Therefore, discriminatory intent cannot be inherent in the reason. Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996). For instance, the veniremember's grooming may be a sufficiently race neutral explanation, Elem, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769, as may his style of dress, United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1992), and his inattentiveness and demeanor, United States v. Marrowbone, 211 F.3d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 2000).

We uphold facially neutral reasons where the opponent of the strike makes no attempt in the trial court to demonstrate pretext. Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171, 176 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1285 (1996). Our caselaw establishes that explanations of the sort offered by the prosecutor in this case are race-neutral. See, e.g., Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996) (postal workers); United States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1995) (rented home indicating lack of community attachment), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1285 (1996); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1406 (8th Cir.) (insufficient attachment to community), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 371 (1994); United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1992) (hostility toward prosecutor); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (sporadic work history and lack of property ownership, indicating lack of community attachment); United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 1990) (insufficient commitment to community).

While a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may serve as cause for a procedural default, a petitioner cannot rely on such a claim unless it was itself properly exhausted in state court. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000) (explaining that an ineffective-assistance claim cannot be used to establish cause unless it was first presented to the state courts in a manner that state law requires); accord Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986); Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, to satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception, a petitioner must make a credible showing of actual innocence, not mere legal innocence, through new and reliable evidence.

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with the State that only the strikes of Campbell and Guyton are preserved for this Court's habeas review. See Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that because the habeas petitioner did not challenge the peremptory removal of a certain prospective juror in his direct state court appeal, the Batson claim challenging this individual's removal was procedurally defaulted); Troupe v. Groose, 72 F.3d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1995) (same). Petitioner has not asserted cause or prejudice to excuse his default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the Court does not review his race-based Batson claim with respect to Lyles.

Id. at 2329. See also Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261-62 (8th Cir. 1995) (otherwise neutral explanation for removing African-American juror may be pretextual if stated reason also applies to white juror who is not removed). Furthermore, "a prosecutor must state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives."Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2332.

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). The prosecutor's explanation was race-neutral, see Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir.1996), and the state courts did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply Batson by proceeding to the third step of the Batson inquiry. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767–68, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Edwards also contends the state supreme court made an unreasonable determination of the facts when it stated that the “trial court found that the strike [of Burton] was not pretextual and denied the challenge.”

In a typical case, once the party making the peremptory challenge states a race-neutral justification under the second part of Batson, the opposing party "may then attempt to prove the facially valid reason is mere pretext and that the real reason for the strike was discrimination." United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Elem, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769); accord United States v. Jones, 245 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996)). This procedure is consistent with the key principle that "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike."

We cannot conclude that the trial judge's comment, made in the context of disciplining Gladfelter's attorney for improper argument, denied Gladfelter due process. Cf. Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996) (prosecutor's comments regarding burden of proof did not constitute a due process violation). II.

In Sloan, however, the issue of the proper procedure to be followed in such cases was not decided because we held that any further state proceedings would be futile and thus proceeded to consider the petitioner's claims without requiring the petitioner to attempt to exhaust his state court remedies. In contradistinction to Sloan and the cases cited by Victor, we have repeatedly adhered to the command of Rose v. Lundy in other cases. See, e.g., Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Mellott v. Purkett, 63 F.3d 781, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1995); Ashker v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1993); Gray v. Hopkins, 986 F.2d 1236, 1237 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 112 (1993); Shook v. Clarke, 894 F.2d 1496, 1497 (8th Cir. 1990) (modifying order of dismissal so that dismissal would be without prejudice); Nottlemann v. Welding, 861 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Irwin v. Minnesota, 829 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Snethen v. Nix, 736 F.2d 1241, 1244, 1246 (8th Cir. 1984). These eight cases, however, have not clearly presented the precise issue we here decide.

Put another way, a federal habeas court may not consider the merits of a petitioner's unexhausted claims. Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996).