Where a plaintiff's alleged harm “was not caused by any de facto policies independent of any officer's actions, ” a constitutional violation by an individual officer must be found before a municipality may be held liable under Monell . See, e.g., Harris v. City of Chicago, No. 14-cv-4391, 2016 WL 3261522, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1080-81 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Under certain circumstances, “a municipality can be held liable under Monell even when its agents are not, ” although this is only possible where such a finding would not create an “inconsistent verdict.”

The existence of probable cause would defeat Plaintiff's claims for false arrest, unlawful detention, and malicious prosecution. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016) (“To prevail on a false-arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his arrest”); Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that a claim for unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment requires a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause); Vaughn v. Chapman, 662 Fed. App'x 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution). Defendants also move to dismiss Count IV based on probable cause, but as discussed in section III.F, this count is dismissed on other grounds.

"In determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a widespread practice in a Monell claim, the Court looks to the instances of misconduct alleged, the circumstances surrounding the alleged constitutional injury, and additional facts probative of a widespread practice or custom." Williams v. City of Chicago , 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Hill's factual allegations, taken as true, nudge his Monell claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible."

To state a claim of unlawful detention, plaintiff must allege that (1) he was detained, (2) without probable cause, and (3) the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1070 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2020)

. To determine whether the City's liability is dependent on liability against its officers, the Court looks at “the nature of the constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set forth.” Id.; see also Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2018).

Id. (quoting Elder v. Dart, 2015 WL 509555, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2015)). However, this is not a blanket rule, and courts in this District to address the issue more recently have recognized that "a plaintiff raising a Monell claim may rely solely on his own experience, rather than being required to plead examples of other individuals' experiences," Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2018), as Monell claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard. See White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiff "was not required to identify every other or even one other individual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained through the complained-of process" (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993))); see also Williams v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 3169065, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ("Post-0‰te courts analyzing Monell claims similarly have 'scotched motions to dismiss' premised on arguments that the complaint does not contain allegations beyond those relating to the plaintiff." (quoting Stokes v. Ewing, 2017 WL 2224882, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2017), and collecting cases)).

The court of appeals explained that the plaintiff's allegation was enough to satisfy the "short and plain statement of the claim" requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) and that Plaintiff "was not required to identify every other or even one other individual" whose rights had been violated by the complained-of process. Id.; see also Williams v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 3169065, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2017) (explaining that "Post-White courts analyzing Monell claims ... have 'scotched motions to dismiss' premised on arguments that the complaint does not contain allegations beyond those relating to the plaintiff" and collecting cases); Hill v. Cook County, 463 F. Supp. 3d 820, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2020); Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Instead, "[i]n determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a widespread practice in a Monell claim, the Court looks to the instances of misconduct alleged, the circumstances surrounding the alleged constitutional injury, and additional facts probative of a widespread practice or custom."

As another district court in the Seventh Circuit recently said, because of "the inherently speculative task of analyzing causation in fabrication claims, a relatively broad standard for causation applies." Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2018). "If [the plaintiff] has pled that the fabricated evidence . . . furthered the prosecution, he has done enough."

Since the briefing of this motion, the Supreme Court in Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) held that claims of unlawful pretrial detention, including claims of pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence, are covered by the Fourth Amendment. 137 S. Ct. 920; see also Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1071 (2018). "To bring a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment per Manuel, courts have set forth the following elements: 'the defendant[s] (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.'"

To determine whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a widespread practice theory of liability, the Court must look to “the instances of misconduct alleged, the circumstances surrounding the alleged constitutional injury, and additional facts probative of a widespread practice or custom.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Although a plaintiff is not required to identify “every other or even one other individual” who suffered the same constitutional violation as a result of the complained-of practice, White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016),