Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-354
05-09-2022
RALPH OMAR WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO L. HARPER, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Ralph Omar Williams pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF 4). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss this habeas case with prejudice and without service.
The Court has a pre-service duty to screen and dismiss petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. See also Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (which also applies to § 2241 cases).
II. REPORT
The information contained herein is taken from the Petition (ECF 4) and the criminal docket sheets for Petitioner's cases before the trial court. These docket sheets are available for public review at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx (last visited May 9, 2022). The Court takes judicial notice of the information contained on them.
Petitioner, who is proceeding pro se in this habeas case, is a state pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail. He is awaiting his trials in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (“trial court”) at Criminal Docket numbers:
• CP-02-CR-6649-2021 (“Case 1”), on charges of two counts each of possession of a firearm prohibited, receiving stolen property and firearms not to be carried without a license; and one count each of manufacture, delivery, or possession with
intent to manufacture or deliver, fleeing or attempting to elude officer and related charges;
• CP-02-CR-4608-2021 (“Case 2”), on charges of accidents involving death or personal injury, use/possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless driving and related charges; and,
• CP-02-CR-2560-2021 (“Case 3”), on charges of aggravated assault, robbery, possession of firearm prohibited and related charges.
Attorneys Wendy Williams and Ralph Karsh previously represented Petitioner in one or more of these cases.
Petitioner was released on bail on December 24, 2020. The docket sheet for Case 3 shows that his bail was revoked in that case on June 22, 2021, and that he was denied bail on September 7, 2021. According to Petitioner, his “bail was revok[ed] on the grounds that he had a gun case then [g]ot a shooting case with a gun involved. Attorney Ralph Karsh told [him] these were the reasons for his bail being revoked[.]” (ECF 4-1 at p. 1.) Petitioner claims Attorney Williams never informed him that his bail was revoked. (Id. at p. 2.)
Attorney Corrie Allen Woods now represents Petitioner in Cases 1, 2 and 3. Petitioner's non-jury trial on all three cases is currently scheduled to be held on June 23, 2022, before Judge Susan F. Evashaik DiLucente.
Petitioner recently filed with this Court a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF 4). He challenges the June 22, 2021 decision to revoke his bail, asserting that it “was [an] indirect violation of [his] constitutional rights.” (ECF 4-1 at p. 1.) Petitioner also claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct for requesting that his bail be revoked and that his “constitutional rights have been violated at every step” of his criminal cases. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)
Petitioner asserts that the revocation of his bail caused him emotional distress and makes the conclusory statement that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, but does not describe any act on the part of the prosecutor that violated his federal constitutional rights.
Petitioner also asserts that his prior and current counsel performed deficiently in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance. He claims that Attorney Williams was ineffective because she failed to challenge the identification evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing held in Case 3, did not attend the preliminary hearing held in Case 1, and did not inform him that his bail was revoked. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Petitioner asserts that Attorney Karsh was ineffective because he failed to “[e]ntertain” Petitioner's concerns about identification evidence (id. at p. 2), and allegedly did not provide Petitioner with “his full discovery in [C]ases , ” and did not address “any of the issues” that Petitioner presented in a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus that he filed with the trial court “even though Petitioner advised him of every issue.” (Id. at p. 3.) Finally, Petitioner contends that Attorney Woods was “ineffective for waiving his rights to a preliminary hearing after [P]etitioner ask[ed] him to postpone the hearing.” (Id.)
As relief, Petitioner seeks a conditional writ of habeas corpus directing that the trial court must either reinstate his bail or the Warden of the Allegheny County Jail must release him to house arrest. Petitioner also requests “full discovery” and an evidentiary hearing “to prove ineffectiveness of counsel.” (ECF 4 at p. 7; ECF 4-1 at p. 4.)
Petitioner also seeks an order directing that “a new preliminary hearing” be held in Cases 1 and 2 and the charges in Cases 2 and 3 be dismissed. (ECF 4 at p. 7; ECF 4-1 at p. 4.) This type of relief is not available in a federal habeas case and this Court has no authority to enter such orders.
B. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. See, e.g., Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). “For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy[.]” Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967)). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners. It provides: “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001). After a state prisoner has been convicted, sentenced, and has exhausted his remedies in the state courts, he may seek federal habeas relief pursuant to § 2254. Thus, for example, Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are premature. He can only litigate such claims in the event that he is convicted and then only after he has exhausted his available state court remedies with respect to those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
While § 2254 applies to post-trial situations, the more general habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides federal courts with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state judgment is rendered, but only in very limited circumstances. “[T]hat jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance ‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes.'” Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless.., [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, under this statute, a state criminal defendant has the mechanism in a federal habeas action to challenge the legality of his pretrial confinement by arguing that he should not be in pretrial custody in the first place because, for example: (1) his upcoming trial violates his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); or, (2) he is being deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Braden v. Judicial Cir. Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1973); or, (3) the trial court has unconstitutionally denied or revoked bail, see, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981).
Only Petitioner's claims challenging the revocation of his bail fall within the above categories. However, Petitioner did not exhaust his state court remedies with respect to these claims and pretrial detainees like him must first do so before filing a federal habeas petition. Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law.. .as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 49091); Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (no distinction between § 2254 and § 2241 “insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”).
The exhaustion requirement is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-49 (1999); Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Exhaustion addresses federalism and comity concerns by affording the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must have “invoke[d] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[, ]” in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
It is Petitioner's burden to show that he exhausted available state remedies. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Ellison v. Rogers, 484 F.3d 658, 660-62 (3d Cir. 2007); Coady, 251 F.3d at 488. A review of the state court dockets for his criminal cases shows that he cannot meet his burden with respect to any of his claims challenging the revocation of his bail. To the extent Petitioner raised such claims in a pro se motion he filed in one of his state criminal cases, that would not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because Pennsylvania law does not permit “hybrid” representation and, therefore, a state court generally will not review on the merits a pro se motion submitted by a defendant who is represented by counsel. Pa. R. Crim. Pro. 576; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 353, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1999).
In any event, to properly exhaust a claim challenging his bail revocation, it appears that Petitioner had to file a petition for specialized review with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania within 30 days of the date the order revoking his bail was issued. Pa.R.A.P. 1602, 1610; see also 20 West's Pa. Prac., Appellate Practice § 312:13 (available on Westlaw, last updated Dec. 2021); 20A West's Pa. Prac., Appellate Practice § 1610.2 (available on Westlaw, last updated Dec. 2021). A review of the trial court's docket sheets for Petitioner's cases, as well as the docket for the Superior Court, shows that no appeal was filed.
Because Petitioner did not file a petition for specialized review with the Superior Court, he procedurally defaulted any cognizable habeas claim that he seeks to litigate in this case which challenges the revocation of his bail. The doctrine of procedural default, like the related doctrine of exhaustion, is “grounded in concerns of comity and federalism, ” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. In relevant part, it provides that a Pennsylvania state prisoner in a non-capital case defaults a federal habeas claim where, as is the case here, he failed to present it to the Superior Court and he cannot do so now because the time to file an appeal has expired. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 851-56 (1999) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (describing the history of the procedural default doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 162-69 (3d Cir. 2000).
Based on all of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the petition with prejudice.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner under either § 2254 or § 2241. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from.. .the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). The Court should not issue a certificate of appealability in this case. Petitioner is not entitled to one because jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether his claims should be dismissed. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 4) and deny certificate of appealability. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).