Summary
holding Dallas Area Rapid Transit’s failure to post signs prohibiting bicycling near train tracks did not injure plaintiff because his injuries were caused by third party bicyclist
Summary of this case from Tex. S. Univ. v. MoutonOpinion
No. 05-14-01303-CV
02-01-2016
JOHN WILLIAMS, Appellant v. DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-00720-B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Myers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
John Williams sued Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), seeking to recover for personal injuries he suffered from being struck by a bicyclist at a DART rail station. The trial court granted DART's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Williams appeals the trial court's order, arguing he sufficiently pleaded a waiver of governmental immunity because DART was engaged in a proprietary function and there was nexus between the condition of the property and his injuries. We affirm the trial court's order.
Background
In his live pleading, Williams asserted he was a passenger on a DART train that stopped at the American Airlines Center rail station. After Williams got off the train, he was hit by a bicyclist and injured. Williams alleged DART was negligent by failing to post signs at the station that prohibited activities such as bicycling near or around the area of the platform where passengers might board or exit trains.
DART filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground Williams failed to plead a waiver of DART's governmental immunity because the alleged premises defect, the lack of appropriate signage, did not proximately cause Williams's injuries. Williams responded that he often rides the TRE train in Tarrant County and the TRE train system had signs prohibiting certain activities at the "I.T.P." and "T&P" stations. Neither Williams nor DART submitted any evidence in connection with the plea to the jurisdiction. After considering the plea, argument of the parties, and the pleadings on file, the trial court granted DART's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Standard of Review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the trial court's power to decide a case. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2014). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction. Id.; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is "to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit." Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554. We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Klumb., 458 S.W.3d at 8.
The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the sufficiency of the claimant's pleadings or the existence of necessary jurisdictional facts. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When, as in this case, the plea challenges the claimant's pleadings, we determine whether the claimant has pleaded facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction, construing the pleadings liberally in favor of the claimant. Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 8; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, the plea should be granted. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. If the pleadings do not contain enough facts to demonstrate the propriety of jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the claimant should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. But if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, the plea may be granted without allowing the claimant an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
Analysis
We first note that Williams is appearing pro se in this appeal. We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs. Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). However, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854. To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854; Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). Applying these standards, we construe Williams to be contending the trial court erred by dismissing the case because DART was performing a proprietary function and he sufficiently pleaded a nexus between his injuries and the condition of DART's property. Although we question whether these arguments are adequately briefed, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (h), (i), we will consider the merits of this appeal.
Proprietary Function
Williams first argues DART was not entitled to governmental immunity because it was engaged in a proprietary function and, therefore, "is liable to the same extent as a private entity or individual." DART is a governmental unit and a regional transportation authority, Castro v. Cammerino, 186 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied), and was not engaged in a proprietary function at the time Williams was injured. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 452.052(c) (West 2013). Absent legislative consent to suit, a governmental unit is immune from suit and liability. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). Accordingly, absent a waiver of DART's governmental immunity, the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Williams's claim.
The transportation code provides that an "authority," which includes a regional transportation authority created under chapter 451 of the transportation code:
is a governmental unit under Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the operations of the authority are not proprietary functions for any purpose including the application of Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Premises Defect
William next argues he sufficiently pleaded a nexus between the condition of the rail station and his injuries to establish a waiver of governmental immunity. The Texas Tort Claims Act [the Act] waives a governmental unit's immunity from suit only "to the extent of liability created by" the Act. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.025(a) (West 2011). The Act outlines a statutory scheme that waives governmental immunity in three areas: "use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property." Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000)); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021. If, as in this case, the plaintiff is asserting he was injured due to the negligent condition of real property, he must meet the heightened standards of a premises defect claim set out in section 101.022 of the civil practice and remedies code. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 233; City of El Paso v. Collins, No. 08-14-00319-CV, 2016 WL 240882, at *11 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 20, 2016, no pet. h.).
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001—.109 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). --------
When the claim arises from a premises defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a); see also Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2015). This duty requires the landowner to avoid injuring a licensee by willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct. City of Dallas v. Reed, 258 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). When the landowner is aware of a dangerous condition, and the licensee is not, the landowner must use ordinary care either to warn the licensee of the condition or to make the condition reasonably safe. City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (citing State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1974)); Reed, 258 S.W.3d at 622.
Williams alleges the lack of a sign prohibiting certain activities at the rail station was the premises defect. However, DART's failure to post such a sign did not injure Williams; rather, Williams pleaded that he was injured by a third-party bicyclist. "Allegations that a plaintiff was injured by persons 'purposefully misusing or misbehaving on the [property]' do not give rise to a claim for a premises defect" under the Act. City of San Antonio v. Butler, 131 S.W.3d 170, 179-80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (quoting Vongphachanh v. City of Dallas, No. 05-02-00566-CV, 2002 WL 31247974, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 8, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication)); see also Dimas v. Tex. State Univ. Sys., 201 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (governmental immunity not waived for premises defect claim because it was "the actions of [plaintiff's] attacker, not the allegedly defective lights," that were proximate cause of her injuries); Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Moreno, 172 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (governmental immunity not waived for premises defect claim based on injuries plaintiff received when crowd tore down goal post following football game because, although injury occurred on governmental unit's football field, "the property itself did not cause [plaintiff's] injuries"). We conclude Williams's allegation that he was injured on DART's property by a third-party bicyclist is insufficient to plead a waiver of governmental immunity in connection with his premises defect claim.
We resolve Williams's issues against him and affirm the trial court's order dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE 141303F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-00720-B.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Myers and Whitehill participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the October 3, 2014 order of the trial court granting Dallas Area Rapid Transit's plea to the jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 1st day of February, 2016.
Id. § 452.052(c).