Summary
determining no evidence inmate's right to an impartial decision maker was violated where his adjustment officer was the same person who responded to calls for assistance regarding a stabbing and handcuffed him as this did not show the adjustment officer fell within any of the disqualification categories
Summary of this case from Travis v. SmithOpinion
NO. 2013-CA-002017-MR
01-09-2015
MARK A. WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. GREG HOWARD, WARDEN; AND JENNIFER BOWERSOCK, LIEUTENANT APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Mark Williams, Pro Se West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CI-00206
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. CAPERTON, JUDGE: Mark A. Williams appeals from the dismissal, pursuant to CR 12.02(f), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, of his petition for declaratory judgment following his prison disciplinary action. After a thorough review of the parties' arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm.
Judge Caperton authored this opinion prior to Judge Debra Lambert being sworn in on January 5, 2015, as Judge of Division 1, Third Appellate District. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 3, 2013, correction staff at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex found a laundry seam ripper lying in the floor of the laundry room and a pool of blood on the floor. After reviewing security camera footage and investigating the incident, the staff learned that Williams and fellow inmate Scott Miller had been in a fight with inmate Darryl Downing. Downing had suffered a laceration over his left eye and was transported to an outside hospital for treatment; the wound required five sutures to close.
Following the investigation, Williams was charged with "physical action resulting in death or serious injury of another inmate." A disciplinary hearing was held on January 22, 2013, by Lt. Bowersock as the Adjustment Officer; Williams was found guilty and penalized with 180 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 730 days of good time credit. He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 50% of Downey's medical bills.
Williams appealed these findings to the Warden but the Warden concurred with the Adjustment Officer's decision. Thereafter, Williams appealed to the Oldham Circuit Court; the court denied his petition for declaratory judgment and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is from this that Williams now appeals.
At the outset, we note that the standards governing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss, and those dictating our review, have been repeated often. They are as follows:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted admits as true the material facts of the complaint. So a court should not grant such a motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved.... Accordingly, the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true. This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact; rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court's determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted).
On appeal, Williams argues: (1) this Court has subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Williams's due process rights were violated when he failed to receive an impartial decision maker at his disciplinary hearing; (3) there were due process violations at the hearing because it was held without any of his requested witnesses being called in his defense; (4) there were due process violations because Williams did not receive timely and adequate notice of charges and other documents used during the disciplinary process; (5) the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the disciplinary charges against him and the hearing officer's findings of facts fail to meet minimum due process requirements. In contrast, the Commonwealth argues the circuit court's order dismissing Williams's petition for declaration of rights should be affirmed. With these arguments in mind we turn to the issues at hand.
We decline to further address this argument as our jurisdiction is not in question in this case.
Prison disciplinary proceedings are administrative, rather than criminal, in nature. While inmates retain rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, a defendant in a prison disciplinary proceeding is not entitled to "the full panoply of rights due a defendant" in a criminal proceeding. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357-58 (Ky. App. 1997). Instead:
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that due process requirements in prison disciplinary hearings, where the loss of good time credit is at stake, include: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a writtenWebb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 117-18 (Ky. 2007) (citation omitted).
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
In Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), the United States Supreme Court added a fourth requirement, holding "the revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record." Id. at 454, 105 S.Ct. at 2773 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The "some evidence" review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of evidence." Id. Instead, the "relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id.
First, Williams argues his due process rights were violated when he failed to receive an impartial decision maker at his disciplinary hearing. In support thereof, he claims that the Adjustment Officer, Lt. Bowersock, placed handcuffs on him and escorted him to segregation with other officers. The Commonwealth disagrees because Lt. Bowersock only responded to the call for assistance when blood was found on the laundry room floor. The Commonwealth argues that there was no ground for disqualification per the Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures ("CPP") 15.6, as there was no evidence that Bowersock filed the complaint against Williams, witnessed the incident, participated as an investigating officer in the disciplinary report, or was assigned to review the decision.
The Commonwealth and Williams disagree over whether this argument was properly preserved for our review. Given that this is a pro se plaintiff and the record is clear, we decline to address this argument further.
--------
At issue, CPP 15.6(II)(A)(4) requires disqualification in the following instances: when the employee has: (1) filed the complaint or witnessed the incident; (2) participated as an investigating officer; or (3) been assigned the subsequent review of the decision. We agree with the Commonwealth that there is no evidence to suggest that Lt. Bowersock met any of the disqualification criteria; accordingly, we decline to reverse on this ground.
Williams next argues that there were due process violations at the hearing because it was: (1) held without any of his requested witnesses being called in his defense; and (2) as a result of his failing to receive timely and adequate notice of charges and other documents used during the disciplinary process.
Williams argues that his due process rights were violated when another inmate, Miller, was not interviewed by the investigator and he was denied the opportunity to call that inmate during the hearing. The Commonwealth argues that Williams received an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense. Moreover, Williams did not identify to the Adjustment Committee or Adjustment Officer what witnesses he had selected at least 24 hours prior to the hearing; thus, this argument has been waived.
While Williams claims that Miller's statement was not provided to him until after the hearing, the record shows that Williams provided Miller's statement to the investigator, which stated, "Mr. Williams then hit Mr. Downie. When Mr. Downie went to the ground Mr. Williams tried to wresal (sic) the object away from Mr. Downie. When I seen that he had lost it I tried to break them up and when I did me and Mr. Williams left."
We decline to reverse on this ground as the record is clear that Williams gave Miller's statement to the investigator and Williams has waived this argument because he had not asserted that he properly complied with CPP 15.6(II)(C)(5)(a)(2) requiring an inmate to identify to the Adjustment Committee or Adjustment Officer what witnesses he has selected not less than 24 hours prior to the initial hearing. See Adams v. Meko, 341 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Ky. App. 2011).
We likewise do not agree that a due process violation occurred as a result of his failing to receive timely and adequate notice of charges and other documents used during the disciplinary process. Williams received advanced written notice of the disciplinary charge. He refused to leave his cell during the investigation and refused to sign the form but was given a copy of the disciplinary report on January 10, 2013. Williams received a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action. This was sufficient to safeguard his due process rights.
Williams further argues that the victim's medical records were not submitted into evidence and that he was entitled to all documents related to the incident. We disagree because it is apparent that the adjustment officer relied upon the statement from the reporting employee that the victim was sent to an outside hospital and did not rely on the medical records.
Last, Williams argues that the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the disciplinary charges against him and the hearing officer's findings of facts fail to meet minimum due process requirements. We disagree. Williams admits that his hands and knuckles were red and that he participated in a closed-fist fight. Instead he argues he did not cause the serious damage to the victim. We note that he does not dispute the severity of damage sustained by the victim. We believe that there is some evidence to support the fact-finder given the security camera footage, Williams's admission of a fight, and the witness statements. Thus, we decline to reverse on this ground.
Finding no error, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Mark Williams, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown
Frankfort, Kentucky