Opinion
No. 05-11-00434-CV
04-27-2012
ESTER WILLIAMS AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-01667-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Lang-Miers, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Murphy
Ester Williams appeals a judgment granting possession of the premises located at 245 Creekwood Drive, Lancaster, Texas, to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust. In a single issue, Williams contends the trial court erred in finding her to be a tenant at sufferance. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Deutsche Bank acquired the property at a foreclosure sale pursuant to a substitute trustee's deed. According to this document, Williams signed a note payable to the Long Beach Mortgage Company for $205,680 on June 22, 2004. That same day, she secured the note with a deed of trust granting a first lien security interest in the property. As a result of Williams's default, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale.
Deutsche Bank subsequently notified Williams of the change in ownership and gave her notice to vacate the property. When she did not vacate, Deutsche Bank filed an original petition for forcible detainer in the justice court. Williams did not file an answer or appear for trial, and the justice court awarded possession of the property to Deutsche Bank.
Williams filed a pro se appeal in the county court at law and a general denial to Deutsche Bank's allegations. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 753 (answer in county court when judgment by default). Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment determining that Williams was a tenant at sufferance pursuant to the foreclosure and Deutsche Bank was entitled to possession of the property. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed in this case. Accordingly, all findings necessary to support the trial court's judgment are implied. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When, as here, a complete reporter's record is filed, implied findings may be reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency by the same standards applied to a jury's answer. Cadle Co. v. Parks, 228 S.W.3d 915, 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
Williams challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence on a matter for which she did not bear the burden of proof. She therefore must demonstrate on appeal there is no evidence to support the trial court's adverse findings. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); ECF N. Ridge Assocs., L.P. v. Orix Capital Mkts., L.L.C.,336 S.W.3d 400, 408 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied). Under a no-evidence point, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, indulging every reasonable inference in support. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). A legal sufficiency challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the judgment. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is such that reasonable and fair minded people could differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). Evidence that does no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion is insufficient to rise to the level of a scintilla. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983).
Applicable Law
A forcible detainer action is used to determine the superior right to immediate possession of real property where there is no claim of unlawful entry. Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 926 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). It is intended to be a “speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property.” Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The only issue in a forcible detainer action is which party has the right to actual possession of the property. Tex. R. Civ. P. 746; Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 318 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
Analysis
Williams contends there was no evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship between Williams and Deutsche Bank, which she argues is required to establish she was a tenant at sufferance and that Deutsche Bank had a superior right to possession of the property. Specifically, she asserts that Deutsche Bank failed to offer evidence of a deed of trust executed by Williams or any other evidence to show a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship existed between the parties; she argues the substitute trustee's deed and notice to vacate were not evidence of this relationship.
Forcible detainer may be committed by a tenant at sufferance. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.002(a)(2) (West 2000). A tenancy at sufferance is created when one wrongfully continues in “naked possession of property” after his right to possession has ceased. ICM Mortg. Corp. v. Jacob, 902 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied); Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
The substitute trustee's deed established Deutsche Bank purchased the property in a public auction following Williams's default on the deed of trust. Williams's continued possession of the property following Deutsche Bank's notice to vacate created a tenancy at sufferance. See Clarkson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 331 S.W.3d 837, 839-40 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.); see also McGillivray v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,360 F. App'x 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2010) (under Texas law, purchaser of property at foreclosure not required to produce original note or deed of trust to establish right to recover in forcible detainer action; substitute trustee's deed provided sufficient evidence of ownership and basis for determining right to immediate possession). Evidence of Williams's tenancy at sufferance, along with the notice to vacate, proves Deutsche Bank's right to immediate possession of the property. Clarkson, 331 S.W.3d at 839-40.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, we conclude legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that Deutsche Bank had a superior right of immediate possession of the property.
CONCLUSION
We overrule Williams's sole issue. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MARY MURPHY
JUSTICE
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ESTER WILLIAMS AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants
No. 05-11-00434-CV
V.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, Appellee
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. CC-11- 01667-E).
Opinion delivered by Justice Murphy, Justices Moseley and Lang-Miers participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust recover its costs of this appeal from appellant Ester Williams and from the cash deposit in lieu of supersedeas bond. After all costs have been paid, we DIRECT the clerk of the Dallas County court to release the balance, if any, of the cash deposit to Ester Williams.
Judgment entered April 27, 2012.
MARY MURPHY
JUSTICE
Although the case style included “all occupants” at the justice court and on appeal to the county court at law, Williams tried the case pro se and the county court's judgment is against her only. Williams also filed the notice of appeal and general denial in the county court pro se, although her appellate brief is signed by counsel. Accordingly, Williams is the only appellant before the Court and shall be referred to in the singular.