Opinion
No. 3:03-CV-0587-P.
July 2, 2004
ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 19, 2004. After careful consideration of the evidence and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On June 18, 2004, the Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff that he had failed to respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and that if he did not file a response within ten days of the Order, the Court would proceed to determine Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment without a response from Plaintiff. On June 24, 2004, the Court received a Motion to Leave Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files and a Motion Not to Leave Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files, which were almost identical to and requested the same relief as two of Plaintiff's other pending motions, Plaintiff's Motion to Leave Summary Judgment in the Files, filed April 27, 2004, and Plaintiff's Motion to Court's Order to Reconsider Plaintiff's Motion Not to Leave Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files, filed May 10, 2004. Rather than submitting evidence to support his claims, Plaintiff relies on two sentences to support his contention that he is entitled to relief for his claims. First, Plaintiff continues to insist, despite the Court's previous Orders stating otherwise, that the following sentence in the EEOC's Determination entitles him to relief: "A court complaint must contain a short statement of the facts of this case which shows that the aggrieved party is entitled to relief." However, this sentence does not entitle Plaintiff to the relief he requested. The EEOC includes this sentence in the Determination only for the purpose of explaining to Plaintiff what information should be included in his Complaint, and is not intended to be a statement by the EEOC indicating that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff also relies on the following sentence from Defendant's Original Answer: "Defendant is without information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in the . . . Complaint and therefore denies them." Based on this sentence, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment "has nothing to do with this case, has no connection at all." However, this sentence does not affect the relevancy or merit of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant is merely denying that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested in his Complaint. Therefore, neither of these sentences entitle Plaintiff to relief. For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Leave Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files, Plaintiff's Motion Not to Leave Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files, and Plaintiff's Motion to Court's Order to Reconsider Plaintiff's Motion Not to Leave Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Files.
BACKGROUND
Defendant hired Plaintiff on April 3, 2002 as a warehouse shipping clerk. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. App. at Ex. A-2.) On June 21, 2002, Plaintiff received a written warning for being disrespectful to his co-workers. Id. at A-3. On June 28, 2002, Defendant terminated Plaintiff alleging that he had attitude problems, disrespected his supervisors, and slept during office hours. Id. at A-5. On March 19, 2003, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pro se claiming that Defendant terminated him and refused to hire him as a salesperson based on his race in violation of Title VII. (Compl. at 1.) Since Defendant moves for summary judgment, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff's discriminatory discharge and hiring claims.DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Legal Standard.
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett., 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such an absence. Id. at 323. However, all evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Once the party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party defending the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless he provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent a summary judgment. Id. at 248-50; Abbot v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Washington v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988). A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition, even if the failure to oppose it violates a local rule. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Adminstracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985). However, when the nonmovant fails to provide a response identifying the disputed issues of fact, the Court is entitled to accept the movant's description of the undisputed facts as prima facie evidence of its entitlement to judgment. Eversly v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 173-174 (5th Cir. 1999); Nordar Holdings, Inc. v. Western Sec. (USA) Ltd., No. 3:96-CV-0427-H, 1996 WL 739019, *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1996).
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). "The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise matter in which the evidence supports his or her claim." Id. A party may not rely upon "unsubstantiated assertions" as competent summary judgment evidence. Id.
II. Discriminatory Discharge.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to adversely affect the status of an employee because of the individual's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove her claim through direct evidence, statistical proof, or the tripartite burden-shifting test established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a prima facie case of race discrimination is established by the plaintiff once she proves that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for her position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that others similarly situated were treated more favorably. See generally Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2001); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1997).
The prima facie case, once established, raises a presumption of discrimination which the defendant must rebut by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Shackelford v. DeLoitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999). This burden on the employer is only one of production, not persuasion, involving no credibility assessments. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). If the employer carries its burden, the mandatory inference of discrimination created by the prima facie case drops out of the picture, and the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. "Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination." Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404 ( citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996)). The ultimate burden of persuasion rests squarely on the plaintiff. See Marcantel v. Department of Transp. Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1994).
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, or that he was discharged from his position at DinLi LP. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 3.) Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the remaining elements of the prima facie case. Despite the fact that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish the remaining elements, the Court will assume arguendo that he can establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Even with the benefit of this assumption, Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge will not survive summary judgment.
Since the Court assumes arguendo that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination. See Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 193 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1999). To satisfy this burden, Defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
Defendant offers competent summary judgment evidence in the form of affidavits and business documents setting forth the reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Defendant explains that Plaintiff was terminated because he had attitude problems, disrespected his supervisors, and slept during office hours. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. App. at Ex. A-5.) To support these allegations, Defendant submits the affidavits of two of Plaintiff's co-workers, Kenneth Quillens and Gabino Ramos, Jr. Quillens, a Shipping Manager at DinLi LP, personally witnessed Plaintiff sleeping during working hours, disrespect DinLi LP's president, and curse. Id. at Ex. D. Ramos, Jr., explained that Plaintiff disappeared one day while he was supposed to be moving equipment into an office located in another building. Id. at Ex. E. Ramos, Jr. states that Plaintiff's failure to work promoted resentment among the other employees as they had to do extra work while Plaintiff "hid in the warehouse and got paid to do nothing." Id. Thus, Defendant satisfied its burden by articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that these articulated reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Pratt v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2001). To establish pretext, Plaintiff must present evidence to rebut each of the non-discriminatory reasons that Defendant articulates. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish pretext. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge.
III. Discrimination in Hiring.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination regarding Defendant's hiring practices, Plaintiff must establish (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 411 U.S. at 802. Here, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory hiring as there is no evidence in the summary judgment record to show that he applied to be a salesperson, much less to show that Plaintiff was rejected from such a position despite his qualifications. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.