Opinion
No. 2203 C.D. 2011 No. 2204 C.D. 2011
10-01-2012
Douglas Williams, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
Douglas Williams (Licensee) appeals two orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that upheld a two-year suspension of his driver's license by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT). The two one-year suspensions, to be served consecutively, were based upon his two convictions for driving under the influence (DUI). Licensee argues that because his two DUI convictions, entered on the same day, were both treated as first offenses and penalized with concurrent five-day sentences, his license suspensions should also run concurrently. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm.
By order dated March 14, 2012, this Court consolidated Licensee's appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. On October 19, 2010, Licensee was convicted of two separate DUI offenses under Section 3802(c) of the Vehicle Code. The first conviction was based on Licensee's March 26, 2010, offense for driving with a blood alcohol level of .204%. The second conviction was for his December 21, 2009, offense of driving with a blood alcohol level of .317%. Because the convictions were entered on the same day, the trial court treated each conviction as a first offense and sentenced Licensee to five days imprisonment for each incident. The court also ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total period of incarceration of five to ten days, with credit for time served.
In relevant part, Section 3802(c) provides:
Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.75 Pa. C.S. §3802(c)
On December 13, 2010, PennDOT imposed a one-year suspension of Licensee's operating privilege, effective January 17, 2011, for Licensee's conviction for the March 26, 2010, offense. On December 14, 2010, PennDOT imposed a one-year suspension of Licensee's operating privilege, effective January 17, 2012, for his conviction for the December 21, 2009, offense. Each suspension was imposed under authority of Section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code.
In relevant part, Section 3804(e) provides that:
Suspension of operating privileges upon conviction.--
(1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual's conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for:
(i) an offense under section 3802 ...
(2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with the following:
75 Pa. C.S. §3804(e).(i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter.
Licensee appealed the license suspensions, arguing that PennDOT's license suspensions should have run concurrently, as did his criminal sentences. The trial court denied Licensee's appeals. Licensee now appeals to this Court.
Our review is limited to determining whether the factual findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Drive Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 443-44, 737 A.2d 1203, 1205 (1999).
On appeal, Licensee raises one issue for our review, which is the same issue raised to the trial court: his license suspensions should run concurrently, not consecutively, because each conviction was a first offense. In support, he offers three arguments. First, Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code does not mandate concurrent or consecutive sentences for DUI violations but left that matter to the discretion of the trial court. Second, PennDOT does not have sentencing authority and, as such, must follow the sentence structure imposed by the trial court. Third, PennDOT's suspensions violated collateral estoppel, law of the case and the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
We begin with a review of Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code, which provides the penalties for DUI convictions. In relevant part, it provides:
(c) Incapacity; highest blood alcohol; controlled substances.--An individual ... who violates section 3802(c) ... shall be sentenced as follows:
(1) For a first offense, to:
(i) undergo imprisonment of not less than 72 consecutive hours;
(ii) pay a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000;
(iii) attend an alcohol highway safety school approved by the department; and
(iv) comply with all drug and alcohol treatment requirements imposed under sections 3814 and 3815.
***
(e) Suspension of operating privileges upon conviction.--
(1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual's conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for:
(i) an offense under section 3802...
(2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with the following:
75 Pa. C.S. §3804. Section 3804 separates the criminal penalties for DUI offenses from the civil penalty of license suspension, which is a collateral civil consequence of a criminal conviction. Thorek v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 938 A.2d 505, 509 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (listing numerous cases in which Courts of this Commonwealth have recognized this principle).(i) ... 12 months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter.
Contrary to Licensee's assertions, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case as well as the coordinate jurisdiction rule are not implicated. --------
In Stair v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 911 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), we explained that license suspensions
are mandatory civil penalties, imposed not for penal purposes, but to protect the public by providing an effective means of denying an intoxicated motorist the privilege of using our roads.Stair, 911 A.2d at 1018 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). We held in Stair that neither a district attorney nor a trial court can make PennDOT's suspension an element of a plea agreement. Accordingly, we held in Stair that a plea agreement categorizing a DUI as a first offense, when it was, in fact, not, was not binding on PennDOT.
Further, with respect to the suspension of operating privileges, this Court has held "[e]ach conviction arising from a separate act merits punishment." Xenakis v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 702 A.2d 572, 575 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). We based this holding on Section 1544 of the Vehicle Code, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[w]hen any person's record shows an additional suspension of the operating privilege assessed during a period of suspension or revocation, the department shall extend the existing period of suspension or revocation for the appropriate period ....75 Pa. C.S. §1544(b). Stated otherwise, each suspension of a licensee's operating privileges must be served consecutively.
Licensee was convicted of two DUI offenses that took place on two different days. The trial court chose to order Licensee's criminal sentences to be served concurrently, but this did not bind PennDOT. Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code requires that each DUI conviction trigger a 12-month suspension. Under Section 1544 of the Vehicle Code and our precedent, each DUI conviction is subject to a 12-month suspension and must run consecutively. That is exactly what PennDOT did, and the trial court did not err in denying Licensee's appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of October, 2012, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated October 21, 2011, in the above captioned matter are hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge