1961); Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Wilmington, Inc., 6 Storey 179, 192 A.2d 910, 912 (Del.Supr. 1963); National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 220 A.2d 217, 220 (Del.Super. 1966); Phillips v. Delaware Power Light Co., 7 Storey 466, 202 A.2d 131, 132 (Del.Super. 1964); Williams v. General Baking Co., 9 Terry 104, 98 A.2d 779, 780 (Del.Super. 1953). Under Delaware law, to be entitled to the use of res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff must show that the accident or injury happened under such circumstances that in the ordinary course of events no accident or injury would have occurred absent the defendant's negligence.

As a separate cause of action, plaintiffs rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Reliance is primarily placed upon Williams v. General Baking Co., 9 Terry 104, 98 A.2d 779, in which case a plaintiff was given the benefit of the doctrine as defined in Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, 6 Terry 226, 71 A.2d 69. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been followed consistently by Delaware courts.

This rule has previously been applied by this Court. See Williams v. General Baking Co., 9 Terry 104, 48 Del. 104, 98 A.2d 779 (Del. Superior Court, 1953). Defendant argues, however, that even assuming the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it has conclusively rebutted any inference of negligence. Specifically, defendant points to the testimony of a supervisor of its Philadelphia food processing plant and of a manager of the restaurant in question.