a check to Williams for the security deposit and the first month's rent. And IDRS continued writing checks to Williams for the rent payments until the end of the tenancy. Likewise, IDRS also paid the utility bills each month. Given these circumstances, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the conduct of the parties was sufficient to establish an oral agreement.
The payments for the July, August, and September electric bills are disputed, and we address those in detail in the following section.
III. Damages
[¶11] IDRS argues the trial court erred when it awarded damages to Williams. Specifically, IDRS contends the trial court's findings (1) "as to an award against IDRS for unpaid electric bills" and (2) "that IDRS occupied and controlled the leased premises and caused damages to the premises" are not supported by the testimony and evidence presented at trial. Appellee's Br. p. 7.
[¶12] "The amount of damages to be awarded is a question of fact for the trier of fact." Jasinski v. Brown, 3 N.E.3d 976, 978 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). "A court is not required to calculate damages with mathematical certainty, but the calculation must be supported by evidence in the record and may not be based on mere conjecture, speculation, or guesswork." Id. at 978-79 (internal citation omitted). We will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, and we will reverse the trial court's award only when it is not within the scope of the evidence in the record. Id. at 979.
[¶13] As a preliminary matter, we note the trial court explicitly found that "[IDRS] occupied and controlled the leased premises from July 9, 2021, to April 8, 2022." Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 25. Presumably, this finding stems from not only the oral agreement formed between the parties, but IDRS's constant presence in the home. As Breaziel explained, IDRS employees were at the home each day, spread over three shifts.
[¶14] Accordingly, the trial court awarded damages to Williams as follows: Unpaid Rent: 1,166.65 Unpaid Utility Service: 412.49 Damages: 4,617.70 6,196.84 Less Security Deposit: 1,250.00 Total: 4,946.84 Id. at 27. On appeal, IDRS challenges only the award of unpaid utilities in the sum of $412.49 and the award of physical property damages in the sum of $4,617.70. Consequently, we do not address the amounts awarded for unpaid rent and credited for the security deposit.
[¶15] The trial court's calculation of unpaid utilities, namely three electric bills from AES Indiana, is as follows:
[July 30, 2021] Electric Bill 90.14 (Ex L)
[August 31, 2021] Electric Bill 215.95 (Ex M)
[September 30, 2021] Electric Bill 106.40 (Ex N)
Total 412.49Id. at 24. An examination of the bills (Exhibits L, M, and N) and Williams' testimony reveals: (1) Williams paid the bills (although, per the agreement of the parties, IDRS was responsible for payment using Tenants' funds), and (2) there are discrepancies with each of the amounts awarded by the trial court.
[¶16] First, the July 30 bill was paid late, and a late fee was assessed. When the bill was paid on September 7, the amount tendered was $92.88. Second, the August 31 bill total includes the unpaid July 30 bill. Ex. Vol. 3, p. 16 (Ex. M). When this bill for August service was paid on September 14, the amount tendered was $119.07. Third, the September 30 bill was paid on time, and a late fee was not assessed. When the bill was paid, the amount tendered was $103.29. Thus, the trial court's award of $412.49 is not supported by the record, and consequently, we reduce the amount of the unpaid utilities award to $315.24.
[¶17] The trial court's calculation of physical property damages is as follows:
Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 26. An examination of Exhibits A through K and O through Q as well as Williams' testimony reveals only one discrepancy: the total amount paid to Bushen Construction (Exhibit J) was $138.00. Although the amount due was $83.00, Williams had previously paid $55.00 on the invoice, bringing the total paid to $138.00.
[Repair Invoice] (Ex A)
1,961.00
Paint (Ex B)
52.91
Painting Tools (Ex C)
12.05
Gloss (Ex D)
[16.03]
Misc Repair Supplies (Ex E)
113.81
Kitchen Sink Repair Supplies (Ex F)
44.90
Polyurethane (Ex G)
42.78
Floor Stain (Ex H)
11.21
Poly Floor (Ex I)
26.71
[Bushen Construction Invoice] (Ex J)
83.00
[Travis Forey Invoice] (Ex K)
200.00
Hardwood Floor Refinish (Ex O)
500.00
Gas Leak Repair (Ex P)
126.95
Toilet Repair (Ex Q)
475.00
Interior Door
66.98
Interior Door Installation
126.98
Interior Door Knobs
18.97
Shower Curtain
24.98
Shower Rings
16.98
Shower Rod
26.98
Pantry Cabinet
250.00
Blinds
34.48
Gas Stove Installation
0.00
Fire/CO2 Detectors (3)
135.00
Microwave
250.00
Total
4,617.70
We do note a discrepancy with the amount awarded for the hardwood floor refinish (Exhibit O). However, the trial court detailed the following finding: "The request for compensation in the amount of $3,677 to repair wood floors based upon a 'calculator' is not reliable enough to support inclusion in a judgment. The court will allow $500 for general repair." Id. We will not reweigh this evidence. See Jasinski, 3 N.E.3d at 979 (we will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility).
[¶18] We next address the trial court's calculations in the final ten entries: interior door, interior door installation, interior door knobs, shower curtain, shower rings, shower rod, pantry cabinet, blinds, fire and carbon dioxide detectors, and microwave. These awards, which total $951.35, are neither supported by testimony nor exhibits. A close examination of the record reveals the trial court sourced these amounts from Plaintiff's Exhibit FF, which was admitted into evidence by the trial court as a "demonstrative aid" only. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 45.
The award for the gas stove installation was $0, so we omit it from our discussion here.
[¶19] A demonstrative aid "is offered for purposes of illustration and clarification." Fratter v. Rice, 954 N.E.2d 497, 505 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. "To be admissible, the evidence must be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant testimony to be of potential help to the trier of fact." Id. For example, a photograph introduced as a demonstrative aid need only be supported by "testimony that the photograph[] accurately depict[s] the scene or occurrence as it appeared at the time in question." Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236, 245 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). But when a photograph is admitted for substantive purposes, "the foundational requirements are vastly different." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
[¶20] The trial court expressly admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit FF into evidence as a demonstrative aid only. Thus, all information contained within the demonstrative aid is not substantive evidence itself but rather must be corroborated by substantive evidence. See Fratter, 954 N.E.2d at 505 (the demonstrative aid must explain or illustrate relevant testimony). For the final ten entries, Williams neither produced documentary evidence nor offered testimony about the specific damages or the monetary value of the repairs. Because the trial court's award here is only partially supported by the record, we reduce the amount of the physical property damage award to $3,721.35, calculated as follows: the trial court's $4,617.70 property damage award, minus $951.35 disallowed for the final ten entries in that award, plus $55.00 for the Bushen Construction invoice Williams had previously paid.
Counsel for Williams described Plaintiff's Exhibit FF as "just a summary [of] what's already been admitted and testified," and counsel for IDRS did not object to the admission of the exhibit as "a summary of Plaintiff's alleged damages." Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 44-45. The trial court admitted the exhibit "as a demonstrative aid." Id. at 45. When tendering Exhibit FF, counsel for Williams refers to the exhibit, and to other exhibits, that had been filed with the trial court clerk on January 11 and appears to allude to testimony given at a prior hearing, possibly on January 13. We do not know when that testimony concerning the final ten entries on Exhibit FF is alleged to have occurred. We note, however, that at the beginning of the trial, the court took "judicial notice of all pleadings filed and orders issued in [the] Chronological Case Summary," but Williams did not ask and the trial court did not take judicial notice of any testimony. Id. at 4. If counsel for Williams had requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the Williams testimony, IDRS would have been entitled to be heard. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(e). Counsel's oblique reference to "the testimony" of Ms. Williams did not place that testimony in the record.
[¶21] Considering only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, we conclude the trial court's award of damages is clearly erroneous. See Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d at 748 (when determining if a judgment is clearly erroneous, we "consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom"). We reverse the award, and remand with instructions to reduce the overall award to $3,953.24, calculated as follows:
Unpaid Rent:
1,166.65
Unpaid Utility Service:
315.24
Property Damages:
3,721.35
5,203.24
Less Security Deposit:
1,250.00
Total:
3,953.24
IV. Attorney's Fees
[¶22] Williams argues the trial court erred when it declined to award her attorney's fees. She bases her argument on an attorney's fees provision contained in the written lease agreement between her and Tenants.
[¶23] "The general rule in Indiana, and across the country, is that each party pays its own attorney's fees; and a party has no right to recover them from the opposition unless it first shows they are authorized." River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020). "Known as the American Rule, this doctrine reflects a compromise between keeping courts open to all and allowing attorneys the freedom to contract with clients." Id.
[¶24] Williams acknowledges the American Rule but argues that both the common law obdurate behavior exception and Indiana's General Recovery Rule apply. The "'obdurate behavior' exception empowers a court to order a party, under certain circumstances, to pay the opposition's attorney's fees." Id. Specifically, the prevailing party can recover attorney's fees if the opposing party "files or fails to dismiss a baseless claim and a trial court finds the conduct vexatious and oppressive in the extreme and a blatant abuse of the judicial process." Id. at 913 (internal quotations omitted).
[¶25] Indiana's similar statutory exception to the American Rule is the General Recovery Rule, which allows an award of attorney's fees based on another party's actions during the litigation. Specifically,
(b) In any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:
(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;
(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or
(3) litigated the action in bad faith.Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1 (1998).
[¶26] During the bench trial, Williams requested attorney's fees. A close examination of the record reveals Williams neither produced documentary evidence nor offered testimony about the monetary value of the attorney's fees she requested. Yet, according to the trial court, Williams "request[ed] compensation for attorney['s] fees in the amount of [$5,356.68]." Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 27. Again, the trial court sourced this amount from Plaintiff's Exhibit FF, the demonstrative aid which, in order to be used, must be corroborated by substantive evidence. See Fratter, 954 N.E.2d at 505 (the demonstrative aid must explain or illustrate relevant testimony). Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately denied the request "because attorney['s] fees were not authorized by a written contract signed by [IDRS]." Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 27.
[¶27] As part of her argument, Williams points to the age of the trial court case and attributes it to IDRS's actions. A glance at the CCS shows that Williams initiated the case in August of 2021 and the final judgment was rendered nearly two years later. But a closer look reveals that Williams intended for this case to be an eviction proceeding: "[Williams] asserts it was her intention to request eviction but used the wrong Notice of Claim form and omitted any information." Id. at 5. In fact, the first portion of this case culminated in Tenants voluntarily vacating the premises by April of 2022. The damages hearing (bench trial) was immediately set by the trial court but then rescheduled on three different occasions for the following reasons: (1) Williams' amended complaint; (2) IDRS's motion for continuance; and (3) dismissal of Tenants as defendants.
[¶28] We conclude that both parties are equally responsible for the age of the trial court case. But we cannot say that any part of the litigation was baseless, vexatious, oppressive, frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or pursued in bad faith. Neither the obdurate behavior exception nor the General Recovery Rule apply, and Williams has not otherwise shown that attorney's fees are authorized. The trial court's denial of Williams' request for attorney's fees was not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[¶29] The trial court did not err when it denied Williams' request for attorney's fees. However, the trial court's award of damages was clearly erroneous, and we reverse the award and remand with instructions to reduce the overall damages award to $3,953.24.
[¶30] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Riley, J., and Felix, J., concur.