Opinion
No. COA12–1273.
2013-05-21
Phillip WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Danny Keith HAMPTON, Defendant.
E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant. Teague Rotenstreich Stanaland Fox & Holt, P.L.L.C., by Michael D. Holt and Kara V. Bordman, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 6 March 2012 and order entered 1 May 2012 by Judge Shannon R. Joseph in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 March 2013. E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant. Teague Rotenstreich Stanaland Fox & Holt, P.L.L.C., by Michael D. Holt and Kara V. Bordman, for defendant-appellee.
HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.
On 1 February 2012, a jury awarded plaintiff $5000 for personal injuries after concluding that plaintiff was injured as a result of defendant's negligence. The trial court entered a written judgment reflecting the verdict on 6 March 2012. On 16 March 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rules 50, 59, and 60. Plaintiff also filed a motion for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rules 36 and 37. On 1 May 2012, the trial court filed an order: (1) denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (2) denying plaintiff's Rule 37(d) motion for sanctions; (3) awarding plaintiff $115.00 in costs and $100.82 in interest; and (4) denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 68. On appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the jury's verdict was contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; (2) the judgment entered was inappropriate as a matter of law; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for costs and attorney's fees. After careful review, we find no error in the trial court's entry of judgment and affirm the trial court's order addressing plaintiff's post-trial motions.
Background
On or about 4 November 2008, at approximately 9:40 a.m., plaintiff Phillip Williams was riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by Jonathan Leggett near Fuquay–Varina. At the time of the accident, the Leggett vehicle was lawfully stopped. Defendant Danny Hampton was driving in the same direction but failed to stop and drove his vehicle into the back of the Leggett vehicle. As a result of the accident, plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries to his right shoulder, back, and neck.
On 24 March 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging negligence. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, defendant offered plaintiff $10,000 to settle his claims against defendant. Plaintiff rejected this offer. Defendant filed an answer on 24 June 2011 admitting negligence but denying proximate cause and damages. Defendant also filed, contemporaneously with the answer, an offer of judgment in the amount of $10,001. Plaintiff filed an objection to the offer of judgment on 29 June 2011. On 6 January 2012, defendant filed an amended offer of judgment in the amount of $20,001 plus attorney's fees and costs. Again, plaintiff objected to the amended offer of judgment.
The matter came on for trial on 30 January 2012 before the Honorable Shannon R. Joseph. During the trial, plaintiff testified that, after the accident, he experienced severe neck, back, and shoulder pain. He claimed that although he has experienced past problems with his shoulder, he had not had any issues in the last ten years until the accident. As a result of the accident, plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Speer, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Speer performed a shoulder replacement surgery on 6 February 2009. At trial, on cross-examination, plaintiff testified that he had a prior shoulder surgery in 1983. Additionally, plaintiff stated that he has had three back surgeries and has been on disability since 2002 as a result of medical issues caused by plaintiff's former jobs that required significant lifting.
Dr. Speer's 19 January 2012 videotape deposition was admitted at trial. Dr. Speer stated that plaintiff's “bone-on-bone shoulder osteoarthritis was clinically aggravated [as a result of the accident] and made symptomatic to the severity it required the surgery that [he] performed.” However, on cross-examination, Dr. Speer noted that he did not know anything about the forces involved in the accident and whether they were significant enough to cause plaintiff's injuries. Defendant did not present any evidence at trial.
Plaintiff submitted medical bills totaling over $74,000. On 1 February 2012, the jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff was injured as a result of defendant's negligence and awarding plaintiff $5000 for personal injuries. The trial court entered final judgment 6 March 2012.
On 16 March 2012, pursuant to Rules 50, 59, and 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff filed a JNOV and a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. Plaintiff also filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Rule 37, Rule 68, and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1.
On 1 May 2012, the trial court filed an order addressing all post-trial motions. Specifically, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial “on the ground that no new trial is warranted.” With regard to plaintiff's Rule 37(d) motion for sanctions, the trial court denied it “with all factors having been considered[.]” As to plaintiff's motion for costs, the trial court awarded plaintiff the costs incurred between the date the complaint was filed, 24 March 2011, and the filing of defendant's first offer of judgment, 24 June 2011. Finally, with regard to plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees made pursuant to Rule 68 and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1, the trial court denied the motion after applying all the factors set forth in Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C.App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334–35 (1999). It does not appear that the trial court made any specific findings or conclusions with regard to its denial of plaintiff's JNOV. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order on 1 June 2012.
Arguments
A. Motion for New Trial
First, plaintiff argues that the verdict “was contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and all of the competent evidence present in the trial of this matter and the law of the State of North Carolina.” Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant offered no competent evidence to rebut his evidence establishing that his shoulder injury was caused by the accident. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that his medical bills totaled $74,127.45 and that the jury ignored this evidence and based its verdict on speculation by only awarding plaintiff $5000. We disagree.
Pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes or grounds:
...
(6) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice[.]
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 59(a) (2011). “A motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequate damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 127 N.C.App. 1, 12, 487 S.E.2d 807, 814 (1997). The trial court's ruling “will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Di Frega v. Pugliese, 164 N.C.App. 499, 511, 596 S.E.2d 456, 464 (2004). “Abuse of discretion results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
Plaintiff argues that although the jury may believe any, part, or none of the testimony of a witness, there was no evidence presented rebutting Dr. Speer's testimony concerning plaintiff's injuries nor the amount of plaintiff's medical bills. Instead, plaintiff contends that the jury “pick[ed]” a number that did not correspond to the evidence.
However, plaintiff's assertion that his medical evidence was “unrebutted” is without merit. Dr. Speer testified that plaintiff's arthritic condition could have been happening slowly over time and not as the result of the car accident alone. Moreover, Dr. Speer stated that he could not tell whether the “golf ball size loose bodies,” i.e., the bone spurs, he discovered during surgery existed prior to the accident. Therefore, although defendant did not present any evidence himself, he did elicit testimony on cross-examination that cast doubt on plaintiff's contention that the accident was the proximate cause of all of his injuries and disputing the extent of plaintiff's injuries.
Additionally, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. Both proximate cause and the extent of plaintiff's injuries were contested at trial. While plaintiff argues that his evidence definitively established that defendant's negligence made him liable for all of plaintiff's medical bills, “[t]his Court has held that where there is no stipulation of the parties as to damages, testimony of witnesses as to the nature and extent of a party's injuries or damages is simply evidence in the case to be considered by the jury.” Di Frega, 164 N.C.App. at 511, 596 S.E.2d at 464–65 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is well within the jury's power to minimize or wholly disregard even the testimony given by a party's expert witnesses.” Id. Here, while the jury concluded that defendant was negligent, it, apparently, determined that plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages he requested. “[I]t [is] for the jury to weigh this evidence and to determine what damages, if any, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.” McFarland v. Cromer, 117 N.C.App. 678, 682, 453 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1995). Thus, the jury was not bound by Dr. Speer's opinion, and it is plausible that the jury did not award plaintiff all his requested damages based on the evidence presented at trial of plaintiff's prior surgeries and medical issues with his back and shoulder. Regardless of the jury's reasoning, however, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.
B. Rule 37 Motion for Attorney's Fees
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to make appropriate and sufficient findings of fact concerning his motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 37(c). We disagree.
Pursuant to Rule 37(c),
[i]f a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay to him or her the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 37(c) (2011). “Determining which sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The court's ruling on sanctions will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Baker v. Rosner, 197 N.C.App. 604, 606, 677 S.E.2d 887, 889 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In his response to plaintiff's request for admissions, defendant denied that his negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries and damages. Plaintiff asserts that because the jury found that plaintiff was injured by defendant's negligence and awarded him $5000, plaintiff proved the matter asserted, and defendant is liable for costs associated with that proof pursuant to Rule 37(c). However, plaintiff's argument fails to take into consideration the fact that although the jury found some of plaintiff's injuries and damages were proximately caused by the accident, others were not. Therefore, defendant's denial of that admission was not entirely proven true by the jury, and plaintiff is unable to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 37(c) motion for attorney's fees.
It should be noted that plaintiff is correct that the trial court did not enter substantial findings on this issue. In contrast, the trial court stated that “[p]laintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 37[c] is also denied, with all factors having been considered, including arguments of counsel and applicable law[.]”
However, based on the circumstances in the present case, we believe that these findings were sufficient.
We note that plaintiff's motion was made per Rule 37(c), which is discussed herein, but the trial court's order erroneously references Rule 37(d).
C. Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21 .1
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for attorney's fees made pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1. Specifically, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by not making sufficient findings, failing to award the fees, applying an improper standard in making its findings of fact, and entering conclusions of law not supported by the findings. We disagree.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1 (2011) provides, in pertinent part, that:
In any personal injury or property damage suit ... upon findings by the court (i) that there was an unwarranted refusal by the defendant to negotiate or pay the claim which constitutes the basis of such suit, (ii) that the amount of damages recovered is twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or less, and (iii) that the amount of damages recovered exceeded the highest offer made by the defendant no later than 90 days before the commencement of trial, the presiding judge may, in the judge's discretion, allow [ ] reasonable attorneys' fees to the duly licensed attorneys representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorneys' fees to be taxed as a part of the court costs. The attorneys' fees so awarded shall not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(Emphasis added). Here, while plaintiff did recover less than $20,000, in accordance with subsection (ii), the amount of damages recovered did not exceed the highest offer made by defendant as required under subsection (iii). The jury returned a verdict for $5000. However, the verdict did not exceed the offer of judgment defendant made for $10,001 on 24 June 2011, and the trial court's findings reflect this. Thus, plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1, and we affirm the trial court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees made pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1
D. Motion for Costs
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for costs pursuant to Rule 68. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court's order failed to make appropriate and sufficient findings of fact and that the trial court applied an “improper legal standard in making its finding of fact[.]” We disagree.
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 68(a) (2011). “Otherwise stated, if the ‘judgment finally obtained’ is less favorable than the offer of judgment, a plaintiff who has rejected the offer of judgment must bear the costs and attorney's fees incurred after the offer of judgment.” Roberts v.. Swain, 353 N.C. 246, 249, 538 S.E.2d 566, 568 (2000).
Here, since the judgment obtained was $5000, which was less than defendant's first offer of judgment of $10,001, the trial court reasoned that plaintiff was entitled to costs he accrued between the date the complaint was filed, 24 March 2011, and the filing of defendant's first offer of judgment on 24 June 2011. Accordingly, the trial court awarded plaintiff the costs he incurred for filing and serving the complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in determining the amount of the “judgment obtained.” In addition to the jury verdict, plaintiff contends that in calculating the amount of the judgment, the trial court was required to include prejudgment interest in the amount of $381.37, all the court costs incurred (not just those incurred prior to the date defendant made its first offer of judgment) in the amount of $1,808, and all requested attorney's fees which totaled $53,018.50. By factoring in all of these costs and fees, the amount of the “judgment obtained” would be $60,208.67, which is greater than defendant's offers of judgment.
While plaintiff's argument may be novel, it is without merit. In calculating the “judgment obtained,” the trial court is required to determine the amount of money actually awarded to a plaintiff, including any verdict amount and adjustments. However, it is illogical to presume that the amount of a “judgment obtained” would include any cost or fee requested but not awarded by the trial court. Here, the trial court properly calculated the “judgment obtained” using: (1) the jury verdict of $5000; (2) its award of $115 for costs incurred prior to defendant's offer of judgment, properly made under Rule 68; and (3) its award of $100.82 in interest. While plaintiff requested attorney's fees pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1 and Rule 37 and costs for litigation incurred after defendant's initial offer of judgment, the trial court did not award those to plaintiff, and, as discussed above, did not abuse its discretion in so doing. Therefore, the “judgment obtained” was less than defendant's offers of judgment, and plaintiff's argument is without merit.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court's entry of judgment and affirm the trial court's order addressing plaintiff's post-trial motions.
NO ERROR; AFFIRMED. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).