Opinion
3:23-cv-00659-ART-CLB
11-20-2024
MICHAEL LEON WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. HARTMAN, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
ANNE R. TRAUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Michael Williams, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1). The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Williams's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious[,]” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,]” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if the plaintiff clearly cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable, like claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist, as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations, like fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).; see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A. Factual allegations
The events of the Complaint happened while Williams was incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (“NNCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). On July 19, 2023, NNCC Investigator Suwe charged Williams with MJ53 for possession or sale of intoxicants. (Id. at 8). Williams possessing a packet of yeast was the deciding factor for the charge. (Id.) The other items that Suwe listed as contraband “were not compatible with alcohol in any way.” (Id.) Prison regulations required Suwe to provide Williams with a form noting any property that was confiscated as unauthorized, but he failed to do so. (Id.) Williams was placed in administrative segregation before being formally charged with any rule violation. (Id.) Williams was charged only after his property had been inventoried for his placement in segregation. (Id.)
On August 9, 2023, NNCC Investigator Santos charged Williams with MJ2 for assault, stemming from an incident that happened on August 6 and was not witnessed by Santos but a different officer. (Id. at 7). Williams was found guilty of the charge and sanctioned with being housed in segregation, which resulted in the loss of personal property, good or work credits, and privileges enjoyed by inmates in general population like access to the telephone, visitation, and recreation spaces. (Id.)
While rehousing Williams in administrative segregation on August 9, NNCC Investigator Donald Hicks reported finding drug paraphernalia in his possession. (Id. at 6). Hicks reported that a test he later performed detected morphine or heroine on the items. (Id.) Hicks didn't send the items to a third-party lab for testing. (Id.) No supervisor signed the test verifying Hicks's finding. (Id.) Neither Williams's blood nor urine were tested for drugs. (Id.) Williams asked to examine the physical evidence that was tested for drugs, but Lieutenant Kristy Fonoimoana directed him during the hearing to simply look at the picture of that evidence. (Id.) Williams was convicted of an MJ54 charge for using intoxicants. (Id. at 7).
Williams was convicted of all three charges. (Id. at 9). Fonoimoana was the hearing officer in all three disciplinary proceedings. (Id.) Williams appealed the disciplinary convictions, highlighting the institutional and constitutional violations. (Id. at 10). NNCC Associate Warden Hartman rejected Williams's appeal on grounds that pages were missing. (Id. at 10-11). Williams contends that Exhibits A, B, and C to the Complaint demonstrate that Hartman's rejection was false; all “missing” documents were in fact attached as required by administrative regulations. (Id. at 10-11).
B. Analysis of claims
Based on the allegations summarized above, Williams sues Hartman, Kristy Fonoimoana, Danilo Santos, Robert Suwe, and Donald Hicks. (Id. at 1-2). He seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 12). The Court liberally construes the Complaint as bringing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment about violation of due-process rights during placement in administrative segregation and three disciplinary proceedings. The Court addresses each theory and any issues below.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). When analyzing a due-process claim, courts engage in a two-step analysis: (1) “determine whether the inmate was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest” and (2) “examine whether that deprivation was accompanied by sufficient procedural protections.” Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 2022); accord Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement, but such an interest may ‘arise from state policies or regulations.'” Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1180 (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221-22). “An interest in avoiding certain conditions of confinement constitutes a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause if the challenged condition ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Ashker v. Newsom, 81 F.4th 863, 887 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1180; and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, (1995)).
a. Placement in administrative segregation
For the first step of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit has held that if the prisoner alleges material differences between the conditions in general population and administrative segregation, the prisoner's procedural due-process claim should not be dismissed on the pleadings. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 756-57 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining material differences can include access to contact visits, telephone calls, health care, programming, and employment; freedom to move without restraint; and personal property allowances). As for the second step, when a protected interest exists and a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must, within a reasonable time after the prisoner's placement, conduct an informal, non-adversary review of the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. Inmates have the right to notice and the right to be heard. Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. But they are not entitled to “detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation” or “disclosure of the identity of any person providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (cleaned up), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472.
Williams fails to state a colorable due-process claim about placement in administrative segregation. Williams alleges that he was housed in the general population before the events of the Complaint and was placed in administrative segregation pending disciplinary processes. While in administrative segregation, Williams lost personal property and the ability to earn good-time/work credits, communicate with his family, and access recreation spaces. These allegations arguably state that conditions in administrative segregation were materially different from those in the general population, so the first step is satisfied for screening purposes.
But this claim falters at the second step. To the extent Williams contends that he was not afforded sufficient process because prison officials violated NDOC administrative regulations-e.g., Suwe didn't give him an unauthorized property form and Santos made a charging report for another officer three days after the incident-he fails to state a colorable claim for relief. Section 1983 allows a person to vindicate the violation of a right secured by federal law, but neither NDOC administrative regulations nor NNCC operating procedures are federal law.
Williams also contends that he was not afforded sufficient process because Investigator Suwe placed him in administrative segregation before formally charging him with a violation. But as explained above, a prison official violates a prisoner's due-process rights when the official fails to conduct an informal, nonadversary review of the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner within a reasonable time after the prisoner's placement. The Supreme Court has stated that five days is a reasonable time for the post-placement review. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477. Based on the documents attached to the Complaint as Exhibit C, Williams might have received written notice of the charges and evidence supporting the decision to segregate him five days after the incident. (ECF No. 1-2 at 25-26). Considering these documents, it appears unlikely that Williams can plead facts showing that he was not afforded sufficient process when he was placed in administrative segregation. But out of an abundance of caution, this claim is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
b. Disciplinary proceedings
When a protected interest exists and a prisoner faces disciplinary charges, prison officials must provide the prisoner with a written statement at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing that includes the charges; a description of the evidence against the prisoner; an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974); see also Koenig v. Vannelli, 971 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1992) (limiting inmate's right to defend himself must be supported by a legitimate penological interest); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985) (whether to allow witnesses is decided on a case-by-case basis). The right “to present evidence in his defense means that the inmate ‘must also have the right to access evidence that he might use in preparing or presenting his defense.'” Ashker v. Newsom, 81 F.4th 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Melnik v. Dzurenda, 14 F.4th 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2021)). “But a prisoner's right to access and prepare evidence for a disciplinary hearing is not unlimited or unfettered.” Id. at 881 (cleaned up). And there is no right to cross-examine or confront witnesses in prison disciplinary hearings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 56768.
Additionally, “the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.” Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). But this standard does not apply when a prisoner alleges that “a correctional officer has falsely accused him of violating a prison rule in retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of his constitutional rights[.]” Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).
Williams arguably states a colorable claim that his due-process rights were violated during one of the disciplinary proceedings. Generously construed, the allegations state that the conditions in disciplinary segregation mirrored those in administrative segregation. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 29 (purporting that Williams was sanctioned with disciplinary segregation of “time served” for the charges in OIC 522928)). Williams does not plead facts about his sentence, so he has not plausibly stated that he had a liberty interest at stake regarding the “stat loss referral” of 60 days he was sanctioned with, i.e., that the duration of his sentence is necessarily affected by the sanction. See Galanti v. Nev. Dep't of Corr., 65 F.4th 1152, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2023) (confirming that Nevada prisoners do not have a liberty interest in parole eligibility, i.e., minimum-sentence deductions, but remanding for district court to consider the prisoner's due-process claim for deprivation of maximum-sentence deductions under NRS 209.4465). However, the allegations tend to show that Williams was deprived of meaningful interpersonal contact while he was held in disciplinary segregation, e.g., he was denied access to prison employment, the telephone, visitation, and recreational spaces. So the first step of the analysis is satisfied for screening purposes.
As for the second step, allegations that prison officials violated NDOC or NNCC regulations or procedures, e.g., belatedly provided notice of charges, didn't charge other party involved in a physical altercation, didn't provide a supervisor's signature on the notice of charges, fail to state that Williams was denied sufficient process as established by federal law. Williams affirmatively alleges that the decision to convict him of the MJ53 possession/sale of intoxicants charge (OIC #522928) was supported by some evidence, i.e., a packet of yeast. And because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific grievance or administrative appeal system, allegations that Associate Warden Hartman mishandled Williams's administrative appeals fail to state a colorable due-process claim. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).
But Williams also contends that he was denied due process during the disciplinary proceeding on the MJ54 charge for use of intoxicants (OIC #523620) because hearing officer Fonoimoana denied him access to the physical items that were tested for drugs, providing only a photograph of the items during the hearing. He further contends that the suspected drug paraphernalia found on his person was tested by prison employee Hicks-whom Williams alleges is an investigator not an expert-rather than a disinterested third-party lab. Liberally construed, these allegations arguably state that Williams's right to access and prepare evidence was violated and the evidence used to convict him of using intoxicants was not sufficiently reliable. See Melnik, 14 F.4th at 987-88 (right to access evidence); Toussaint, 926 F.2d at 803 (reiterating that “there must be some indicia of reliability of the information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions” (cleaned up)). This claim may therefore proceed as to only the disciplinary proceeding on the MJ54 charge for use of intoxicants (OIC #523620) against Hicks and Fonoimoana.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Because it appears that Williams might be able to cure the deficiencies of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim about being placed in administrative segregation pending disciplinary proceedings, the Court grants him leave to file an amended complaint to attempt to replead this claim. This means Williams has leave to plead facts showing that he was not afforded sufficient process in the decision to place him in administrative segregation. But Williams does not have leave to add new claims.
If Williams chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint replaces the original complaint, so the amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989). This means Williams's amended complaint must contain all claims, defendants, and factual allegations that he wishes to pursue in this lawsuit, including the claim that the Court allowed to proceed in this order. Williams should file the amended complaint on this Court's approved prisoner civil-rights form, and it must be titled “First Amended Complaint.” Williams must follow the instructions on the form. He need not and should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each claim, he should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate his civil rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that a decision on Williams's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is deferred.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim about placement in administrative segregation is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim may proceed as to the disciplinary proceeding on the MJ54 charge for use of intoxicants (OIC #523620) against Donald Hicks and Kristy Fonoimoana.
It is further ordered that Defendants Hartman, Danilo Santos, and Robert Suwe are dismissed without prejudice from this action.
It is further ordered that Williams has until December 18, 2024 to file a first amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
It is further ordered that if Williams does not timely file an amended complaint, then this action will proceed on only the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim about the disciplinary proceeding on the MJ54 charge for use of intoxicants (OIC #523620) against Hicks and Fonoimoana.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to file the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and send Plaintiff Michael Williams a courtesy copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1-1), the approved form for filing a civil-rights complaint by an inmate, and instructions for the same.