Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Super. Ct. No. VCU213395, Paul A. Vortmann, Judge.
Exzemina Williams, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robinson and Keller, Oliver U. Robinson and Michael C. Kellar, for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
CORNELL, J.
Exzemina Williams appeals from an adverse jury verdict. Her vehicle and one owned by Charles Virgle Gregg and Edith Gregg (the Greggs) collided when they simultaneously backed out of their parking places in a parking lot of a Wal-Mart store. The jury found the Greggs negligent, but found the negligence was not the proximate cause of any injury to Williams and did not award any economic damages to Williams. Williams contends there was substantial evidence establishing that the Greggs’ negligence caused damage to Williams. She also claims the trial court wrongly excluded relevant evidence. We will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The collision occurred on July 22, 2004, in the parking lot of a Wal-Mart store in Porterville. On February 18, 2005, Williams sued the Greggs for negligence and damages resulting from of the collision. The Greggs answered, denying liability and asserting affirmative defenses. Trial began on October 23, 2006, with Williams representing herself.
Prior to trial the trial court held that Williams would be unable to seek damages for any pain and suffering because she was uninsured at the time of the collision. Thus, she would be limited to economic losses for damage to her vehicle, past and future medical expenses, and loss of income. The trial court also excluded medical reports that Williams sought to admit, finding that the medical reports were hearsay and could not be admitted unless the doctors were called to testify. Because Williams did not intend to call any medical experts to testify, the trial court also ruled that Williams would be precluded from introducing evidence of alleged future medical expenses. The trial court allowed Williams to testify regarding loss of future income.
Williams was the only witness testifying for the plaintiff. She was driving a 2000 Chevy Malibu at the time of the collision; Charles Gregg was in a 1974 GMC truck. Williams claimed that she climbed into her car, buckled her seat belt, looked in her rear view mirror, and began to back out of the parking space when the Greggs’ truck “rammed” her car.
According to Williams, she suffered chronic muscle spasms in her neck, leg pain, shoulder pain, pain in the lower back, lumbar strain, a bulging disk, joint pain, and upper arm and finger pain, all as a result of the collision. Williams conceded under cross-examination that she had preexisting conditions and had suffered from these same complaints during the past five years.
Also under cross-examination, Williams acknowledged that there were two separate impacts to her car that day in the parking lot; only one of the impacts involved the Greggs’ truck. After the collision with the Greggs’ vehicle, Williams stepped out of her car. She claimed she could not get out the driver’s side of her car, so she climbed over the center console and got out the passenger door. She inspected the Greggs’ truck for damage, but could not find any. She drove her car from the scene.
Williams continued to work at her same job for 21 days after the collision. She then quit her job and did not seek any other employment.
Wal-Mart’s security camera captured the collision on video. The video was admitted into evidence at trial.
Dr. Hiram B. Morgan, Jr., testified for the Greggs. Morgan had examined Williams’s medical records. Morgan testified that Williams had reported neck and back injuries in 2001 and in that year she claimed her household activities were restricted because of pain. In June 2001, Williams had been examined and found to have a 50 percent restriction in her range of motion in her neck, with lumbar pain and neck spasms.
When Williams was examined on August 3, 2004, after the July 22 collision, she was found to have normal gait and posture. Subsequent medical examinations disclosed that she had no points of tenderness on her body, could walk normally, and could enter and exit her car without difficulty. Morgan opined that there was no medical reason Williams could not perform her usual job functions.
Morgan noted that Williams was five feet four inches tall, weighed 298 pounds, and that her excessive weight could be a factor in her history of physical complaints. Morgan testified that Williams had a pattern of excessive complaints of pain that were out of proportion to the stimulus applied during an examination.
Morgan was of the opinion that Williams’s complaints and claimed injuries were not consistent with the low speed of the collision and the location of the impact to her car. Morgan testified that Williams did not sustain any structural injury from the collision and should not have sustained any injury that would impair her ability to work.
The jury found through a special verdict form that Charles Gregg was negligent, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm to Williams. Judgment was entered consistent with the special verdict.
DISCUSSION
Williams contends that the Greggs failed to meet their burden of proving that she was not entitled to economic damages. Williams is misinformed. It was not the Greggs who had the burden of proof on the issue of negligence and proximate cause. In order to obtain an award of damages resulting from negligence by the Greggs, Williams had to prove that the Greggs were negligent and that their negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. (Evid. Code, § 500; Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)
The only evidence presented by Williams was her testimony. The Greggs presented the videotape of the collision and expert medical testimony establishing (1) all the conditions Williams complained of were preexisting; (2) Williams did not sustain any structural injury from the collision; (3) Williams was able to walk and move normally after the collision; and (4) Williams was not physically prevented from engaging in her usual work as a result of the collision.
The jury, as the trier of fact, reasonably could credit the testimony of Morgan and reject the testimony of Williams on the issue of damages. “[T]he direct evidence of one witness entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411.) This is true even when the testimony of that single witness is contradicted by other evidence. (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 353, 366.)
Credibility is an issue for the fact finder and the appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. We have no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. When the evidence gives rise to conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which supports the findings of the trier of fact, the finding is conclusive on appeal. (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 613, 622-623.)
Williams also claims that the pretrial rulings of the trial court prevented her from presenting relevant evidence. We have reviewed the evidence offered by Williams and the rulings of the trial court and we agree with the trial court. While the evidence offered by Williams was relevant, it was not admissible under the Evidence Code.
Williams had her day in court, the jury did not believe her, and she lost. No error occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the Greggs.
WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P.J., HILL, J.