Opinion
No. 05-06-01142-CV
Opinion issued October 26, 2007.
On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 05-10721-F.
Before Justices, WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Williams appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dallas County. In three issues, Williams contends the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment because (i) Dallas County presented no summary judgment evidence, (ii) Williams's uncontroverted evidence established a causal connection between the compensable and subsequent injuries, and (iii) Williams's uncontroverted evidence precluded summary judgment. We reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.
On December 14, 2004, Williams sustained a cervical and low back injury in the course and scope of his employment with Dallas County. Dallas County, a self-insured carrier providing workers' compensation coverage to its employees, concedes that the December 2004 injury is a compensable injury. On February 19, 2005, Williams sustained a knee injury when a muscle spasm and pain in his back caused him to fall. Dallas County disputes compensability of the February 2005 "follow-on" or subsequent injury.
A compensable "injury" means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.011(26) (Vernon 2006). An employee who sustains a specific compensable injury "is not limited to compensation allowed for that specific injury if such injury, or proper or necessary treatment therefor, causes other injuries which render the employee incapable of work." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sosa, 425 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 432 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1968).
A Texas Workers' Compensation Commission conducted a hearing to decide the disputed issue "Does the compensable injury of December 14, 2004 include injury to the right knee?" The hearing officer concluded that as a matter of law the compensable injury of December 14, 2004 includes injury to the right knee. Dallas County appealed the hearing officer's decision and order to the Texas Department of Insurance-Division of Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Dallas County filed this cause in the trial court for review of the appeals panel's final decision.
Dallas County states that the disputed issue was, "Is the Claimant's compensable lumbar injury sustained on December 14, 2004 a producing cause of his right knee condition?" However, the record confirms that by agreement of the parties and with the approval of the hearing officer the issue was amended.
Dallas County then filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. After the trial judge granted Dallas County's motion, Williams filed this appeal.
The standard of review in a traditional summary judgment case is well established. We review a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party has established its right to summary judgment as a matter of law. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Summary judgment procedure in general applies to workers' compensation cases. See Bullock v. Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n, 254 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1952, writ ref'd). A party moving for a traditional summary judgment must show no material fact issue exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); See Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d at 295. "In most of [workers' compensation] cases an issue of fact will arise which will prevent the rendition of a summary judgment. . . ." Fowler v. Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 237 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd).
Dallas County presented no evidence in support of its traditional motion for summary judgment. Instead, it relied on appeals panels' decisions in other cases finding no compensable follow-on injury.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Williams presented evidence which included the letter of Stuart K. Alexander, M.D. and the decision and order of the hearing officer. In that decision and order, the hearing officer stated that Dr. Alexander's letter provided a causal link between the December 2004 injury and the subsequent February 2005 injury. Williams presented additional reports of independent medical examiners Charles W. Kennedry, Jr., M.D. and Arthur L. Sarris, M.D. Dr. Kennedy diagnosed Williams with a lumbosacral strain without radioculopathy and contusion of the right knee with postoperative evidence of chondromalacia and opined that Williams's medical condition was related to the December 2004 injury. Dr. Sarris opined there is a causal relationship between the injuries Williams received on December 14, 2004 and February 18, 2005.
In a trial to the judge, the trial judge "shall consider the decision of the appeals panel" regarding compensability. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.304(b) (Vernon 2006). See Vanliner Ins. Co. v. Ward, 923 S.W.2d, 29, 31 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ). Here, the appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision and order which included findings of fact that on February 19, 2005 Williams sustained right knee injury as a result of the December 14, 2004 compensable injury, the right knee injury was a direct and natural result of the prior compensable injury, and the compensable December 14, 2004 injury was a producing cause of the February 19, 2005 knee injury.
After reviewing the record, we conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether the December 2004 compensable injury included the February 2005 injury. Because a fact issue exists, the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dallas County. We sustain Williams's third issue. In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Williams's other issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.