Summary
holding that "the possibility that [the police officer] did not tell the Grand Jury about victim's potential possession of a razor blade and that officers at the scene did not identify Williams in a photo display falls short of the required showing of fraud, perjury, or bad faith"; "Unlike eyewitness testimony that someone else had committed the crime, the information here does not negate the possibility that plaintiff had in fact stabbed O'Hern"
Summary of this case from Zahrey v. City of New YorkOpinion
02 Civ. 3693 (CBM)
October 23, 2003
S. Jean Smith, New York, NY, for the plaintiff
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, John M. Lambros, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, for Defendants City of New York and Detective Vivian Potter
OPINION
Plaintiff William T. Williams, Jr. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against defendants Vivian Potter, former Detective for the City of New York; New York City ("City"), a municipality within the state of New York, and unidentified personnel of the New York City Police Department, alleging violations of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff charges false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated in the opinion below, defendants' motion is hereby GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On the morning of February 5, 2000, Michael O'Hern was stabbed four times at West 3rd Street and Sixth Avenue, New York, NY.
I. Police Reports Describing the Assault and the Assailant
Police reports about the incident state that there was a scuffle between O'Hern and another man during a narcotics transaction, during which the man demanded $20.00 from O'Hern and stabbed him. The perpetrator is described as a Black man, age 50, 5'11" and 150 pounds, with a salt and pepper beard and moustache. All of the reports conform to this account of the stabbing and the assailant, with two reports including the additional information that O'Hern spit a razor blade from his mouth towards his assailant according to witness Willmont Rush, and that the assailant had a Jamaican accent according to witness Monica Wickers.
II. The Assault Weapon
At the time of the stabbing, Officers Wright and Bernard Williams were in the West 3rd Street subway station when they heard commotion coming from West 3rd Street. Officer Williams subsequently stopped a Black man, age 50, 5, 10"-5' 11" and 150 pounds, unshaven, wearing a black parka jacket with a hood and dark clothing. Williams confiscated a closed knife from the man and then permitted him to proceed. Shortly thereafter, upon learning of the knife's possible connection to a crime, Williams gave the knife to another officer who arrived at the scene of the assault to investigate. Later, the blood on the knife was found to be connected to the blood found where O'Hern was stabbed.
III. Victim's Account of the Assault and his Identification of Plaintiff Williams as the Assailant
On February 6, Detective Vivian Potter and Detective Moller went to St. Vincent's Hospital to interview O'Hern. According to O'Hern's version of the assault and the events leading up to it, the night before the stabbing, he partied all night with DC, Tina, and a man he knew as "Dred" or "Black." The next morning, the group was attempting to purchase narcotics when "Dred" accused O'Hern of taking $20 from him and stabbed him. O'Hern described "Dred" as a Black man, in his 50's, 5'11", with a full beard and salt and pepper dreadlocks, wearing a dark coat. The officers showed O'Hern some photographs in attempt to identify Dred, but O'Hern did not make a positive identification at this time.
After O'Hern was released from the hospital, he went to the 6th precinct police station and looked at the police's PIMS computer database with Detective Potter. Detective Pottet describes the PIMS database as a photo-imaging system that allows the police to input various descriptive characteristics of an individual and the system generates photographs of individuals matching the description given. Based on O'Hern's description, the database produced photographs from which O'Hern identified plaintiff Williams as his attacker. O'Hern swears that "(t)here were hundreds of pictures to choose from. I had no trouble identifying William T. Williams." O'Hern further swears that the police did not attempt to influence his identification.
On February 18th, plaintiff Williams was arrested by two undercover officers for possessing a crack pipe. At the police station, Detective Potter showed Williams a picture of O'Hern. Williams said that he'd seen the man in the picture around and identified him as "Lefty", claiming that he wasn't aware of Lefty's proper name. He also stated that he was with Mr. O'Hern immediately before the stabbing because he was trying to buy crack for Mr. O'Hern.
Thereafter, Detective Potter arranged a line-up including plaintiff Williams. O'Hern viewed the line-up and identified Williams as his attacker. O'Hern swears that "no one, in any way, suggested to me that I identify any (sic) particular person. All of the people in the line-up looked somewhat similar but I could easily identify William T. Williams because he stabbed me. I could not forget him." Detective Potter testified that based on her impression of O'Hern identification, O'Hern was "positive", "lucid", and "sure." She states: "If there had been any doubt in my mind, then I may have gone for additional witnesses."
In his deposition, plaintiff Williams states that to his knowledge, O'Hern does not have anything against him.
IV. The Prosecution of Plaintiff Williams
On February 19th, Williams was arrested and charged with attempted murder in the 2nd degree, assault in the 1st degree, robbery in the 1st degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance. O'Hern testified before the Grand Jury that Williams was his assailant. The Grand Jury indicted Williams for attempted murder, assault, and attempted robbery. On June 7, 2000, New York Supreme Court Justice James Yates denied Williams' motion to dismiss the charges, stating that "having examined the Grand Jury minutes, the evidence adduced before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the charges."
On September 21, 2000, a DNA test of the blood on the knife revealed that the blood belonged to Mr. O'Hern and an unidentified individual, but not plaintiff Williams. On November 13, 2001, on the court's own motion, Justice Yates dismissed the indictment against plaintiff Williams.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith" if it is shown that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is-entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 n. 4 (1986). "[G]enuineness runs to whether disputed factual issues can reasonably be resolved in favor of either party, [while] materiality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law." Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In order to prove that a genuine issue of material fact exists, a plaintiff "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading[s]," but must by affidavit or otherwise "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment." Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).
Courts must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). If the initial burden is met, the non-moving party "must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine issue of fact exists. If the evidence [presented by the non-moving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Scotto Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
ANALYSIS
I. False Arrest
A § 1983 claim for false arrest derives from the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, including the right to be free from arrest absent probable cause. Wevant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). A false arrest claim under § 1983 "is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law."Wevant, 101 F.3d at 852 (citations omitted). Under New York law, "a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification." Id. at 852. Probable cause constitutes justification, and is therefore a complete defense to an action for false arrest. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Wevant, 101 F.3d at 852 ("The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983") (internal citations omitted) (citations omitted). The issue of whether an arresting officer had probable cause to arrest can be determined as a matter of law if "the pertinent events and knowledge of the officers" are not in dispute. Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a lack of probable cause for the arrest. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-46, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979).
Whether or not there was probable cause to arrest depends on the information available at the time of the arrest, Peterson v. County of Nassau, 995 F. Supp. 305, 313 (E.D.N.Yrt998), judged against the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 101 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). There is probable cause to arrest "when the arresting officer has `knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.'" O'Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991). The amount of evidence "need not reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction . . . but it must constitute more than rumor, suspicion, or even a strong reason to suspect." United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
Applying these standards to the case at bar, there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff Williams for O'Hern's assault. The victim identified Williams first in a photograph display, then again in a line-up. O'Hern was unequivocal in his identification and Detective Potter had no reason to question O'Hern's statement. Williams admitted that he was with O'Hern immediately before the assault and that O'Hern had nothing against him. Given these facts, an officer of reasonable caution would have believed that Williams was O'Hern's assailant.
Plaintiff disputes that the PIMS identification ever took place on the grounds that a photo from the PIMS result cannot be found in Potter's case file and according to the six birth dates he gave upon arrest, the PEMS database would not have produced his photograph. By contrast, O'Hern swears in an affidavit that he identified Williams from photos generated by the PIMS database. Detective Potter, in her deposition, states that the fact that the date she put in for Williams' actual age may not have been correct is not dispositive. " . . . I'm not sure the photo listed his correct age. Sometimes there are different photos of the same perpetrator in the PIMS machine. If it isn't in their arrest history and tied into their age or date of birth, things can come up differently." Because plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations or speculation to create a factual dispute about the photo identification and plaintiff has not produced specific facts indicating that a genuine issue of fact exists, plaintiffs claim that the photo identification did not take place is merely colorable and does not defeat summary judgment.See Scotto Almenas; 143 F.3d at 114.
Plaintiff argues that probable cause is defeated by the fact that Detective Potter did not further investigate information plaintiff alleges cast doubt on his guilt, such as the eyewitness description of the assailant as having a Jamaican accent (whereas Williams allegedly does not), the possibility that O'Hern may have had a razor in his mouth, and the fact that O'Hern stated "I recognize him from when I was stabbed," but had previously stated that he "knew" the assailant from having partied with him the night before the assault.
While "the police may not purposely withhold or ignore exculpatory evidence that, if taken into account, would void probable cause," probable cause attaches to a warrantless arrest even if police could have undertaken further investigation. Richards v. City of New York, 2003 WL 21036365, *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2003) See also Gisondi v. Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 285, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234, 237 (1988) ("The police are not obligated to pursue every lead that may yield evidence beneficial to the accused, even though they had knowledge of the lead and the capacity to investigate it," but they may not withhold evidence where "discrepancies are so substantive that failure to disclose them would be comparable to fraud or perjury"); Krause v. Bennett 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It would be unreasonable and impractical to require that every innocent explanation for activity that suggests criminal behavior to be proved wrong, or even contradicted, before an arrest warrant could be issued with impunity"); Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest"). Applying these standards, Detective Potter was not obligated to address every possible discrepancy or alternative prior to arresting Williams. None of the "discrepancies" plaintiff points to are so glaring that failure to pursue them constitutes unreasonable police conduct. In fact, even if further investigation had yielded results in plaintiffs favor, the evidence would not have voided probable.
Plaintiff also challenges probable cause on the grounds that O'Hern's credibility was too weak to warrant a reasonable police officer in relying on his identification of Williams. However, the law dos not require police officers to engage in extensive fact-finding regarding the victim's credibility.
"To . . . insist upon a collateral investigation into the credibility of the complainants would place an unfair burden on law enforcement officers. It would be unreasonable and impractical to require that each complainant be assessed prior to police action regarding the subject of the complaint. Under our system of justice, `(i)t is up to the factfinder to determine whether a defendant's story holds water, not the arresting officer.'"McDermott v. City of New York, 1995 WL 347041, *4 (May 30, 1995, E.D.N.Y.) citing Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d at 371. The fact that the victim and the arrestee present conflicting accounts does not negate probable cause. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In the Second Circuit, "(a)n arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint . . . charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim's veracity." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 199 (2d Cir. 1995);Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp.2d 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998);Miloslavskey v. A.E.S. Eng'g Soc'y, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 2003). "The most common situation in which (doubts as to veracity) arise is when there exists a prior relationship between the victim and the accused that gives rise to a motive for a false accusation."Mistretta, 5 F. Supp.2d at 133. These cases do not require that the victim's statement be wholly ignored, but "that the police have additional information to buttress the victim's statement." McBride v. City of New Haven, 2000 WL 559087, *11 (D.Conn. March 30, 2000),citing Singer, 63 F.3d at 119.
Here, defendants did not have reason to question O'Hern's credibility based on his possible prior relationship with Williams because Williams admitted that O'Hern bore no animosity towards him. Even if O'Hern's veracity could be questioned on this basis, probable cause was not lacking because the defendants "did more" than rely on O'Hern's identification. Williams' own statement that he was with O'Hern immediately before the stabbing and he knew O'Hern verified O'Hern's veracity, in addition to O'Hern's repeated unequivocal identification of Williams as the man who stabbed him.
Because probable cause attached to plaintiff Williams' arrest, as a matter of law, Williams' false arrest claim cannot stand.Wevant, 101 F.3d at 852.
II. Malicious Prosecution
To sustain a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate conduct by the defendant that is tortious under state law and results in a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of liberty. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d at 116. To make out a claim for malicious prosecution under New York State law, a plaintiff must prove "1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; 2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor; 3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant's actions." Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2nd Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). As with a false arrest claim, the existence of probable cause entitles the defendants to summary judgment. See Brouehton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456-57, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92-93 (1975),cert denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277 (1975).
The plaintiff satisfies the first prong; clearly a prosecution was initiated against him. See Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp.2d 232, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (in the case of a warrantless arrest, the prosecution commences at the time of the arraignment or grand jury indictment). Plaintiff also satisfies the second prong; because the judge dismissed the charges against him stemming from O'Hern's assault, the prosecution clearly terminated in his favor.
It is the third prong — whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute-where plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim falters. "In the absence of some indication that the authorities became aware of exculpatory evidence between the time of the arrest and the subsequent prosecution that would undermine the probable cause which supported the arrest, no claim for malicious prosecution may lie." McDermott v. City of New York, 1995 WL 347041, *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 1995,);Feinburg v. Saks Co., 451 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1982). See also Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1996). Because there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and plaintiff has not introduced evidence to suggest that the defendants had different information available to them between the time of Williams' arrest and his grand jury indictment, defendants had probable cause to prosecute plaintiff Williams.
Moreover, probable cause to prosecute Williams is assumed because a Grand Jury indicted him. Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (1983), rearg denied, 61 N.Y.2d 670, 472 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1983). Plaintiff may rebut the presumption by evidence establishing that the indictment was produced by fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith. Id. at 83; Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d at 104;Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d at 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 93. Alternatively, the presumption "`can be overcome by a showing by claimant that the conduct of the police deviated so egregiously from acceptable police activity as to demonstrate an intentional or reckless disregard for proper procedures.'" Richards, 2003 WL 21036365 at *14, citing Harris v. State, 756 N.Y.S.2d 302, 303 (February 13, 2003).
Here, plaintiff argues that the presumption is overcome by the possibility that Detective Potter failed to tell the Judge or Grand Jury about allegedly exculpatory information. As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs claim can only be directed towards Detective Potter because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for activities that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 (1976), including the choices they make regarding evidence presented to the Grand Jury,Maglione v. Briggs, 748 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam). At the same time, Detective Potter is not liable for malicious prosecution on this basis unless there is evidence that she misled the prosecuting attorney. Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). Once a criminal defendant has been formally charged, the chain of causation between the officer's conduct and the claim of malicious prosecution is broken by the intervening actions of the prosecutor, thereby abolishing the officer's responsibility for the prosecution. Id. Plaintiff Williams has not provided any evidence showing that Detective Potter misled the prosecutor, so he cannot argue that her failure to present information to the Grand Jury defeats probable cause to prosecute.
Further, the possibility that Potter did not tell the Grand Jury about victim's potential possession of a razor blade and that officers at the scene did not identify Williams in a photo display falls short of the required showing of fraud, perjury, or bad faith to overcome the presumption of probable cause. `The People maintain broad discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence favorable to the defendant or present all of their evidence tending to exculpate the accused." People v. Mitchell 82 N.Y.2d 509, 515, 605 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (1993). In Gisondi v. Harrison, supra, the police arrested a man who matched certain characteristics given by the victim, but also deviated considerably from other identifying information provided by the victim and had a strong alibi. The arrestee, as a civil plaintiff, alleged that the police officer's failure to investigate his alibi and disclose these discrepancies constituted fraud, perjury, or bad faith sufficient to defeat probable cause.Gisondi disagreed.
Plaintiff does not present any evidence that Williams' photo was included in the photos the officers examined. In order for the fact that the officers did not identify Williams to be relevant, Plaintiff would first need to show that they looked at his picture and affirmatively declined to identify him as the man they stopped and confiscated the knife from following the assault.
"There may be extraordinary cases in which particular discrepancies are so substantive that failure to disclose them would be comparable to fraud or perjury. For instance, if the police knew that a person identified as a rapist by the victim was in fact in custody in the police station at the time of the rape, they could not withhold that evidence from the court with impunity . . . But there are no such discrepancies in this case. On the contrary, the discrepancies which the police `failed' to disclose here are not at all unusual, nor was it unusual or improper for them to do so. If the failure to disclose this type of discrepancy were held to constitute withholding of evidence, virtually every failed prosecution in which the police applied for an arrest warrant or testified at a felony hearing without noting every discrepancy revealed during the investigation, would give rise to suit and trial for false arrest and imprisonment or malicious prosecution."Gisondi v. Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d at 285, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234 (internal citations omitted) (citations omitted). By contrast, inRichards v. City of New York, supra, an investigator's notes from the day of the murder and investigation included conflicting eyewitness accounts about the identity of the murderer and a statement by the leading eyewitness that someone else committed the crime. The plaintiff presented evidence that the notebook was not provided to the District Attorney and other investigators, thereby defeating the presumption that defendants had probable cause to prosecute. Although the information in the notebook about conflicting eyewitness accounts would not have voided probable cause, the leading witness' statement that someone else committed the crime could have affected the Grand Jury's decision. Richards v. City of New York, 2003 WL 21036365, *17.
This case is more like Gisondi than Richards, As inGisondi, even if Potter did not inform the Grand Jury of the allegedly exculpatory information, this information was not so substantive such that failure to disclose it was comparable to fraud or perjury. The information plaintiff identifies as central to his criminal innocence does not go to the heart of probable cause in the same fashion as the information in Richards, Unlike eyewitness testimony that someone else had committed the crime, the information here does not negate the possibility that plaintiff had in fact stabbed O'Hern.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot defeat the presumption of probable cause that attaches to the Grand Jury indictment simply by claiming that the information in question "was not likely to have been presented to the Grand Jury or Justice Yates." Plaintiff is not permitted to establish bad faith, fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence by mere conjecture or surmise; rather, he must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to make such a finding. See Savino v. New York, 331 F.3d 63, 73 (2nd Cir. 2003). In fact, the law presumes that Detective Potter communicated the information in question: "(W)here law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, . . . the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 3319; Savino, 331 F.3d at 74. Even if plaintiff could show that Detective Potter did not pass on information to the prosecuting attorney, plaintiff cannot show that Potter's failure to do so was intentional. Id. ("In any event, even if other officers were aware that Sergeant Brooks had observed Savino continuously while he was alone in the room and that she did not see him take the ring, Savino has presented no evidence that this information was intentionally withheld from ADA Sullivan").
Finally, plaintiff cannot make out the fourth prong of a malicious prosecution claim because plaintiff cannot show that malice motivated Detective Potter's actions. Malice is "a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served."Lowth, 82 F.3d at 573. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence suggesting that if Detective Potter failed to disclose information to the prosecuting attorney or the Grand Jury, her motives were malicious.
Plaintiff cannot establish two of the four prongs necessary to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause created by the Grand Jury indictment and the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim. Savino, 331 F.3d at 75. Also, plaintiff fails to show that Detective Potter acted with malice. As such, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution as a matter of law.
III. Qualified Immunity
The threshold question in conducting a qualified immunity analysis is whether "(t)aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). "The right not to be arrested or prosecuted without probable cause has, of course, long been a clearly established constitutional right." Golino v. City of New Haven. 950 F.2d at 870.
"In an unlawful arrest action, an officer is immune if he has `arguable probable cause,' and is subject to suit only if his `judgment was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice.'"Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 169 (2d Cir. 2001),citine Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1997);Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1995); Rogers v. City of Amsterdam, 303 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2002), citing Golino, 905 F.2d at 870. "Arguable probable cause" is all that is required because "(t)he concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
Although defendant Detective Potter is entitled to summary judgment on the basis that probable cause attached to plaintiffs arrest and prosecution, alternatively, Potter is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In the face of repeated victim identifications of Williams as the assailant, coupled with Williams' admission that he was present at the scene of the stabbing and that the victim bore no animosity towards him, it was objectively reasonable for Potter to believe there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute plaintiff. The fact that DNA testing subsequently revealed another individual's blood on the assault weapon is immaterial: "[F]or the purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, we consider only those facts that were actually available to the police officers, or could reasonably have been perceived by them, at the moment they engaged in the challenged conduct." Lowth, 82 F.3d at 567.
IV. Municipal Liability
To make out a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-83, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). "Though this does not mean that plaintiff must show that the municipality had an explicitly stated rule or regulation, a single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy." Ricciuti, 941 F.2d at 123 (citations omitted). A § 1983 claim will not stand on the basis of vague and conclusory assertions. Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2dCir. 1987).
"In this Circuit, personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation omitted). Allegations that supervisory officials were deliberately and grossly negligent in training their subordinates in the police department and district attorney's office satisfy the "personal involvement" prerequisite to an award of damages against them under § 1983. Sealey v. Giltner 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1997). However, "a claim of inadequate training and supervision under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory body without a finding of a constitutional violation by the persons supervised." Ricciuti, 941 F.2d at 132, citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573 (1986).
Because the individual defendants in this case did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights, plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of municipal liability. Even absent such a finding, plaintiff would not be entitled to relief on this basis. Plaintiff does not offer any evidence suggesting a specific failure in defendants' training; rather, plaintiff relies on vague and conclusory allegations about the failure of the New York Police Department to train its officers about probable cause. These allegations fall far short of what is required to subject defendants to municipal liability. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the municipal liability claims.
CONCLUSION
Because defendants had probable cause to arrest and prosecute plaintiff Williams, plaintiff cannot make out a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution. At the very least, defendants had arguable probable cause for their actions, entitling them to qualified immunity from plaintiffs claims. In turn, plaintiffs claim for municipal liability fails as a matter of law. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is HEREBY GRANTED.
SO ORDERED