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Williams v. City of Holyoke

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Sep 18, 2013
12-P-429 (Mass. Sep. 18, 2013)

Opinion

12-P-429

09-18-2013

JACQUELYNN M. WILLIAMS v. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others. [FN1]


NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, Jacquelynn M. Williams, appeals from the dismissal of counts I, II, IV, and VI of her complaint, which alleges unlawful sexual harassment and a hostile work environment during her employment by the city of Holyoke (city).

Judgment entered below dismissing nine of the ten counts. (Count VIII was not dismissed.) A single justice of this court allowed the plaintiff's petition for interlocutory appeal, specifically referencing counts I, II, IV, and VI of the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of those four counts.

Background. The complaint alleges the following. The plaintiff was hired by the city on October 10, 2001, and in November, was transferred to the tax office to serve as assistant tax collector/deputy , under the supervision of defendant Robert Kane. Beginning in September, 2006, the plaintiff alleged that Kane 'began sending numerous unwanted e-mails to the plaintiff and coworkers of an inappropriate sexual nature.' After the plaintiff complained to three city officials, Kane essentially took away some of her responsibilities. The plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance with her union; when the grievance was denied on September 5, 2008, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) in October, 2008. She was terminated on December, 22, 2008. She filed a complaint in the Superior Court on December 15, 2010. After a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss all but one count of the plaintiff's complaint as untimely, [FN3] the plaintiff sought relief in this court from a single justice who referred the case to a panel. (See note 2, supra.)

Counts not relevant here were dismissed on bases other than untimeliness.

We examine the plaintiff's complaint de novo, pursuant to the 'clarified standard' adopted in Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). We assume that all factual allegations are true and consider whether they are sufficient to 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' and look for factual allegations 'plausibly suggesting' an entitlement to relief. Ibid., quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

A person alleging sex discrimination must file a complaint with the MCAD within 300 days of the discriminatory incident. However, the 300-day requirement shall not bar filing under the 'continuing violation doctrine' where the unlawful conduct complained of is continuing in nature. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 642 (2004). That doctrine was invoked by the plaintiff and is applicable in the present case.

We begin with the judge's assessment of the plaintiff's allegations, which describe at least eight instances of sexual harassment between September, 2006, and March 5, 2007. The judge noted that if these incidents were the basis for the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment, she was required to have filed her complaint with the MCAD by December 31, 2007. She did not file with the MCAD until October, 2008. The judge observed that the plaintiff's argument that there was an event on May 9, 2008, which was a discriminatory act occurring within the 300-day limitation period, would constitute an 'anchoring event,' allowing her to claim the benefit of the 'continuing violation doctrine,' unless she 'knew or reasonably should have known that her work situation was pervasively hostile and unlikely to improve, and, thus, a reasonable person in her position would have filed a complaint with the MCAD before the statute ran on that conduct.' Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 539 (2001) (Cuddyer).

We briefly examine the anchoring event. The plaintiff must show an incident 'which substantially relates to earlier incidents of abuse, and substantially contributes to the continuation of a hostile work environment, such that the incident anchors all related incidents.' Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 533 (2001). The judge accepted, as we do, the plaintiff's allegation that any claim stemming from the May 9, 2008, incident was timely and had a substantial relationship to the untimely incidents. The defendants do not argue otherwise.

In assessing the plaintiff's allegation that she was told by municipal officials in April, 2007, that they could do nothing about Kane's behavior without a formal complaint, the judge concluded that the plaintiff had notice 'that her work situation was pervasively hostile and unlikely to improve,' Cuddyer, supra, and ruled that the plaintiff's claims were time- barred because a complaint should have been filed with the MCAD by January, 2008.

We think the judge erred in ruling that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred because he improperly interpreted what the plaintiff was told by municipal officials as foreclosing any reasonable expectation the plaintiff might have had that her work situation could improve. Moreover, the judge overlooked a number of the plaintiff's subsequent allegations which fairly indicate that the plaintiff reasonably did not act as if her work situation was unlikely to improve. Although the plaintiff continued to be subjected to a number of discriminatory acts, summarized in the margin, she continued to work until her employment was terminated on December 22, 2008. In that period of time, she sought counseling in 2007, and filed a grievance with her local union on June 24, 2008, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Both events readily indicate that the plaintiff had not concluded that her work environment was 'unlikely to improve.' The judge's decision effectively would require a plaintiff to file with the MCAD before exhausting remedies under grievance procedures, and is contrary to 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(2) (2004). Compare Cuddyer, supra at 538 (unfair to prematurely force an employee to choose litigation as a remedy for allegations of harassment).

The plaintiff's allegation states: 'On or about April 2007, [the city solicitor, the mayor, and a councillor] became aware of the e-mails by Kane to plaintiff. Plaintiff was told . . . by these persons that they could do nothing without a formal complaint.' The defendants incorrectly state in their brief that the plaintiff was told that 'no action could be taken.'

The complaint further alleges the following facts. The plaintiff was relieved of her supervisory duties and not allowed to make decisions or sign off on permits in May, 2007. She remained in the same office, still reporting to Kane. In May, 2008, Kane asked that she apply for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act although she had unused sick leave and vacation time available, while others were not requested to do so. In August, 2008, Kane refused to allow the plaintiff to take a certification test to become a certified assistant tax collector, after attending three years of school at Kane's suggestion. On September 22, 2008, the plaintiff was reprimanded for her attendance, while another employee with a similar attendance record was not.

A complaint 'may be filed . . . at any time within 300 days after the alleged unlawful conduct; provided, however, that the 300 day requirement shall not be a bar to filing . . . when pursuant to an employment contract, an aggrieved person enters into grievance proceedings concerning the alleged discriminatory act(s) within 300 days of the conduct complained of and subsequently files a complaint within 300 days of the outcome of such proceeding(s).' 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(2) (2004).
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The grievance was denied on September 5, 2008, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the MCAD in October, 2008. A fair reading of the plaintiff's actions up to the denial of her grievance indicates that only then did she conclude that 'her work situation was pervasively hostile and unlikely to improve.' See Pelletier v. Somerset, 458 Mass. 504, 524 (2010). The plaintiff's allegations clearly rise beyond a speculative level and plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.

Conclusion. So much of the August 9, 2011, judgment as dismisses counts I, II, IV, and VI of the plaintiff's complaint is reversed, and an order shall enter denying the defendants' motion to dismiss those counts.

So ordered.

By the Court (Cypher, Brown & Cohen, JJ.), Clerk


Summaries of

Williams v. City of Holyoke

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Sep 18, 2013
12-P-429 (Mass. Sep. 18, 2013)
Case details for

Williams v. City of Holyoke

Case Details

Full title:JACQUELYNN M. WILLIAMS v. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others. [FN1]

Court:COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Date published: Sep 18, 2013

Citations

12-P-429 (Mass. Sep. 18, 2013)