Opinion
No. 3:01cv0090 AS
March 28, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On February 1, 2001, pro se plaintiff, Brandon C. Williams, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana, filed a complaint purporting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and invoking this Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(3).
The plaintiff is a convicted felon and serving a sentence imposed by a court in the State of Indiana. On March 6, 2002, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.), which complied with the necessary mandates of Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff filed a response and memorandum on March 25, 2002.
This court is mandated to greatly indulge pro se plaintiffs. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). See also Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1008 (1989); and Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). For a recent and insightful reference to that process, see Greer v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, No. 00-4059 (7th Cir. October 3, 2001).
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 1998). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1998). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts shows that there is a genuine [material] issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1994); nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995).
During its summary judgment analysis, the court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, it is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55. Applying the above standard, this Court addresses defendants' motion.
The argument advanced by the Attorney General of Indiana in this case comes down to a simple proposition by reference to provisions in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). More importantly, the Attorney General has cited and relied on a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the united States in Porter v. Nussel, ___ U.S. ___, (February 26, 2002). See also Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001). This Court is not in a position to gainsay Porter or Larkin. This Court has no choice but to GRANT the defendants' motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust available remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Clerk shall enter judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.