Summary
denying stipulated extension of Rule 16 deadlines because diligence to complete discovery had not been demonstrated
Summary of this case from Ortega v. ClintonOpinion
No. CV-09-1511-PHX-LOA.
July 15, 2010
ORDER
This matter arises on the parties' Stipulation to Extend Discovery Deadlines which the Court deems to be a joint motion to extend the Rule 16 discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. (Doc. 26) The motion indicates the basis for the request is that "counsel for City Defendants is in a six-week trial that started June 22, 2010, and may continue into August." ( Id. at 1) Because diligence to complete discovery has not been demonstrated to modify the firm Rule 16 deadlines, the parties' motion will be denied.
I. Background
The docket reflects this action was removed on July 22, 2009 from the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County. (Doc. 1) The April 24, 2009 Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state-law claims arising out of a traffic stop made by City of Mesa police officers on April 26, 2008. (Doc. 1-4 at 5-13) On August 18, 2009, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted as to the City of Mesa Police Department and denied as to the City of Mesa. (Doc. 8)
At the September 21, 2009 scheduling conference, the Court stressed to counsel that the "deadlines in the scheduling order were real, firm, and, consistent with the undersigned's responsibilities mandated by Congress in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq., will not be altered except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the assigned trial judge." (Doc. 17 at 2) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The scheduling order makes clear that the Rule 16 deadlines are "to be taken seriously," citing Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). ( Id.) Further, counsel were informed that "[t]he Court intends to enforce the deadlines in this Order. Counsel should plan their litigation activities accordingly." ( Id.) With this in mind and the active involvement of counsel, the Court fashioned mutually agreed-upon deadlines for the fair and reasonably expeditious resolution of this case. The scheduling order mandates supplementation of all discovery pursuant to Rule 26(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., by Friday, June 25, 2010, completion of all discovery by Friday, August 27, 2010, and dispositive motion(s) filings by Thursday, September 30, 2010. ( Id. at 4)
II. Good Cause and Rule 16
III. Discussion
16Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 607-08 Id.16Federal Practice and Procedure Id. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608 Townsel v. County of Contra Costa,820 F.2d 319320th
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the parties' motion to extend the Rule 16 discovery and dispositive motion deadlines, doc. 26, is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defense counsel shall "use proper capitalization," i.e., use proper upper and lower case type to denote the correct spelling of the party names, in all future captions as mandated by LRCiv 7.1(a)(3). Future violations of the Local Rules may result in the striking of the non-conforming motion, brief or other document.
The parties' Stipulation refers to the undersigned as "Magistrate." Congress changed the formal title of United States Magistrate to United States Magistrate Judge in the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, effective December 1, 1990. Section 321 of Pub.L. No. 101-650; § 102, as set out as a note under 28 U.S.C. § 631; Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The title was changed from `magistrate' to `magistrate judge.'"); United States v. Steelwright, 179 F.Supp. 2d 567, 569 n. 3 (D. Md. 2002). A United States magistrate judge is a "federal judge." See, e.g., Rule 1(b)(3), Fed.R.Crim.P. Thus, a magistrate judge may be appropriately called magistrate judge or judge, but not magistrate.