Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5234-12T2
07-24-2014
ROBYN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYSTONE PARK PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, TANNER MOLLET, JOSHUA IJOLA and BOLANLE ADEKOJE, Defendants-Respondents.
Massood & Bronsnick, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Andrew R. Bronsnick, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kathryn E. Duran, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and Grall.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-642-10.
Massood & Bronsnick, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Andrew R. Bronsnick, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kathryn E. Duran, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robyn Williams, a former employee of Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital (Greystone), appeals from a grant of summary judgment to defendants Greystone and three of her superiors. The judge granted that relief on the ground that plaintiff's action alleging violations of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, was commenced beyond the applicable two-year limitations period. See Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 324 (2010); Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 285-86 (1993).
Plaintiff's complaint included other claims — breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful discharge and infliction of emotional distress — that were dismissed prior to this motion for summary judgment. She does not challenge the dismissal of those claims.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that there was a genuine dispute of material fact pertinent to the accrual of her claim based on discriminatory discipline and that her claim based on a hostile work environment did not accrue until the date she resigned, which was within the limitations period. Based on our review of the record in light of the arguments presented, we conclude that the arguments presented have insufficient merit to warrant any discussion in a written opinion beyond the brief comments on the evidence that follow. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Plaintiff is a white female and was employed by Greystone as a supervisor of nursing. Two of the individual defendants were her immediate supervisors, and they were employed as assistant directors of nursing. Both of those assistant directors are black males of Nigerian descent. The assistant directors reported to the head of nursing, who is an African-American male. Plaintiff took a leave of absence on October 29, 2007, returned to work for one day in February 2008, negotiated an agreement resolving outstanding disciplinary matters pending against her, and resigned in good standing effective February 26, 2008. Plaintiff filed the civil complaint at issue here on February 22, 2010.
In support of plaintiff's argument that her hostile work environment was improperly dismissed as untimely filed, plaintiff's brief refers us to derogatory comments about women, unwanted physical contact, comparisons about the subservience of women in Nigeria and in the United States and conversations that the assistant directors had about work in her presence while speaking a foreign language that she did not understand. All of the alleged incidents referenced in the brief on this appeal occurred prior to plaintiff taking a leave of absence on October 29, 2007 — a date nearly three years before the date she filed her complaint. As the trial judge found, assuming that plaintiff's allegation of a hostile work environment and workplace harassment amount to a continuing violation of the LAD, there is no allegation of such conduct that falls within the limitations period. Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed as time-barred.
Plaintiff's claim that the judge erred in dismissing her allegation of discriminatory treatment related to discipline is equally lacking in merit. The last of many notices of disciplinary charges filed against plaintiff was served on April 1, 2007. We recognize that plaintiff's claim about discriminatory discipline is premised not only on discrimination in the bringing of the charges but also on her employers' delay in resolving those allegations. But, as a matter of law, plaintiff cannot state a claim based on that delay, because she negotiated and signed a settlement agreement before tendering her resignation. In that agreement, plaintiff waived "all claims against the State of New Jersey, the Department of Human Services, their employees, agents or assigns with regard to" the disciplinary charges filed in 2007. Thus, any claim based on discrimination related to discipline was properly dismissed as untimely filed or barred by the waiver agreement.
Plaintiff also argues that disciplinary notices she filed against persons under her supervision were either not processed in a timely manner or never processed. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she sustained or will sustain any injury as a consequence of that alleged conduct. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, which plaintiff sought, she voluntarily resigned from her position, "in good standing," effective February 26, 2008. Thus, she cannot show potential damage to her professional reputation. Moreover, none of the disciplinary charges against plaintiff were based on her performance of her supervisory duties. Those charges were based on plaintiff's tardiness, excessive absenteeism, failure to answer pages and unauthorized leaving of her assigned work area.
Having considered the arguments plaintiff presents and the record on the summary judgment motion in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we have concluded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about the date her viable claims accrued and no viable claim that is not time-barred.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION