Opinion
Case No. 3:17-cv-216-KRG-KAP
10-29-2019
SHAWN LEON WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. NANCY GIROUX, WARDEN, S.C.I. HOUTZDALE, Respondent (John Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Nominal Respondents)
Report and Recommendation
Recommendation
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and then filed two substantially identical motions to vacate the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. See ECF no. 15, ECF no. 16. Last week, in an order docketed at the circuit, the appeal was stayed pending ruling on the motions to vacate. The motions should be denied.
Report
As I have already noted, petitioner entered a counseled, negotiated, guilty plea to two counts of burglary and one count of third degree murder, and his conviction became final under state law in 2011. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed in 2017, was dismissed because it is untimely under AEDPA. Petitioner concedes that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is untimely, Rule 60 Motion at ¶40, but argues that he is actually innocent of one of the two burglary charges he pleaded guilty to and therefore the untimeliness of his petition should be excused. His underlying claims, see ECF no. 2 at 8-9, embracing all the charges to which he pleaded guilty, are 1) that he was incompetent at the time of the plea, and 2) that his counsel were ineffective in failing to "seek an evaluation to access [sic] his sanity at the time of the offense considering the fact that petitioners [sic] sanity was a significant factor of the murder offense." Id.
As petitioner acknowledges in his petition, ECF no. 2, (the brief in support is at ECF no. 4) and in his motion seeking an evidentiary hearing, ECF no. 7, petitioner was originally charged with robbery (and burglary) for breaking into the apartment of his former girlfriend in December 2009, assaulting her, and taking $500 dollars from her. The charges were apparently withdrawn at the victim's request and then reinstated when petitioner was charged with murder and burglary after he broke into the same woman's new residence in August 2010 and stabbed her to death.
As petitioner himself acknowledges, there was a history of conflict between petitioner and the victim, and there were witnesses to both criminal episodes, plus evidence (in the exhibits petitioner attaches to his motion for an evidentiary hearing) indicating that petitioner had repeatedly threatened the victim before killing her. Faced with a first degree murder charge in addition to other felony charges for the events in August 2010, as well as the robbery and burglary charges for the events in December 2009, petitioner entered a guilty plea to the burglary charge for the December 2009 incident as part of the negotiated plea. Petitioner claims that in 2015 he discovered evidence that he was legally entitled to be in the victim's residence on December 22, 2009, and therefore cannot be guilty of one of the counts of burglary he pleaded guilty to. He asserts that he could not exhaust this claim in state court in a timely fashion because he was incompetent. As I already noted, the state court has rejected that claim.
I am not aware of precedent that would allow even a properly supported claim of actual innocence on one charge (the December 2009 burglary) to serve as a vehicle for an untimely habeas petition challenging a different charge or charges as to which there is no claim of actual innocence. Petitioner's claim of actual innocence is really a meritless claim of ineffectiveness styled as an actual innocence claim to attempt to avoid AEDPA's statute of limitations.
Petitioner's claim amounts to the assertion that counsel were ineffective because a piece of the package deal they negotiated, if it had been offered in isolation, could have been disputed on the basis of evidence that petitioner does not claim he had until years later and which petitioner does not claim counsel had any reason to suspect existed at the time. That is not a valid claim of ineffectiveness. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), the Supreme Court observed: [A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. On the record as supplied by petitioner, as a matter of law, negotiating a sentence for a term of years in exchange for the dismissal of a first degree murder charge would not be outside the range of professionally competent assistance, regardless of whether part of that term of years was anchored to a burglary charge or a robbery charge. But the untimeliness of any such claim prevents the court from reaching its merits.
To the extent that petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is anything more, it is the equally untimely, defaulted, and purely hindsight assertion that in May 2011 petitioner was incompetent and counsel therefore were ineffective in allowing him to enter a guilty plea. Petitioner offers one piece of supporting evidence - a portion of his medical record since he has been incarcerated that includes an evaluation and discharge summary from a hospitalization in May 2007 - that would support a claim that in 2009-10 petitioner was mentally ill. A substantial percentage of persons who commit crimes are mentally ill. Mental illness is not legal incompetency, and a claim of ineffectiveness cannot be based on a casual mix-and-match use of the two concepts.
Petitioner offers nothing that amounts to a claim that when he entered his plea he did not have "the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993)(holding that the standard of competency to plead guilty is the same as for standing trial.) Even if his petition had been timely, it would have been proper to dismiss it under Habeas Rule 4 as inadequate because petitioner failed to state specific facts, cite to the places in the record, or describe the nonrecord facts that "point to a real possibility of constitutional error." See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-56 (2005)(quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). And as I have already noted, even when timely an allegation of incompetency does not begin a round of federal litigation over petitioner's incompetency. The motions to vacate should be denied.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the petitioner is given notice that he has fourteen days to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. DATE: October 29, 2019
/s/_________
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge Notice to counsel of record by ECF and by U.S. Mail to:
Shawn L. Williams JZ-9009
S.C.I. Houtzdale
P.O. Box 1000
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000