Opinion
2023-CA-0988-MR 2023-CA-0403-MR
08-16-2024
PAIGE WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE AND PAIGE WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: William G. Deatherage, Jr. Hopkinsville, Kentucky. ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: Christian Woodall Hopkinsville, Kentucky. BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky. ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE: Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky.
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CR-00528
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: William G. Deatherage, Jr. Hopkinsville, Kentucky.
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: Christian Woodall Hopkinsville, Kentucky.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky.
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE: Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky.
BEFORE: COMBS, L. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
OPINION
TAYLOR, JUDGE.
Paige Williams brings Appeal Nos. 2023-CA-0403-MR and 2023-CA-0988-MR from a June 6, 2023, Trial Order and Judgment of the Christian Circuit Court following a jury verdict finding her guilty of eight counts of criminal abuse in the third degree, victim twelve years of age or less. Williams was fined a total of $500. We reverse.
In 2019, Paige Williams was indicted by a Christian County Grand Jury upon eight counts of first-degree criminal abuse, victim twelve years of age or less. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.100. The charges stemmed from the abuse of eight children in late 2018 and early 2019, who were being cared for at a daycare operated by First United Methodist Church (FUMC) in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Williams was the pastor at FUMC and was depicted at the top of the daycare's organizational chart, directly above the daycare's director. An employee of the daycare, Allison Simpson, was the lead teacher in the nursery room for children under one year of age. Several daycare employees reported incidents of abuse of the children to Williams that were perpetrated by Simpson. Despite reports and incidents of abuse being captured on the daycare's video recording system, Williams did not initially act on the reports of abuse. Eventually, a daycare employee reported Simpson's abuse to a parent, and the parent reported the abuse to the police. After obtaining a search warrant, police seized the hard drive of the daycare's video recording system. The video revealed eight incidents of children being abused by Simpson.
First United Methodist Church (FUMC) maintained a large staff. Besides Paige Williams as head pastor, FUMC employed two associate pastors, an administrative staff, a daycare director, daycare staff, a preschool director, and preschool teachers. Additionally, FUMC had a daycare committee that oversaw the daily operation of the daycare program at FUMC. Williams attended some committee meetings but did not chair the committee. No other member of the committee was indicted.
As noted, Williams was subsequently indicted upon eight counts of criminal abuse in the first degree, victim twelve years of age or less. KRS 508.100. Following a jury trial, Williams was found guilty of the lesser included offense of criminal abuse in the third degree, victim twelve years of age or less. Williams was fined a total of $500. KRS 508.120. This appeal follows.
Williams contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal upon the offenses of criminal abuse. More particularly, Williams asserts she did not have actual custody of the infants under KRS 508.120 as she was not involved in caretaking for the children, did not work within the confines of the daycare with the children, had never observed any abusive conduct, and was not a supervisor of the employee who abused the children. As she never had actual custody of the children, Williams contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element of criminal abuse.
Williams filed motions for directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence.
Criminal abuse in the first degree (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.100), criminal abuse in the second degree (KRS 508.110), and criminal abuse in the third degree (KRS 508.120) each requires that the defendant have "actual custody" of the victim.
The standard of review upon the denial of a motion for directed verdict was articulated by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991):
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.Id. at 187; Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01. Upon appellate review, the test is whether if "under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal." Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; see also Eversole v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 217-18 (Ky. 2020). And, as an appellate court, we must be mindful that weight and credibility of evidence are matters within the sole province of the jury. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Ky. App. 2003). To the extent that statutory interpretation becomes necessary, then a question of law arises, and our review is de novo. Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, 37 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ky. 2000). For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that Williams was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal upon the offense of third-degree criminal abuse pursuant to KRS 508.120 as the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Williams did not have actual custody of the children in the daycare.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 50.01 is applicable to this proceeding pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 13.04. See also Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. 2005). Williams also filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to RCr 10.24, which was denied.
When interpreting a statute, it is well established that we attempt "to discern the General Assembly's intent, and we derive that intent, if at all possible, from the language the General Assembly chose[.]" Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Hale v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Ky. 2013)). And, when interpreting a statute, the intent of the legislature is paramount and controls. Moreover, words are afforded their ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent is apparent. Old Lewis Hunter Distillery Co. v. Ky. Tax Comm n, 193 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Ky. 1945).
KRS 508.120 sets forth the elements of criminal abuse in the third degree and provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the third degree when he recklessly abuses another person or permits another person of whom he has actual custody to be abused and thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause him serious physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or cruel punishment;
to a person twelve (12) years of age or less, or who is physically helpless or mentally helpless.KRS 508.120(1) (emphasis added).
From the plain language of KRS 508.120, the defendant must have actual custody of the abused child. The term "actual custody" as utilized in the criminal abuse statutes (KRS 508.100 - 508.120) is not statutorily defined but was analyzed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Davis v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 574, 581 (Ky. 1998) and in Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Ky. 2014).
In Davis, the child's mother and Davis, her boyfriend, resided together with the child. Davis, 967 S.W.2d at 576. The child was repeatedly abused, over a period of time, while left in Davis's care. The child eventually died from injuries sustained from the abuse. In discussing the definition of "actual custody," the Supreme Court observed:
"Actual custody" is not defined in the statute or in our common law. However, we do not believe the legislature intended to confine the criminal liability imposed by KRS 508.100 only to those having legal custody or guardianship of a child. While the legislature presumably did not intend to extend criminal liability to every person having temporary care or charge of a child, we have no difficulty discerning an intent to include persons, such as Davis, who reside within the same household and stand in loco parentis to the child.Davis, 967 S.W.2d at 581. So, in Davis, the Supreme Court recognized that the legislature did not intend the term "actual custody" to include "every person having temporary care or charge of a child." Id. at 581.
In Staples, the Court was faced with determining whether Nickolas Staples, "who lived with [the child's mother] and [the child] and who regularly cared for [the child], was not the child's legal custodian and had not attained in loco parentis status" had a legal duty to intervene and prevent mother from seriously injuring or killing her child. Staples, 454 S.W.3d at 807. Both Staples and the mother were indicted upon charges of murder, either as a principal or as an accomplice, and of first-degree criminal abuse. Following a jury trial, both Staples and the mother were found guilty of the lesser included offenses of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree criminal abuse.
In discussing the term "actual custody" as used in KRS 508.120, the Staples Court observed:
[A]lthough the General Assembly has not defined "actual custody," an actual custodian could be understood to include anyone who has "in fact" (actual) the "care and control" (custody) of a child. By its "plain" meaning, "actual custody" could thus include even brief, casual instances of tending to a child, but as . . . noted in Davis, it seems unlikely that the General Assembly meant "to extend criminal liability [for failure to protect] to every person having temporary care or charge of a child.Staples, 454 S.W.3d at 818 (citation omitted). Thus, in Staples, the Court again recognized the term "actual custody" was not intended to include individuals having only temporary care or control of the child. Id. at 816.
Considering Davis, Staples, and the language of KRS 508.120, we believe actual custody must necessarily include the direct care or the direct control of a child by a defendant. Davis, 967 S.W.2d 574; Staples, 454 S.W.3d 803. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that Williams never exercised direct care or direct control over the children. Williams did not work within the confines of the daycare and was not involved in the caretaking aspect of the children on a daily basis. Therefore, as a matter of law, we are of the opinion that Williams did not have actual custody of the abused children within the meaning of KRS 508.120. See Davis, 967 S.W.2d at 581; Staples, 454 S.W.3d at 818-19. Accordingly, we reverse Williams' conviction upon the eight counts of criminal abuse in the third degree.
Williams' remaining contentions of error are moot.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Trial Order and Judgment entered June 6, 2023, by the Christian Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.