Cf. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 300 Mich.App. at 262; see also Heike v. Guevara, 654 F.Supp.2d 658, 676 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (applying Michigan law and finding plaintiff “did not plead her defamation cause of action with sufficient specificity” where plaintiff did not identify particular statements); Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 523 F.Supp.2d 602, 606 (E.D. Mich. 2007), aff'd 306 Fed.Appx. 943 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Michigan law and finding plaintiff “failed to identify the exact defamatory words that support his defamation claim.”).
Courts within the Eastern District of Michigan are indeed split about whether the higher pleading standard applies to defamation claims filed in federal court. Compare Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 523 F.Supp.2d 602, 606 (E.D. Mich. 2007), aff'd, 306 Fed.Appx. 943 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that defamation claims should be pleaded with the higher standard), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Allied & Assocs., 860 F.Supp.2d 432, 447 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (stating that defamation claims did not require a heightened pleading standard).
District courts "should deny leave to amend" in circumstances involving: (1) undue delay in seeking leave to amend; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies through previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to adverse parties; and (5) futility of the proposed amendment. Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 306 F. App'x. 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995).
See Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 589 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2008) (Griffin, J.) ("Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that a court `should freely give leave when justice so requires,' the right to amend is not absolute or automatic.") (citing, inter alia, Sinay v. Lamson Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1041 (6th Cir. 1991)). See, e.g., Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 306 F. App'x 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of leave to amend) (citations omitted). DeWolff's brief in support of his motion to remand reads, almost in its entirety:
To state a claim for defamation, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant: 1) made a "false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff"; 2) communicated the statement to a third party without privilege; and 3) acted with "fault amounting to at least negligence." Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 306 Fed. Appx. 943, 946 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Royal Palace Homes v. Channel 7 of Detroit, 495 N.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Mich. 1992)).
Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 589 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2008) (Griffin, J.) (citing, inter alia, Sinay v. Lamson Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1041 (6th Cir. 1991)). See, e.g., Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 306 F. App'x 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of leave to amend and citing, inter alia, Duggins v. Steak `n Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding denial of leave to amend where movant "delayed pursuing this claim until after discovery had passed, the dispositive motion deadline had passed, and a motion for summary judgment had been filed", without justification for the delay)). The defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss in part and for summary judgment in part.
In order to establish a claim for defamation, "a plaintiff must show that the defendant 1) made a `false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff'; 2) communicated the statement to a third party without privilege; and 3) acted with `fault amounting to at least negligence.'" Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., No. 07-2520, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1051, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009) (quoting Royal Palace Homes v. Channel7 of Detroit, 495 N.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Mich. 1992)).
In considering the form and context of the alleged defamatory statement, courts consider the medium used to transmit it, and they are more likely to conclude that the statement relates to a matter of public concern if it appears in a widely disseminated publication. Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. (C.A.6, 2009), 306 Fed.Appx. 943, 947 (citing Dun Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762, 105 S.Ct. at 2947, and Flamm v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Women (C.A.2, 2000), 201 F.3d 144, 150). However, the relevant concern need not be of paramount importance or national scope; "`it is sufficient that the speech concern matters in which even a relatively small segment of the general public might be interested.'"