Opinion
No. SA-04-CA-1058-RF.
April 25, 2006
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' DAUBERT MOTION
BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants Guadalupe County, Guadalupe County Juvenile Board and Alvin Goode's Daubert Motion (Docket No. 48), filed January 19, 2006, Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Daubert Motion (Docket No. 55), filed February 17, 2006, and Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Daubert Motion (Docket No. 56), filed February 28, 2006. The parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on this matter on April 25, 2006. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion should be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from the incarceration of James Fox in the Guadalupe County Juvenile Detention Center on September 10, 2003. James Fox had a history of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of bi-polar disorder and severe depression, for which he was prescribed psychotropic medications. Defendants were aware of James Fox's mental illnesses at the time of his incarceration. While he was in a holding area waiting to be processed, James Fox committed suicide. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this civil rights action, alleging Defendants violated James Fox's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Article I, sections 13, 19, and 29 of the Texas Constitution.
James Fox had been retained at the Guadalupe County Juvenile Detention Center several times before this incident, and he received his mental health treatment at that facility.
In their Daubert Motion, Defendants note that Plaintiffs' clinical psychologist experts "include in their reports opinions regarding the Guadalupe County Detention Center policies and procedures and also give opinions on how the failures of the Detention staff caused the suicide of James Fox." Defendants believe Plaintiffs' experts are inappropriately trying to give testimony about the standard of care at a juvenile detention facility and how the breach of that standard of care led to James Fox's suicide. Defendants argue that only an expert in the field of law enforcement would properly be able to offer such testimony. Defendants contend that the testimony of both Dr. Curry and Dr. Murphey should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 104 and 702 on the basis that both fail to meet the required expert witness qualifications by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Defendants further argue that both experts' conclusions are not the product of reliable principles and methods.
Def. Motion (Docket No. 48) at p. 3.
DISCUSSION
Dr. Curry's qualifications as an expert were challenged in a substantially similar action in Ashley v. Williamson County, Texas, A-04-CA-239-LY. The Court adopts Judge Yeakel's reasoning in his Order Denying Motion to Challenge Expert Witness (Docket No. 49).
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Rule 702 was amended to incorporate the principles first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert. Under Daubert, expert testimony is admissible only if the proponent demonstrates that: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the evidence is relevant to the suit; and (3) the evidence is reliable.
See FED. R. EVID. 702, Adv. Comm. Notes (2000).
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998); Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1997).
Following Daubert and its progeny, trial courts act as gatekeepers, overseeing the admission of scientific and nonscientific expert testimony. Trial courts must make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." In carrying out this task, district courts have broad latitude in weighing the reliability of expert testimony for admissibility. The district court's responsibility "is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Daubert provides the analytical framework for determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Daubert framework includes many factors that can be used to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, including, but not limited to, whether the expert's theory or technique: (1) can be or has been tested; (2) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has a known or potential rate of error or standards controlling its operation; and (4) is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Not every Daubert factor will be applicable in every situation and a court has discretion to consider other factors it deems relevant. The Fifth Circuit has directed that, "[i]n the vast majority of cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate." Whether Daubert's suggested indicia of reliability apply to any given testimony is a fact-specific inquiry dependant on the nature of the issue at hand, the witness's particular expertise, and the subject of the testimony.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 141.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151-52.
Black v. Lion Food, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999).
Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2000).
Although the Daubert analysis is applied to ensure expert witnesses have employed reliable principles and methods in reaching their conclusions, the test does not judge the expert conclusions themselves. The focus must be solely on principles and methodology rather than the conclusions generated. However, "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another." "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." A court could conclude that there is simply too much of an analytical gap between the data used and the opinion proffered by the expert.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
Id. at 595.
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
Id.
Id.
Notwithstanding the dictates of Daubert and its progeny, "the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule." Daubert did not work a "`seachange over federal evidence law,'" and "`the trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.'" As Daubert recognized, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 702, Adv. Comm. Notes (2000).
See id (quoting U.S. v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Leflore County, Mississippi, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
This Court's role as a gatekeeper is not intended to supplant the adversary system in which vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on burden of proof are means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Dr. Curry
See id.
Dr. Curry is a licensed psychologist specializing in clinical and forensic consultation on behalf of Applied Forensics, L.L.P. in Washington, D.C. Dr. Curry testified in an affidavit attached to Plaintiff's Response that he has spent more than 21 years working in adult and juvenile detention settings. He also stated that he "served in administrative positions at 4 facilities where I developed mental health care programs, and more specifically, formulated suicide prevention policies and procedures, and trained clinical and custody staff in their implementation." Additionally, from 2000 until 2002 Dr. Curry consulted to PricewaterhouseCoopers and the U.S. Department of Justice "in evaluating the conditions of confinement at non-federal detention centers across the country to determine if the facilities were safe, humane, and protected statutory and constitutional rights." Dr. Curry's proposed testimony is based on the following conclusions: (1) that proper, customary procedures were not followed when James Fox was brought to the facility; (2) that the Guadalupe County Juvenile Board made program decisions that demonstrated a disregard for the safety of potentially suicidal detainees in their custody; (3) that Detention Center administrators failed to develop and implement a suicide prevention plan for the facility; (4) that the training for detention officers was inadequate; and (5) that a combination of the individual detention officers' actions and the absence of meaningful mental health policies, procedures, and formal training led to James Fox's suicide.
See Docket No. 55 at Exhibit A.
Plaintiffs' Response to Def. Daubert Motion (Docket No. 55) at Exhibit A.
Response to Def. Daubert Motion (Docket No. 55) at Exhibit A.
Dr. Murphey
Dr. Murphey is a clinical psychologist with approximately 30 years of experience working with individuals who have psychological and psychiatric problems, most frequently minors and adolescents. Dr. Murphey stated that she has experience observing the reactions of individuals with mental health issues, specifically when those individuals are incarcerated or involuntarily detained at a mental health facility. Dr. Murphey testified in her affidavit that "[t]here are no large-scale studies I am aware of involving suicides of individuals specifically with bipolar disorder while in custody or involuntary detention, and certainly no experimental research in which psychiatrically impaired individuals are placed in control vs. treatment conditions for the purposes of studying whether they will commit suicide." Regarding policies and procedures, Dr. Murphey formulated her conclusions based on the circumstances that existed at the detention center as far as the records disclosed, the internal investigation report, and James Fox's previous successful detentions, which were managed differently. Dr. Murphey's proposed testimony is based on the following conclusions: (1) that James Fox would attempt suicide was foreseeable; (2) that the intake process by which James Fox was admitted to the detention facility was flawed; and (3) that if the proper procedures had been followed at the detention center, James Fox's suicide could have been avoided.
Pl. Response to Def. Daubert Motion (Docket No. 55) at Exhibit B.
See Pl. Response to Def. Daubert Motion (Docket No. 55) at Exhibit B.
CONCLUSION
Drs. Curry and Murphey propose to testify about the adequacy of the policies and procedures at the Guadalupe County Juvenile Detention Center and the appropriate standard of care in dealing with mentally ill detainees, respectively, and how the failure of each was a contributing factor to James Fox's suicide. Having reviewed Dr. Curry and Dr. Murphey's curriculum vitae and expert reports, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' criticisms about Drs. Curry and Murphey's opinions and conclusions can be adequately addressed at trial through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence. Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that the proposed testimony is reliable. Furthermore, Drs. Curry and Murphey's curriculum vitae demonstrate that they are qualified to express the proposed opinions and conclusions. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant's Daubert Motion is DENIED.