Opinion
20-P-634
12-27-2021
MICHAEL WILLIAMS v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & another [1]
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction (DOC), brought suit alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs -- in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- and negligent in failing to provide him with proper medical care. He sought compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction ordering his release from DOC custody and placement in a facility operated by the Department of Mental Health (DMH). A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P.12 (b) (1) and 12 (b) (6), as amended, 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), and the plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment.
The complaint was correctly dismissed for several reasons. First, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's constitutional claims, insofar as they seek monetary damages. State agencies, such as DOC and DMH, are not "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the vehicle for bringing a Federal constitutional claim. See Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 178 (2004). Sovereign immunity also bars the plaintiff's claim for damages under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 474362 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 94 Mass.App.Ct. 52, 64-65 (2018). To the extent the complaint can be construed to assert a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 111 (MCRA), the defendants are likewise immune from that claim because the Commonwealth and its agencies are not "persons" under the MCRA. See Commonwealth v. ELM Med. Labs. Inc., 33 Mass.App.Ct. 71, 76-77 (1992).
Although sovereign immunity would not bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief brought against a State official in his or her official capacity, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908); Doe No. 474362 , 94 Mass. App Ct. at 64, such relief is not available to the plaintiff because he has "not sued any State official, but the State itself." Lopes, 442 Mass. at 180. In any event, even had the plaintiff named a State official, he still would have no viable constitutional claim because the factual allegations of the complaint do not establish "a right to relief above the speculative level." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) . To state a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege acts or omissions that rise to the level of a "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Here, the complaint does not allege even what the plaintiff's medical needs are, what treatment the defendants did or did not provide, or why any treatment provided was inadequate. Rather, it raises only general assertions that the defendants "ignore[d] all attempts of the plaintiff to draw attention to his plight" and that "there is no adequate treatment or facilities being made available for the [plaintiff] to take advantage of." These assertions do not provide "enough factual heft" to withstand a motion to dismiss. Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 609 (2017).
The plaintiff's negligence claim was also correctly dismissed because the complaint does not allege compliance with the presentment requirements of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 4. This alone is fatal to the claim. See Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1010 n.3 (2015) ("Because proper presentment is a condition precedent," plaintiff must "plead performance of the condition in his complaint"); Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721 (1994), quoting Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47 (1982) ("Presentment must be made 'in strict compliance with the statute'").
Even after the defendants raised lack of presentment in their motion to dismiss, the plaintiff did not assert, either in his opposition to the motion or in his appellate brief, that he presented his claim in compliance with G. L. c. 258, § 4.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.