According to this statute, appellant is the presumed father by virtue of two genetic tests indicating a 99.99% likelihood that he is the father of the minor child and therefore has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence that he is not the father of the child. In support of his argument that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, appellant primarily relies upon our decision in Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).

See Zinnel, 274 N.W.2d at 498 (for purposes of directed verdict motions, the credibility of opposing party's evidence and every inference which may be fairly drawn are taken as true); Louwagie, 378 N.W.2d at 68 (all factual inferences and direct evidence must be drawn in favor of the opposing party for summary judgment motions). This court dealt with a case similar to this one in Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 656-57 (Minn.App. 1993) (defendant's denial of intercourse in likely month of conception sufficient to overcome summary judgment even where he had burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not the father), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).

We note that the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reached a similar result in two analogous cases. See Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn.App. 1993) (holding putative father's denial of intercourse with mother during period of conception sufficient to preclude summary judgment despite 99.21% statistical probability of paternity); Nash v. Allen, 392 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn.App. 1986) (holding putative father's denial of intercourse with mother during period of conception sufficient to preclude summary judgment despite 98.864% statistical probability of paternity); see also People ex rel. M.C., 844 P.2d 1313 (Colo.App. 1992) (reversing the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the jury believed the putative father's denial of sexual intercourse during the period of conception and found that he successfully rebutted, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of paternity attached by (a) the child's birth within 300 days after the marriage was terminated and (b) an unchallenged blood test establishing a 99.9% probability of paternity). In Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Alaska 1993), the superio

To satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard on summary judgment, a party must provide evidence that a reasonable jury might find clear and convincing. Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).

Id. at 837. But because the application of collateral estoppel here is in the context of summary judgment, we consider the facts as alleged by the nonmoving party and review de novo whether the district court erred as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn.App. 1993). Res judicata is a finality doctrine that mandates that there be an end to litigation.

While we recognize that MHRA claims are tried to the court without a jury, that does not weaken the principle that credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are functions properly assigned to the finder of fact after trial. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in her favor. Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).

While the alleged father has the burden of meeting the clear and convincing standard at trial, he need not meet that standard on summary judgment. Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn.App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).