Opinion
Case No. 05cv1138-J (JMA).
March 7, 2006
ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT RECOMMENDATION; (2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; and (3) GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler's Report and Recommendation ("RR") recommending that the Court grant Respondent R.J. Hernandez's ("Respondent") Motion to Dismiss Petitioner David L. Williams's ("Petitioner") Petition for Habeas Corpus ("Petition"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for failure to exhaust state court remedies. [Doc. No. 22.]; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). The parties were permitted to file objections to the RR no later than November 28, 2005. ( See RR at 6.) On November 30, 2005, Petitioner filed an Objection to the RR. [Doc. No. 27.] This Court accepted Petitioner's Objection as timely filed. [Doc. No. 31.] For the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the RR in its entirety, DENIES Petitioner's Petition with prejudice, and GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Background
On May 28, 2002, Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) and waived his right to appeal his sentence in case No. SCE219698. ( See Resp't's Lodgm't No. 1 at 3-5.) On June 26, 2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner, in compliance with the plea bargain, to a year in custody to run concurrently with his sentence on a parole violation. ( See id. at 6.) Petitioner was placed on three years formal probation. ( See id.)
On December 16, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to receiving a stolen vehicle with prior offenses in violation of California Penal Code §§ 496(d) and 666.5(a) in case No. SCE240544. ( See Resp't's Lodgm't No. 2 at 5-7.) His prior offenses included receiving stolen property in violation of California Penal Code § 496.1 and theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851(a). ( See id. at 5-6.) Petitioner again waived his right to appeal his sentence. ( See id. at 5-7.) On January 27, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to three years formal probation with credit for time served in local custody. ( See id. at 9.) The trial court imposed a four-year prison sentence in the event Petitioner violated probation. ( See id.)
On May 2, 2005, Petitioner admitted to violating his probation in both case Nos. SCE219698 and SCE240544. ( See Resp't's Lodgm't No. 1 at 8, and No. 2 at 10.) On May 23, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to four years in prison on both cases. ( See Resp't's Lodgm't No. 1 at 9, and No. 2 at 11.)
On May 27, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 1] He raised the following four claims: (1) "misrepresentation by court-appointed attorneys," (2) "failure to adhere to statutory law," (3) "jeopardizing safety and security of institution," and (4) "failure to return personal property." (Pet'r's Pet. at 3-7.)
On June 30, 2005, Petitioner raised the same claims in a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. ( See Resp't's Lodgm't No. 3 at 2-8.) On July 20, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's Petition without comment. ( See Resp't's Supplemental Lodgm't at 1.) In its decision, the California Supreme Court cited In re Swain, 209 P.2d 793, 796 (Cal. 1949); People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995); and In re Dexter, 603 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1979). ( See id.)
On July 21, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's federal Petition. [Doc. No. 10, 11.] Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner: (1) presents unexhausted claims, (2) fails to state a federal question, and (3) is vague and conclusory. ( See Resp't's P. A., Mot. to Dismiss, at 2-5.)
Legal Standard
The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are set forth in rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989).
When no objections are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge's findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. See Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo." Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Discussion
I. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies
The RR recommends Respondent's Motion to Dismiss be granted because Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies. ( See RR at 5-6.) In Petitioner's objection to the RR, he contends that he did exhaust state court remedies because he filed a prayer for relief with the California Fourth District Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court, and that both were denied. (Pet'r's Objs. at 1.) Petitioner also argues the Magistrate Judge violated Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986), by not independently examining Petitioner's previous filings in state court. ( See id.) Additionally, Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge's reference to Dexter in the RR violates his due process rights. ( See id.) Furthermore, Petitioner objects to the RR's conclusion that the grounds alleged in his Petition are unclear, and asserts that he stated adequate grounds in reference to "common law and rules of Congress." ( Id. at 1-2.) Finally, Petitioner argues a granting of dismissal on presumptive innocence is necessary. ( See id.) After a de novo review of factual findings relevant to Petitioner's objections and a de novo review of conclusions of law, this Court FINDS the RR correctly addressed the issues raised in Petitioner's Objections. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the RR in its entirety, and GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies.
A. Relevant Law
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (1996). A petitioner's state court remedies have not been exhausted if his or her writ of habeas corpus in state court is dismissed because petitioner's allegations are vague and conclusionary. See Swain, 209 P.2d at 796. "The petition should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim. . . ." Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1258.
In addition to the state court exhaustion requirement, when an administrative remedy is provided by statute, judicial relief is not afforded to grievances lodged by prisoners unless administrative remedies have been exhausted. See In re Dexter, 603 P.2d at 37; see also Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 109 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1941).
B. Application
The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's state court petition without comment, but indicated that the petition was denied on procedural grounds by citing to Swain, Duvall, and Dexter. See Harris v. Superior Court of California, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1974) ("In denying habeas corpus petitions without opinion the Court now frequently cites . . . a California Supreme Court case . . . which indicates to the petitioner the grounds for the denial."). The California Supreme Court's holding in Swain requires that a petitioner allege his or her claim for habeas corpus relief with sufficient particularity. See Swain, 209 P.2d at 796. In addition, Duvall held a petitioner must provide sufficient evidence to support his or her claim. See Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1258. Finally, Dexter requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before grievances lodged by prisoners can be afforded judicial relief. See In re Dexter, 603 P.2d at 37; see also Abelleira, 109 P.2d at 949. Therefore, Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies because the grounds for denial of Petitioner's state petition were that Petitioner's allegations were vague and not supported by evidence, and that some of his claims were unexhausted at the administrative level. See Harris, 500 F.2d at 1128 ("If the denial of the habeas corpus petition includes a citation of an authority which indicates that the petition was procedurally deficient . . . then the available state remedies have not been exhausted. . . ."). Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the RR's recommendation to GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the federal petition because Petitioner's state petition was denied on curable procedural grounds that left state remedies unexhausted.
However, it is incumbent on this Court to independently review Petitioner's state petition to determine whether Petitioner fairly presented his habeas corpus petition to the state court. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d at 1320. For the reasons set forth below, this Court FINDS that Petitioner's grounds in his state court petition were unclear as to preclude the state court from determining the nature of his claims.
Petitioner's first claim in his federal petition is "misrepresentation by court appointed attorneys." (Pet'r's Pet. at 3.) Petitioner states his attorney, Mr. Osper, withdrew himself from Petitioner's case due to a conflict of interest. ( See id.) Petitioner was then represented by Mr. Crowley, who negotiated a plea bargain for him. ( See id.) Petitioner appears to be making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but does not present facts adequately explaining what his attorneys allegedly did that was ineffective. ( See id.)
Petitioner's second claim is "failure to adhere to statutory law." ( Id. at 4.) Petitioner states that "[f]rom arraignment to preliminary [he] never waived any of [his] rights, but [he] was bound over by Judge Christine Goldsmith at a `preliminary-examination hearing.'" ( Id.) However, Petitioner's statement that he was "bound over" at the preliminary examination is unclear and does not explain how the trial court failed to follow statutory law.
Petitioner's third and fourth claims are "jeopardizing safety and security of institution" and "failure to return personal property," respectively. (Pet'r's Pet. at 7.) The California Supreme Court cited to Dexter in its order, which holds that grievances by prisoners will not be afforded judicial relief unless available administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Dexter, 603 P.2d at 37. Thus, it appears the California Supreme Court's citation to Dexter was in response to Petitioner's third and fourth claims because the claims were based on incidents that occurred while Petitioner was serving his sentence, rather than on challenges to the conviction itself. ( See RR at 4 n. 1.)
Applying Dexter, judicial relief is not afforded to Petitioner's third and fourth claims because his administrative remedies have not been exhausted. See Dexter, 603 P.2d at 37. Moreover, even if Petitioner's claims were exhausted at the administrative level, the basis for these claims are still unclear. Petitioner did not provide sufficient facts explaining the nature and basis of his third claim because all he states in his explanation is that Deputy Grimm told another inmate to tell Petitioner not to get in Deputy Grimm's way. ( See Pet'r's Pet. at 7.) Petitioner also did not fairly present the legal basis for his fourth claim; he only states that a deputy sergeant took his property and did not return it upon his discharge. ( See id. at 7.)
Further, Petitioner's reference to Kim is unwarranted. (Pet'r's Objs. at 1.) Kim holds that when faced with a Swain citation from state court, the federal court should independently review a petitioner's state habeas petition to determine whether the claims were fairly presented. See Kim, 799 F.2d at 1320. This Court FINDS that the Magistrate Judge followed Kim by independently reviewing Petitioner's state habeas petition and concluding his allegations were not fairly presented. ( See RR at 3-6.)
Furthermore, the Court ACCEPTS the RR's recommendation to GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's federal petition because despite Petitioner's attempt to clarify the grounds for relief in his Objection to the RR, Petitioner's grounds remain vague and unsupported by evidence. Petitioner objects to the RR's conclusion that his grounds were unclear by arguing that he "stated grounds in reference to common laws and rules of Congress," such as the Tom Banes Civil Rights Act, Fifth Amendment "Right to Travel," "Penal Code § 26 (Three)," "Penal Code § 859(B)" and "Common Law Right of Possession." (Pet'r's Objs. at 1; Pet'r's Pet. at 3-4.) However, Petitioner does not explain how any of these statutes and laws support his claim. For example, while Petitioner cites California Penal Code § 26(3), which provides that persons who commit a criminal act under ignorance or mistake of law lack the criminal intent needed to be capable of committing a crime, he does not present any facts or evidence showing he lacked criminal intent. See Cal. Penal Code § 26(3) (2006).
Petitioner in his Objection also gives the following indecipherable argument: "ground 1 was petitioned to display the occurrence of an ignorance to law that has caused a court to `expunge' Petitioner's due process within that `ignored' law, and the fact that it was not addressed nor interpreted as `ineffectiveness or otherwise' . . . had an adverse effect upon Petitioner." (Pet'r's Objs. at 2.) Petitioner does not go on to explain what the "ignored law" is, or how his due process rights were violated. Petitioner also urges the Court to grant his Petition on the grounds of "presumptive innocence," but his request lacks legal authority. ( See id.)
Petitioner's claims remain vague and unsupported because Petitioner's Objection does not clarify his grounds for relief asserted in his original state petition. For the reasons set forth above, the Court ACCEPTS the RR's recommendation to GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus.
II. Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for an Order Granting Relief
On September 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and a separate Motion for an Order Granting Relief. [Doc. No. 16, 18.] A petitioner may have an evidentiary hearing on a claim if: (1) his or her allegations, "if proved, would entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts." Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim because his vague and unsubstantiated allegations do not entitle him to relief. This Court ACCEPTS the RR's recommendation to DENY Petitioner's Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for an Order Granting Relief. ( See RR at 5-6.)
III. Motion to Lodge Documents and Request for Judicial Notice
On November 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion to Lodge Documents and Request for Judicial Notice. [Doc. No. 24.] Petitioner requests the Court take notice of the following cases: Minsky v. City of Los Angeles, 520 P.2d 726 (Cal. 1974); Holt v. Kelly, 574 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1978) and People v. Panfili, 194 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1983). The RR did not address Petitioner's Motion to Lodge Documents and Request for Judicial Notice because Petitioner's Motion was filed after the RR was filed. Respondents have not challenged Petitioner's Motion. Accordingly, insofar as the Court has relied on these cases for its analysis, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Motion and take judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Fed.R.Evid. 201.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) ADOPTS the RR in its entirety, (2) GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, (3) DENIES Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice, (4) DENIES Petitioner's Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for an Order Granting Relief, and (5) GRANTS Petitioner's Motion to Lodge Documents and Request for Judicial Notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.